Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

1991

The collapse of the German army in the East in the
summer of 1944 (Volume 1)
Stephen Ariel Veal
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Veal, Stephen Ariel, "The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944 (Volume 1)"
(1991). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4301.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.6183

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Stephen Ariel Veal for the Master
of Arts in History presented June 10, 1991 .

Title: The Collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer
of 1944.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITIEE:

Franklin C. West, Chairman

Lois Becker

7

Kenneth W. Butler
The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of
1944 is analzyed and determined to be the result of the following
specific factors:

German intelligence failures; German defensive

doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the
Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West;
Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and

2

tactics.

The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the

XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in
Rumania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The
significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is
compared to events occuring on the Anglo-American fronts and the
German losses on both theaters of military operations are
compared.

The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German

Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of
Soviet historiography and American historiography compared.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The summer of 1944 marked a significant turning point in the
war against Nazi Germany.

It was pushed back closer to its borders

on the Eastern and Western Fronts.

The Anglo-American forces had

landed in France and the Soviets had entered Poland. The Red Army
had overrun Rumania causing it to switch sides against Nazi
Germany by the end of August and Finland was seeking an armistice
with the Soviet Union.

These dramatic events of the summer of

1944 were significant to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
Anglo-American and Soviet operations during the summer of
1944 can be compared to examine the significance of contributions
on the Eastern and Western Fronts to the defeat of Nazi Germany in
a period of time when both allies were conducting extensive
operations.

A careful analysis of the contributions made by both

the Soviet and Anglo-American allies during the summer of 1944
produces a more balanced view of this period.

The Anglo-American

allies played the dominant role in the air war against Germany
while the Soviet Union was dominant in the ground war.

Neither

side can claim with any veracity to have been able to defeat Nazi
Germany alone. The massive defeats suffered on the Eastern and
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Western Fronts by the German Army in 1944 were based upon the
joint contributions made by the Soviet Union and the AngloAmerican allies combined with the mistakes made by Hitler and the
German High Command.

The factors analyzed in this study will

hopefully provide sufficient basis to assess the relative
contributions to the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and
Western allies.
This study will use quantitative data to determine the
significance of each factor in the collapse of the the German Army
in the East.

Actual military events will be analyzed day by day

summarizing the significant events on each army front using the
same techniques employed by U.S. military Sigint traffic analysis.
The operational and tactical level of military operations will be
presented to delineate how the German Army was defeated in the
field.

The purpose of this study is to present each significant

factor as a case study in the analysis of the collapse of the German
Army in the East in the summer of 1944. The day by day analysis of
operational and tactical military actions will delineate the
combination of decisions and actions which lead to military
disasters which could have possibly been avoided.

This study will

prove useful as a case study of a numerically inferior army on the
defense against the Red Army which would have been similiar to
the conditions which existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
armies prior to German unification.
This work is directed toward professionals familiar with
detailed military analysis such as military historians, military

3

professionals, military analysts and intelligence analysts.

This

work is not intended for the general reader because of the
extensive in depth detail employed to analyze the factors behind
the collapse of the German Army in the East during the summer of
1944. The actual day by day summaries of operations on the
Eastern Front are highly detailed and directed toward professionals
accustomed to the use of extensive in depth military detail.
German writers have presented narrative accounts of the
German defeats in the East during the summer of 1944.1

However,

this study is unique from other studies done in German with the
detailed major differences being the examination of the following
factors:

military intelligence, defensive doctrine, air superiority,

Lend-lease, mobile reserves and the impact of Soviet strategy and
tactics.

Furthermore, this study is unique by examining the day by

day details of the three major events on the Eastern front during
the summer of 1944:

(1) the collapse of Army Group Center; (2) the

destruction of the XIII Army Corps in Army Group North Ukraine; and
(3) the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine.
The failure of German military intelligence to determine the
main direction of the Soviet offensive during the summer of 1944
had disastrous results.

The Germans had limited mobile and

infantry reserves to meet the Soviet summer offensive.

It was,

therefore, imperative for the Germans to deploy their reserves in
the area where they would be available to meet the main Soviet
offensive thrust.

The placement of the scarce Panzer divisions to

act as mobile reserves to prevent encirclement of German infantry
was crucial to the survival of the Wehrmacht in the East.
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The following German Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions
were available on the Eastern Front to act as mobile reserves on
June 15, 1944:

1st Panzer Division, 3rd Panzer Division, 3rd SS

Panzer Division "Totenkopf," 4th Panzer Division, 5th Panzer
Division 7th Panzer Division, 8th Panzer Division, 10th Panzer
Grenadier Division, 12th Panzer Division, 13th Panzer Division,
14th Panzer Division, 16th Panzer Division, 17th Panzer Division,
18th Panzer Grenadier Division, 20th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer
Grenadier Division, 23rd Panzer Division, 24th Panzer Division,
25th Panzer Grenadier Division, 60th Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle, '! 11th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Nordland" and
Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland."
If the Germans could have deployed these reserves correctly

then they could have prevented the destruction of Army Group
Center which would have then prevented the draining of reserves
from Army Groups North, North Ukraine and South Ukraine which
then weakened their defensive capabilities against subsequent
Soviet offensives launched against them.

Army Group Center

constituted a dike against the onrushing torrent of the Red Army
and once it was breached the entire Eastern Front gave way and the
front was only stabilized once the Red Army entered Eastern
Europe.
Foreign Armies East made inaccurate predictions about the
main thrust of Soviet offensive operations for the summer of 1944.
Foreign Armies East continued to predict that the Soviet main
effort would be against Army Group North Ukraine.

Foreign Armies

5

East continued to hold this position despite increasing evidence
that offensive operations were imminent against Army Group
Center.

German intelligence failed to identify the movement of

Soviet tank armies opposite Army Group Center.

Soviet radio

silence and deception measures contributed to German confusion
which prevented accurate intelligence assessments.

Soviet air

superiority also prevented adequate German aerial reconnaissance
which deprived the Germans of a significant source of information.
Therefore, the failure of intelligence was to play a central role in
the collapse of the German Army in the East during the summer of

1944.
Hitler's defensive doctrine of "standing fast" completely
handicapped the German Army on the defense.

Hitler forbid the

German Army from using a flexible defense which would have
permitted the use of gradual withdrawal and counterattack to
absorb Soviet attacks.

Hitler instead insisted that each German

defensive line be held to the very end before permitting any
withdrawals.

This resulted in Soviet breakthroughs and ·

penetration of German flanks and subsequent Soviet encirclements
of German units.

Entire German Armies and Corps would then be

forced to fight for their survival in breaking out to the rear and in
the process loosing the bulk of their heavy weapons.

The German

Army as a result often was forced to destroy their own equipment
during breakouts from encirclements to prevent it from being
captured by the Red Army.
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Hitler's Wavebreak Doctrine dictated that the army must
make an "inflexible stand" and defensive lines in depth in the rear
were not to be employed since Hitler believed that soldiers would
not "standfast" if they could retreat to prepared defensive
positions in the rear.

Hitler established by decree numerous

fortresses on the Eastern Front which were to be defended like
medieval fortresses in earlier centuries.

However, this notion was

clearly anachronistic given the mobility and firepower of the Red
Army.

The tying down of German forces defending fortresses

merely deprived local commanders of flexibility in deploying
reserves to deal with Soviet attacks.
Hitler's failure to allow Field Marshal Busch, Commander of
Army Group Center, to execute an elastic defense based on
withdrawal behind the Dnieper and Berezina rivers resulted in the
destruction of Army Group Center.

The shortening of the front by

160 Kilometers by withdrawal to the Berezina river would have
created reserves and better defensive conditions to meet the
Soviet summer offensive.

However, Hitler absolutely forbid this

withdrawal and forced Army Group Center to conduct a defense on a
vastly overextended front which resulted in enormous material and
personnel losses.
The loss of air superiority by the Luftwaffe to the Soviet Air
Force was critical to the collapse of the German Army in the East.
The Luftwaffe from the beginning of the Russian campaign was
already overextended by fighting on several fronts.

This situation

only became worse as the summer of 1944 approached. The loss of

7

air power because of dispersion to several theaters prevented the
concentration of strength in the East to wage strategic warfare.
The failure to wage strategic warfare from the air against the
Soviet sources of armaments allowed the Soviet production of
tanks, aircraft and artillery to continue without interference.
Thus, the Luftwaffe was forced to destroy Soviet military
equipment in the field instead of in the factories.

The end result

was the Luftwaffe was increasingly forced into a defensive role on
the Eastern Front.

The Soviet Air Force attained numerical

superiority over the Luftwaffe by the end of 1943 and this had an
enormous impact on German ground forces which were mostly on
the defensive on the ground.

Previously, the Germans had enjoyed

air superiority or at least air equality but by 1944 the Luftwaffe
had fallen into a numerically inferior position compared to the
Soviet Air Force. The Soviets had more than a 7:1 advantage in
aircraft by the summer of 1944.

The Soviet advantage was due

mostly to the fact that 56% of the Luftwaffe was engaged in the
West against the Anglo-American allies.

Thus, German soldiers

were forced to defend themselves against attacks from the air and
on the ground.

The Soviet use of airpower in support of its army

proved effective with the Germans suffering heavy losses as a
result of continuous air attacks.
Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union played a key role in the
defeat of the German Army in the East during the summer of 1944.
The U.S.S.R. had received more than 6 million pairs of boots by the
summer of 1944 which put the Red Army in marching boots.

Lend-
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Lease food was of significant aid to the Red Army since it provided
one pound of concentrated ration per day for 6 million soldiers for
the length of the entire war.

Lend-Lease motor vehicles provided

perhaps the rriost significant aid to the Red Army by motorizing it.
The

intensiy~ motorization of the Red Army with approximately

/
500,000 tend-Lease trucks provided the Red Army with superior
mobility compared to the Wehrmacht.

Superior mobility enabled

the Red Army to outmaneuver the German Army and drive deep into
the rear areas causing encirclements and major disruptions which
resulted in a series of German defeats.
Lend-Lease truck shipments not only provided the Red Army
with the necessary mobility to outflank non-motorized German
formations but also allowed the Soviets to de-emphasize vehicle
production.

The Soviets were able to concentrate on tank and

aircraft production since the United States provided the bulk of the
Red Army's trucks, jeeps and motorcycles thru Lend-Lease aid.

The

concentration on tank production permitted huge numbers of tanks
to be produced which dwarfed German tank production.

Soviet

production of tanks and self-propelled guns amounted to 112,952
compared to the German production of 46,742 vehicles.

Thus, Lend-

Lease aid proved significant to the defeat of the German Army in
the East during the summer of 1944.
The second front played a crucial role in tying down German
mobile reserves thereby depriving the Wehrmacht of significant
mobile formations to meet the Soviet summer offensive in the East.
The Wehrmacht deployed 51% of its mobile formations and 42°/o of
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its non-mobile formations in the West.

Germany's two-front war

by the summer of 1944 was depriving the Wehrmacht of necessary
forces to concentrate in the East to meet the advances of the Red
Army.

The Eastern Front was deprived of sufficient mobile

reserves as a result of the Anglo-American second front.

This

created a situation where the Wehrmacht could not achieve a
stalemate on the Eastern Front because it had been weakened to
meet the Anglo-American second front.

The mobile reserves

constituted elite German formations which would have been highly
effective if used against Soviet breakthroughs on the Eastern Front
during the summer of 1944.

However, half of these reserves were

tied down in the West to meet the Anglo-American second front.
The German Army in the East had managed to maintain most
of its defensive positions on the Belorussian sector during the
winter of 1944. The German defensive success had been achieved
by the use of mobile reserves and the shifting of troops in the lines
along lateral roads and raiJways to prevent Soviet breakthroughs.
German commanders also managed to coordinate their artillery and
concentrate it against Soviet attacks.

Soviet attacks at a

superiority of 10: 1 were common and failed against German
defensive positions.

Soviet tactical errors on the Belorussian front

included failure to make diversionary attacks against extended
sectors of the front; attacks renewed at identical sectors of
previous attacks; and a failure to coordinate their artillery in the
breakthrough sectors.
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Soviet operational planning for the summer offensive of 1944
corrected the deficiencies noted in the winter offensives against
the Belorussian front during the winter of 1944.

Soviet planning

called for six separate breakthrough areas to dismember the
German defenses along the entire length of Army Group Center. The
breakthrough areas on each of the four Soviet fronts were
compressed so that the average total divisional frontage was 5.8
kilometers compared to 24 to 32 kilometers for the German
divisions.

However, the frontage on the breakthrough sectors was

compressed further to 1.5 kilometers per division to achieve not
just overwhelming numerical superiority over the Germans but
bring a level of mass to bear against German defensive positions
which would cause them to disintegrate under the weight of the
attack. The depth of the operation was extended for an advance of
550 to 600 kilometers and the total number of divisions was
increased to 166 divisions.

A total of 11 armies were deployed

against Army Group Center and two combined armies were assigned
to make each penetration.

The four fronts deployed to attack Army

Group Center were reinforced with approximately 30 additional
divisions prior to the start of the summer offfensive.

Soviet

numerical superiority was overwhelming with 166 divisions
attacking approximately 49 German divisions.

Soviet superiority

was definitive in every category.

The Soviets possessed the

following margins of superiority:

1.7:1 in troops; 1.8:1 in artillery

and mortars; 1.6:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.9:1 in operational
aircraft.

Thus, Soviet operational planning established a plan with
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the key elements necessary to dismember Army Group Center as the
first step in its offensive operations for the summer of 1944.
The collapse of Army Group Center was the most significant
event of the summer of 1944.

It marked the turning point on the

Eastern Front during the summer of 1944. Army Group Center was
the bulwark of the Eastern Front and once it was smashed the
entire Eastern Front collapsed.
following:

Army Group Center consisted of the

3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army and 9th Army.

The Soviet offensive on June 22, 1944 began first in the north
against the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army.

The 3rd Panzer Army's

sector was critically overextended in the LI 11 Army Corps sector
which constituted the Vitebsk enclave.

The Liii Army Corps was

completely encircled on June 24, 1944 within the Vitebsk sector
and it capitulated on June 27, 1944. The IX Army Corps of the 3rd
Panzer Army was battered and pushed back in the direction of Army
Group North. The VI Army Corps was pushed to the south in the
process of the Soviet encirclement of the Liii Army Corps.

On June

25, 1944, the VI Army Corps was removed from command of the 3rd
Panzer Army.
The 4th Army came under attack on June 22, 1944. The 4th
Army had the strongest forces deployed to defend its sector of the
front.

The 4th Army retreated slowly under Soviet attack and was

not completely encircled until July 1, 1944.
The 9th Army was attacked on June 23, 1944 which was one
day after the major assaults against 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th
Army.

However, the main weight of the Soviet attack did not hit
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the 9th Army until June 24, 1944.

The encirclement of the 9th

Army and Bobruisk was completed on the night of June 26-27,
1944.
Thus, Army Group Center disintegrated under a series of
Soviet encirclements which dismembered the Army Group and
resulted in the loss of Belorussia and the annihilation of 28 German
divisions in less than two weeks.

The resulting losses had to be

replaced primarily by weakening the other Army Groups on the
Eastern Front: Army Group North, Army Group North Ukraine and
Army Group South Ukraine. The weakening of these Army Groups
was followed by a Soviet offensive against each Army Group in turn
which brought about the collapse of the Eastern Front.
The Soviets launched the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive with the
1st Ukrainian Front against Army Group North Ukraine on July 13,
1944.

Soviet goals in this operation were to clear the Ukraine and

occupy southern Poland.

The Soviets had massed sufficient

numerical superiority to achieve their objectives.

The Germans

attempted to respond to the Soviet use of mass by tactical
flexibility in meeting the weight of the Soviet attack.

However,

the Soviet use of mass on narrow sectors was consistently
successful and the Soviets drove into the 4th Panzer Army and the
1st Panzer Army on the flanks of the XIII Army Corps.

The XIII

Army Corps began to disengage during the night of July 16-17,
1944 because of the deteriorating situation along its flanks.
However, the XIII Army Corps withdrawal movement was too slow
and the Corps was completely encircled on July 18, 1944. On July
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20, 1944, 85,000 men were compressed into a pocket west of
Brody.

The XI 11 Army Corps ceased to exist as an effective combat

formation on July 22, 1944 under the tightening ring of Soviet
There were only a few units of the XII I Army Corps

encirclement.

which managed to escape the Brody pocket. German losses
amounted to five divisions and approximately 25,000 to 30,000
soldiers.

The losses experienced by Army Group North Ukraine were

mostly replaced by transfers from Army Group South Ukraine which
weakened this Army Group further.
The final chapter in the collapse of the German Army in the
East during the summer of 1944 was the destruction of Army Group
South Ukraine.

The Soviet methods employed against Army Group

Center and Army Group North Ukraine were essentially the same
methods used against Army Group South Ukraine with equally
devastating effects on German defensive positions.

Army Group

South Ukraine had served as the reserve pool for the other Army
Groups throughout the summer by continuous transfers of divisions
to Army Group Center and Army Group North Ukraine to replace
their losses.

Consequently, Army Group South Ukraine was depleted

of reserves and substantially weakened prior to the Soviet
offensive against it on August 20, 1944.
German intelligence failed to provide concrete direction
about Soviet intentions toward Army Group South Ukraine.

First,

Foreign Armies East indicated that an offensive was unlikely as of
July 30, 1944.

Later, Soviet activity was recognized on the

Rumanian Front stretching from Tiraspol to the Carpathians.
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Nevertheless, Foreign Armies East despite significant increases in
Soviet activity maintained the view that a major offensive against
Army Group South Ukraine was unlikely as late as August 15, 1944.
However, local attacks were forcast with the intention to prevent
the further transfer of German divisions to the central front.

It

was not until August 19, 1944 which was the day preceeding the
main offensive that intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions
underwent a major revision, but too late to help Army Group South
Ukraine.
The issue of Rumanian reliability was questioned by Colonel
General Schomer, Commander of Army Group South Ukraine, with
the result that he was transferred on July 23, 1944 to command
Army Group North.

Meanwhile, optimistic reports were filtering

through OKW overestimating Rumanian reliability.

The loyalty of

the Rumanian people and the Rumanian Army was confused with the
loyalty of Marshal Antonescu.

Defensive plans were based upon the

reasonable expectations of Rumanian reliability.

Therefore, a

withdrawal to more secure defensive positions on the Pruth river
was not permitted.
The Soviets launched the Jassy-Kishinev Operation on August
20, 1944. The two main attacks were launched against the area
south of Tiraspol and northwest of Jassy.
occurred on the Rumanian held sectors.

Deep breakthroughs
Soviet forces drove deep

into the German rear area surrounding the German 6th Army and
other elements of Army Group South Ukraine.

Marshal Antonescu

was arrested on August 23, 1944 and King Michael announced on
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state radio that Rumania would seek an armistice.

The Rumanians

leaving the war created large holes in the defensive line and the
German position in Rumania turned into a catastrophe.

However,

the situation even became worse with the German decision to
attack Bucharest on August 24, 1944 in an attempt to crush the
Rumanian putsch.

The Germans failed to crush the revolt against

Antonescu in Bucharest by not deploying sufficient forces for this
task and this resulted in the new Rumanian government declaring
war on Germany and bringing the Rumanian Army into the war on
the Soviet side.

The end result for Army Group South Ukraine was

the destruction of 5 army corps headquarters, 18 divisions and the
almost total loss of 3 other divisions.
Finally, the significance of the German defeats in the East
during the summer of 1944 can be demonstrated quantitatively.
German losses in troops, armored vehicles, non-armored vehicles,
generals and divisions exceeded the losses in the West. German
armored vehicle and non-armored vehicle shipments were far
greater to the East to replace its greater losses than to the West.
The only area where German losses were higher on the AngloAmerican Fronts was in aircraft losses.

The Luftwaffe received

75% of its losses in the West compared to 25% in the East.
Nevertheless, the German Army received the bulk of its losses
during the summer of 1944 in the East which made the Eastern
Front the predominant front even after the allied landing in France
on June 6, 1944.
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Therefore, the analysis of data from the summer of 1944 will
show that the collapse of the German Army in the East was the
most decisive military event during

the summer of 1944 based

upon the military losses suffered by the German Army and was the
result of the following factors:

German Intelligence failures;

German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lendlease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in
the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive
doctrine and tactics.
The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII
Army Corps in Army Group North Ukraine and the destruction of
Army Group South Ukraine will be examined in detail day by day in
order to delineate the significant details of the collapse of the
German Army in the East during the summer of 1944. These three
events constitute the decisive defeats which resulted in the
retreat of the German Army from the Soviet Union in the summer of
1944 and the subsequent advance of the Red Army into Eastern
Europe.
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CHAPTER II

THE FAILURE OF GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
TO PREDICT THE SCHWERPUNKT OF THE SOVIET
SUMMER OFFENSIVE IN 1944

The failure to predict the Soviet summer offensive in 1944
was not the fault of Adolf Hitler but a failure of German military
intelligence.

Foreign Armies East under Colonel Reinhard Gehlen

was responsible for intelligence estimates of Soviet military
intentions, operations and capabilities.

Gehlen was appointed head

of Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere Ost) on April 1, 1942. He
introduced reforms which produced a new organization which
provided a rapid flow of intelligence data from the front to his
department.

Gehlen established two parallel channels of

intelligence.

The first channel followed the military chain of le or

intelligence officers at each command level and the second channel
consisted of the Abwehr chain with crossovers at each level .1
The overall intelligence network on the Eastern Front (see
Figure 1) produced accurate predictions that had increased the
operational and defensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht in
countering and defeating the Red Army in the past. The defense of
Osuga in the Ninth Army sector of Army Group Center in November

19

of 1942 delineated how successful operational military
intelligence can be in contributing to defensive victories.2

In the

summer of 1944, the German Army needed a clear answer to these
questions: Where and when would the main offensive occur and how
many forces would be involved? The answers to these questions
were critical to its survival in the East.
The lack of reserves ruled out the development of more than
one center of defensive resistance which meant the Germans had
only reserves to counter one main Soviet effort.

However, the

Soviets had learned how to confuse German intelligence by 1944
and Foreign Armies East made predictions about the major Soviet
offensive in the summer of 1944 that proved to be false.

The

results of these inaccurate predictions caused a disaster of
unprecedented scale:

the destruction of Army Group Center.

FOREIGN ARMIES EAST AND OBERKOMMANOO DES HEERES

On March 30, 1944, Gehlen's intelligence summary predicted
further Soviet offensive operations against Army Group A which
was designated Army Group North Ukraine on April 5, 1944.
stated:
The present situation on the eastern front is
overshadowed by the anticipated general enemy
offensive against our Army Groups A and South.
As it proceeds, a more menacing situation than
ever before has emerged on the eastern front,
and in the not too distant future this may result

Gehlen
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in far-reaching political, military and economic
repercussions on the rest of the war in Europe.3
Colonel Gehlen was accurate in his assessment on March 30, 1944
that there would be a longer operations pause before the next
operations commenced.4

However, his prediction that the enemy

had been recognized to favor the operation of an effective thrust
against the San and Weichsel rivers and also against Rumania with
the bulk of his forces proved to be incorrect in the short range
assessment (see Figure 2) but accurate in the long range view of
the strategic situation on the eastern front. s
On April 19, 1944, Gehlen postulated the next Soviet
objective based on the disposition of Russian forces to be the line
Stanislau - Przemysl - Lubin - Brest.6

He predicted that the enemy

upon reaching this line would advance in a southwestern direction
through Slovakia into the Balkan area or drive in a northwestern
thrust toward Warsaw and Danzig.7

Foreign Armies East (Fremde

Heare Ost, FHO) issued a "Beurteilung der Feindlage" (enemy
situation assessment) on May 3, 1944 which confirmed Gehlen's
view of the situation on April 19, 1944.
possible Soviet offensives.

FHO forcasted two

One possible offensive was predicted

to cross the line Kovel-Lutsk advancing through Warsaw to the
Baltic coast thereby cutting off Army Groups North and Center.

The

other offensive forecasted was a possible thrust through Rumania,
Hungary and Slovakia into the Balkans (see Figure 3 & 4).a FHO
noted that the northwestern offensive toward the Baltic coast
would require a high level of tactical efficency.

Therefore, FHO
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concluded that the most probable main effort by the Red Army
would be directed toward the south where the weak axis allies
could be exploited and Soviet hegemony over the Balkans be
established.9
Gehlen confided to his deputy Gerhard Wessel that the Soviet
High Command would most likely choose the lower risk offensive
based on their past behavior when confronted with such options.
Gehlen concluded that the Soviets would attempt to cross the
Beskiden moutain range or the Carpathians and in conjunction or as
an alternative advance between the eastern border of the
Carpathians and the Black Sea coast in the direction of the Balkans
and the Mediterranean.10

The attack through Warsaw to the Baltic

coast was seen as a decisive operation that would if successful
have major consequences on the war in the east.

However, such an

operation would encounter fierce resistance in the territory of the
Reich.

Therefore, Gehlen concluded that the Soviet main effort

would be in the south (see Figures 3 & 4).
On May 10, 1944, FHO revised their estimate of enemy
offensive preparations.

Heavy rail traffic and signs of a buildup

were observed in the Kovel-Ternopol area

11

Foreign Armies East

noted in their intelligence bulletin:
The limitation of radio transmissions that occurred on
9 May on an unprecedented scale over the entire
Eastern Front, as we know from experience, could
indicate that preparations for the enemy offensive may
be nearing completion. That is why it is possible to
consider the possibility that the enemy will initiate his
offensive in the known regions within the nearest
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future. This is most likly to occur in the area of the
Army Group North Ukraine and along the right flank of
the Army Group Center.12
FHO on May 12, 1944 was now predicting two offensives according
to the Kriegstagebuch (war diary) of the operations officer of Army
Group Center.

The main effort was still to be in the south between

the Carpathians and the Black Sea, but another offensive force was
assembled between the Carpathians and the Pripyat marshes to
attack on the axis Lvov, Lublin and Brest.13 (see Figures 3 & 4)
Chief of Staff at OKH, Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler
recommended the buildup of reserves in Army Group North Ukraine
to meet the anticipated offensive projected by FHO.

These forces

were taken from Army Groups North and Center to develop an
Abwehrschwerpunkt.

The OKH Kriegsgliederung of June 15, 1944

showed the following Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions in
Army Group North Ukraine:
OKH Reserve:
Army Group
Reserve:
1st Hungarian
Army:
1st Panzer
Army:

4th Panzer
Army:

20th Panzer Division
9th SS Panzer Division, 10th SS
Panzer Division, 16th Panzer Division
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division
1st Panzer Division, 7th Panzer
Division, 8th Panzer Division
17th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer
Grenadier Division
4th Panzer Division, 5th Panzer
Division.14

The 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were transferred to the
Western Front in the middle of June but still appear on the OKH
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Kriegsgliederung as of June 15th.

However, both divisions received

orders to leave the Eastern Front on June 12th and the 9th SS
Panzer Division reached the Franco-German border on June 16th.15
The 20 Panzer Division was also later transferred to the 9th Army
in Army Group Center on June 16th because of enemy
concentrations in the Ninth Army sector.

Nevertheless, the bulk of

the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions on the Eastern Front
remained in Army Group North Ukraine.
Army Group Center, the bulwark of the Eastern Front, had
insignificant mobile force by contrast to Army Group North Ukraine.
The OKH Kriegsgliederung of June 15, 1944 delineated the following
mobile force in Army Group Center:
OKH Reserve:
3rd Panzer
Army:
4th Army:
9th Army:
2nd Army:

Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle"
No mobile reserves
18th Panzer Grenadier Division, 25th
Panzer Grenadier Division
No mobile reserves
No mobile reseves.16

The situation only improved on June 16th when the 20 Panzer
Division was transferred to the 9th Army. 17
This shifting of mobile reserves on the Eastern Front was
based on the intelligence estimates that developed during May and
June.

Zeitzler suggested shifting the LVI Panzer Corps from 2nd

Army in Army Group Center to Army Group North Ukraine on May
10th and this suggestion was followed by a formal request by Field
Marshal Model for the transfer of the LVI Panzer Corps to his army
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group. On May 20th Hitler approved Model's request and the LVI
Panzer Corps was transferred to Army Group North Ukraine which
stripped Army Group Center of its panzer reserves.1s

The 4th and

5th Panzer Divisions were lost with the transfer of the LVI Panzer
Corps and the 20 Panzer Division was also transferred separately
to Army Group North Ukraine.19

Army Group Center was left with

only three Panzer Grenadier Divisions until June 16th when the
20th Panzer division was returned.

This lack of mobile reserves

was to be significant to the defeat of Army Group Center.

Faulty

intelligence was to play a major role in the placement of the
critical Panzer reserves in the wrong sector of the Eastern Front to
meet the Soviet summer offensive.
On May 21, 1944, German Intelligence Bulletin No. 1
stated:
The continuing animated rail traffic along sectors
occupied by both army groups, along with partially
known transportation of tanks by rail, makes possible a
conclusion concerning the continuation of major enemy
measures aimed at the reinforcement of the troops and
the shipment of material. According to the enemy's
current position it is possible to establish that the
enemy is very thoroughly preparing for his future
operations, the main goal of which still consists of the
"Balkan resolution".20
The 9th Army in Army Group Center began to report an enemy
buildup north of Rogatchev on May 30th.21

Despite 9th Army

reports, the German Intelligence Bulletin of May 30, 1944 noted:
Aerial reconnaissance data at the present moment
indicate very heavy railway traffic around Kiev,
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Dnepropetrovsk, Rovno, and Ternopol, which confirm the
opinion concerning the movement of Crimean
soyedineniya to the front.

The movement is primarily

toward the vicinity of Balta, Ternopol, Rovno, and
Koval, as a result of which the assumption to the
effect that these forces are being increasingly
confirmed.22
Both Keitel and Jodi were convinced that the attack would
come in the south.

Keitel in May 1944 stated:

The situation has stabilized on the Eastern Front. We
can feel confident that the Russians will not be able to
launch an assault for some time. Proceeding from data
pertaining to the regrouping of enemy forces and the
overall military and political situation, it is necessary
to consider that the Russians probably will concentrate
their main forces in the southern sector of the front.
They are presently incapable of fighting along several
main directions.23
The Chief of Operations of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(OKW), General Jodi, declared at the Nuremburg trial:
that the Russian attack would take place in the
southern sector, in the direction of Rumanian
petroleum, which is why most of the tank divisions
were concentrated by us in the vicinty of the southern
army groups.24
The situation began to change in June and signs of an attack
on Army Group Center began to emerge. On June 3, 1944, FHO
discounted the activity opposite Army Group Center as "apparently
a deception."25

The enemy situation report of June 4, 1944

indicated that "at any time the enemy could strengthen his local
concentrations on the eastern front by switching his very
considerable reserves. "26

OKH finally began to acknowledge some
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form of offensive operations directed at Army Group Center in the
Intelligence Summary of June 10, 1944:
Even if there is no reason to change the opinion that the
attacks to be expected on Army Group Center will only
be secondary operations in the framework of the Red
Army's major offensive as a whole, account must be
taken of the concentrations which are still continuing
opposite Army Group Center. These place the enemy in
a position to develop centers of effort with a
penetrative power which, given the relative strenghts
of the two sides, must not be underestimated.27
Despite the radio silence that descended along the Russian
side of the front, German Signal Intelligence was still able to
intercept critical information.

Captain Krickendt sent a report to

OKW on June 12, 1944 concerning a radio intercept about a large
sabotage mission from the 3rd Belorussian Front to the "Grischin"
Partisan Regiment:
The enemy has used the lull on the Soviet-German front
to increase the redeployment of troops and technical
material over the railroads. With the objective of
disruption of the enemy's transfers of troops, I order
all the forces of your units to conduct mass destruction
of railroad tracks in the rail war(Schienenkrieg) and in
the Orsha Borisov railroad sector detonate 1000
sections of track. You are to start immediately with
the execution of this operation and keep the
demolitions secret. The first attack is to be conducted
with continuous blows to achieve a total neutralization
of the enemy's troop redeployments. Further orders
will not be given. Proceed independently as
heretofore.2s
This information indicated a positive sign of an impending
offensive on Army Group Center. The Soviet High Command, Stavka
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had given the same all-out rail war order to partisans on July 14,
1943 to commence operations on July 20-21 , 1943 to coincide with

the offensive against Orel and Briansk.29

Therefore, intelligence

alarms should have jolted the FHO and the OKH to an immediate
reassessment of Soviet offensive intentions.

Furthermore, Signal

Intelligence detected the presence of new armies; aerial
reconniassance units noted strong new artillery units along the
entire front of Army Group Center; and prisoners reported the
appearance of assault formations in the rear of the enemy front.30
The situation assessment by FHO on June 13, 1944 indicated
more than one ·offensive developing on the Eastern Front.

However,

the Schwerpunkt that was seen as immediately forthcoming was
once again expected by the FHO in the area between Kowel and the
Carpathians, (see Figures 5 & 6) but the FHO also predicted with
certainty diversionary attacks on Army Group Center or on the
Rumanian northern border.31

A larger attack against Army Group

Center was considered conceivable.

An offensive from the Gomel-

Smolensk area with the objective of Minsk was possible.
several reports indicated just such an enemy intention.

In fact,

FHO

predicted that· if the enemy should actually conquer the area
Mogilev-Orsha-Vitebsk that more than enough forces would remain
available to conduct a further advance toward Minsk.32

Therefore,

nine days before the Soviet offensive the intelligence assessment
that the Schwerpunkt of operations would be against Army Group
North Ukraine appear highly questionable.
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Gehlen claims in his memoirs that by early June "all the
indications were that they planned a major offensive against Army
Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Busch, which was
defending Poland and East Prussia."33 However, the FHO reports
during June prior to the offensive continued to predict the main
offensive to be against Army Group North Ukraine with a secondary
offensive against Army Group South Ukraine (See Figures 5 & 6).
Attacks against Army Army Group Center still were viewed as
secondary or feints to confuse the Germans as to real direction of
the major attack.

Gehlen on June 13, 1944 recognized the

increased Soviet strength opposite Army Group Center:
Particular attention should be paid to the areas
southeast and east of Bobruisk, on both sides of
Chausey, along the highway northeast of Orsha, and on
both sides of Vitebsk. 34
Neverthless, Gehlen' s FHO ignored these positive signs of an
offensive and treated them as only secondary to the expected
Schwerpuhkt against Army Group North Ukraine.35
Gehlen neglected to mention in his memoirs the error of
predicting the main Soviet offensive against Army Group North
Ukraine instead of Army Group Center.

He merely defends his

assessment that the operation was to take place in phases:
As I had predicted on June 13, a second phase of the
Soviet offensive began a few days after the first, with
a general attack on Lemberg (Lvov).36
However, the holding or diversionary attacks that had been
predicted against Army Group Center were in actuality the
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Schwerpunkt of the Soviet summer offensive and Gehlen and the
FHO had failed in their prediction of Soviet offensive plans which
had disastrous effects on the Eastern Front.
The uncertainty of FHO intelligence estimates was noted in
the German Intelligence Bulletin of June 13, 1944 which indicated
that the German command had as a result of Russian radio silence
"lost one of the most important and reliable intelligence
sources. "37

The uncertainty was reflected further in the same

bulletin which stated:
After it became almost completely impossible to carry
out radio reconnaissance difficulties occured in the
determination of the position occupied by enemy forces.
At present aerial reconnaissance is rather difficult
because of the constantly increasing Russian defenses.
That is why details pertaining to the strategic
deployment of the enemy, which is nearing completion,
cannot be determined.38
Nevertheless, OKH on June 14, 1944, called a conference of
army group and army chiefs of staff to brief them on the
forthcoming Soviet offensive operations.

Zeitzler and Chief of

operations of OKH, General Heusinger impressed upon the chiefs of
staffs that the Soviet offensive would be against Army Group North
Ukraine and not Army Group Center.

The attacks against Army

Groups Center and South Ukraine were merely preliminary and
secondary operations.

OKH was sure that they would be able to

handle the Soviet offensive.

The expression used was:

"zum ersten

Mal Schwerpunkt gegen Schwerpunkt. "39 Gehlen was also present at
the conference and warned that "simultaneous attacks on Army
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Groups Center and South Ukraine could be expected as preliminaries
to the big offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. "40
Army Group Center presented clear evidence that strong
Soviet forces were massing opposite it.

No other front including

Army Group Norh Ukraine could present such infallible indicators of
offensive preparations on their respective fronts.41

However, Chief

of Staff of OKH, General Zeitzler informed General Krebs, Chief of
Staff of Army Group Center, that according to Gehlen the following
operations were foreseen:
Phase 1 as a simultaneous attack on Army Groups South
Ukraine and Centre, followed after a certain interval by
the main operation--an offensive against Army Group
North Ukraine.42
Therefore, despite offensive indicators against Army Group Center;
OKH, FHO and Hitler were fixated upon the offensive in Galicia. OKH
did at least recognize the threat to the 9th Army at Bobruisk and
the 20th Panzer Division was transferred to Army Group Center
from Army Group North Ukraine.
Gehlen's assessment of the enemy's intentions had a direct
impact upon reserve deployment as indicated by the FHO
memorandum of June 17, 1944:
In connection with the withdrawal of certain German
formations from Army Group North Ukraine's area, the
briefing given to the Chief of staff on 17 June 1944, on
the instructions of the Head of Branch, was this. By and
large, the centre of effort of future Soviet offensive
operations remains directed against Army Group North
Ukraine. The strong infantry and tank forces
concentrated here under the command of Marshal Zhukov
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will presumably be required to make the main thrust of
the enemy operations as a whole, with the inital
objectives in the Przemysl-Lublin area or thereabouts.
This view, confirmed by numerous reports from higher
intelligence agencies (Abwehrmeldungen), remains
unchanged despite the enemy offensive preparations
recently observed opposite Army Group Centre ... 43
Thus, Gehlens analysis and recommendations which provided the
basis for assumptions about Soviet operations were in error and
resulted in the deployment of the critical mobile reserves behind
the wrong sectors of the Eastern Front instead of Army Group
Center.

Therefore, the mobile reserves were not available to

prevent the catastrophe in Army Group Center.
On June 19, 1944, more indications of an attack on Army
Group Center developed. Marshal Zhukov was confirmed as having
taken command of the southern part of the enemy front by a
captured pilot.

POW's reported having been indoctrinated about the

necessity of liberating occupied Belorussia as the first objective
of the forthcoming offensive.44

Fremde Luftwaffe Ost (Foreign Air

Forces East) sent a report to OKW giving the statement of 1st
Lieutenant Kusmenkow of the Moscow Guard Fighter Regiment of
the 3rd Air Army.45

Kusmenkow revealed that all preparations of

the 3rd Air Army had to be complete by June 20th for the impending
offensive that would follow within a few days.

The first objective

was Polotsk in an attempt to encircle Vitebsk rather than frontally
assaulting it.
formations.
orders.

The Air Army was to operate in support of the army
These details were confirmed by captured written

Kusmenko reported strong artillery and Panzer forces
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assembling opposite Polotsk.

The 3rd Air Army was reported as

having to abandon good air bases in the rear to concentrate on less
favorable forward air bases to achieve the closest possible
concentration in the area of Polotsk.

Polotsk was designated as the

next objective for massed air attacks by the 3rd Air Army.
Meanwhile, Field Marshal Keitel of OKW was giving a briefing
at Sonthofen and announced that he was certain that the Russians
would not mount a large scale offensive on Army Group Center.

He

believed that an offensive would occur in the south towards Lvov
and then Rumania. 46
The night· of June 19, 1944 brought about a new perspective
at FHO. The partisans in Belorussia during the night had conducted
the most massive railroad demolition operation recorded to date.
10,500 demolitions interrupted all railway traffic to the west of.
Minsk.47 The Germans managed to disarm 3500 explosives on the
rail lines but the material damage done was so great that rail
movement was paralyzed for 24 hours and longer in some areas.48
The operation of double tracks was no longer possible.

One track

had to be disassembled to repair and maintain the second track.
The demolitions conducted on the night of June 19-20th exceeded
the total number of demolitions for the entire month of May which
amounted to 7000.49
The FHO Intelligence Report of June 20, 1944 stated:
The question of the center of effort of the offensive
had to be reviewed in the light of the wave of
demolitions in Army Group Center's rear during the
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night of 19/20 June, focused as this was on the axial
rail links through Luninets, Borisov and Motodechno; and
that there had been several mentions of 22 June as the

date for
reported
German
opposite

it. Preparations for the offensive were
to be complete on 3rd Panzer Army's and the
4th Army's sectors, but still in progress
the German 9th Army (See Figure 7).50

OKH and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) on June 20th
noted the concentration of air power along the front.

OKL

calculated 4000 Soviet aircraft concentrated along the central
front.5 1

The long-range air forces continued to be deployed in the

south.

OKL asserted that "clearly attacks must be seen as possible

anywhere but particularly probable in the south."

OKH noted the

strong ground-attack and fighter units in the Gome! area and west
of Smolensk.

Such concentrations indicated that the enemy

intended to pursue objectives in great depth.

These air units were

intended for close air support of mechanized formations.

The

number of aircraft available permitted the enemy to provide
massive air support along all primary thrust tines.

The air units

were noted to have completed all preparations as of of June 20,
1944.52
On June 21, 1944, OKW, OKH and Army Group Center were
alerted by Lt. Colonel Scmatschlaeger in the Abwehr that known
enemy agents and partisans had received orders from the 3rd
Belorussian Front on June 19th indicating impending offensive
operations.

In addition to destroying rail road tracks along the

Orsha-Borisov line, they were to "report by radio transport trains,
military concentrations and possible targets for the Soviet Air
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Force. "53

This indicated the direction of Soviet air operations as

being behind Orsha, Vitebsk and Mogilev.

Previously, Polotsk had

been identified as a target for massed air attacks.

Thus, Army

Group Center emerged as the primary target of impending Soviet
Air offensive operations, but FHO clung to the belief that the major
offensive would occur in the south.
FHO issued a report on June 21, 1944 warning of impending
attack:
The lively enemy reconnaissance activity and local
probing attacks, coupled with information from signals
intelligence, indicated that the enemy facing Army
Group Center was ready to attack. 54
However, this attack was still viewed as only preliminary or
secondary.
The First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts started the
offensive on June 22, 1944 by attacking northwest and southeast of
Vitebsk in the sector of 3rd Panzer Army.

The German 4th Army

was also attacked by the Third and Second Belorussian Fronts.
However, there were no attacks against 9th Army near Bobruisk and
only three minor probing attacks occurred in the sector of the 2nd
Army.ss
On June 23, 1944, OKH still had not determined the
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet offensive.

Soviet Breakthroughs had

occurred in the 3rd Panzer and 4th Army sectors; 9th Army was
experiencing battalion and regimental attacks; and 2nd Army
reported no attacks. ss

FHO perceived the shifting attacks as a
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possible deception since Soviet attacks were continuing against
Army Group North Ukraine.
However, On June 24th, the attacks against Army Group North
Ukraine abated and the question of whether these attacks in
conjunction with the attacks against Army Group Center were in
fact feints remained unanswered.57
Soviet activity against 2nd Army.

Army Group Center reported no
But the 3rd Panzer Army, 4th and

9th Armies reported major Soviet breakthroughs and serious
problems maintaining their flanks against continuous Soviet
attacks.

Vitebsk was encircled and contained 5 German divisions

and elsewhere the front was collapsing.

Finally, OKH realized too

late on June 25th that the Soviet offensive against Army Group
Center was the main offensive.
One central problem that plagued the Germans prior to the
offensive was the failure to identify entire Soviet armies.

This

failure caused underestimation of forces on the central sector and
overestimation of enemy capabilities on the southern sectors.

FHO

had not identified the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Armies on the
central front.

FHO still believed their location was north of Jassey

opposite Army Group South Ukraine. But the 2nd Tank Army was
near Smolensk with the 3rd Belorussian Front. 58

FHO had received a

report from a reliable source that Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander
of the 5th Guards Tank Army was seen near Yartsevo (northeast of
Smolensk).59

However, FHO discounted their source since German

Intelligence had not noted any movements of the 5th Guards Tank
Army from its area north of Jassey.

The problem was that German
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Intelligence could not ascertain with any accuracy the location of
Soviet strategic reserves.

The 8th Guards Army was located on the

3rd Ukranian Front east of Tiraspol by German Intelligence, but it
had actually been transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front.

The 2nd

Guards and 51st Army were supposed to be in the Crimea according
to German Intelligence.

However, the 2nd Guards Army was

deployed near Smolensk and the 51st Army was near Gomel.60 The
1st Polish Army went undetected in the area east of Koval.

FHO

continued to delineate all six tank armies in the area between
Ternopol and the Black Sea.61
Thus, FHO and OKH made false projections about the
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet summer offensive based upon their
assessment of the deployment of the six tank armies.

On May 3,

1944, FHO showed the deployment of the bulk of the Soviet tank
corps in the first and second Ukranian Fronts (see figure 8).

The

FHO Uebersicht ueber die Komandobehoerden der Roten Armee for
May 18, 1944 delineated a Soviet order of battle with all six tank
armies in the south.62 The 3rd Guards Tank Army, 4th Tank Army
and 1st Tank Army were subordinated to the 1st Ukranian Front.
The 5th Guards Tank Army, 2nd Tank Army and 6th Tank Army were
located with the 2nd Ukranian Front.

FHO failed to detect the

movement of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army out
of the 2nd Ukranian Front.
On May 28, 1944, FHO noted that the XXIX Tank Corps of the
5th Guards Tank Army had been placed in reserve which meant that
all the elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army were now in reserve
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except for the 5th Guards Headquarters.63 The XVIII Tank Corps and
the V Guard Mechanized Corps of the 5th Tank Army were already
noted in reserve on May 18, 1944.64 The 2nd Tank Army was noted
as deployed with the 2nd Ukanian Front on May 18, 1944. On May 28,
1944, the subordinate elements of the 2nd Tank Army:

Ill Tank

Corps and XVI Tank Corps were noted to have been placed in reserve
on the 2nd Ukranian Front.65 FHO noted on June 7, 1944 that that
the entire 5th Guards Tank Army was now in reserve, but it was
still located by FHO as part of the front reserve for the 2nd
Ukrainian Front.66 The XVI Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army was
believed to have reverted from the front reserve to actual
deployment on the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The Ill Tank Corps of the
2nd Tank Army was noted to have reverted from the front reserve
to deployment on the 2nd Ukrainian Front on June 17, 1944.67 FHO.
concluded that the 2nd Tank Army was deployed on the 2nd
Ukrainian Front (see Figure 9) when it had actually been redeployed
to the 1st Belorussian Front.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was still

noted to be in the 2nd Ukrainian Front reserve as of June 17, 1944
(see Figure 9).68
Belorussian Front.

However, it had actually shifted to the 3rd
Therefore, FHO conclusions as to the area of the

next major Soviet offensive continued to be directed toward the
south.

The tank armies were to be the chief components of the

expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine while the
attacks against Army Group Center and South Ukraine were
diversionary.

The consequences of this intelligence failure were

catastrophic and resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center.
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Figure 10 delineates German projected deployment of Soviet
Armies alongside the actual Soviet deployment.

The figure can be

interpreted by use of the following legend:
1-- Position of the sides by the start of the
Belorussian
operation; 2 -- Deployment of ob'
yedineniya of Soviet forces on the situation map of the
German General Staff of the land forces on 22 June
1944; 3--Actual deployment of Soviet forces on 22
June 1944; Troop lift carried out by Hitler's command
for closing gaps in the penetrated front in Belorussia; 5
--Sebastopol; 6 -- Baltic Front; ?--Belorussian Front; 8
-- Ukrainian Front; 9 -- Army Group South Ukraine; 1O - Army Group North Ukraine; 11 -- Army Group North;
12 -- Army Group Center; 13 -- Kiev; 14 -- Dnepr; 15 -Black Sea.69
The German overall estimate of Soviet Amies in Belorussia fell
short.

Specifically, the Russians had 25% more units opposite

Army Group Center than German Intelligence had identified (see
Table 1).

ARMY GROUP CENTER'S PROJECTION OF THE
SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE

Army Group Center had remained in agreement with OKH and
the FHO assessment of the location of the major summer offensive
until the middle of June 1944. Even as of June 2, 1944, Army
Group Center's analysis did not contradict OKH and FHO as revealed
by the situation assessment:
Repercussions are to be expected from the imminent
Soviet offensive against Army Group North Ukraine, on
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German 2nd Army's extreme right (VIII corps). No
preparations for an offensive aimed at Brest have been
detected, but local attacks are possible. On the Eastern
Front, holding attacks on friendly forces must be
reckoned with, especially in these sectors: Southeast
of Vitebsk, Lenino-Bayevo (northeast of Gorki),
Northwest of Chausy, Southwest of Chausy, North of
Rogachev, South of Zhlobin. The enemy will endeavor to
exploit any inital successes with great speed by
concentrating his reserves. On Army Group Center's
extreme right the effects of some kind of offensive
directed onto Polotsk may be felt. 10
However, the situation before Army Group Center had changed
by June 14, 1944.

More Soviet reinforcements were were noted to

have deployed before Army Group Center which caused General
Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center, to raise this issue with
General Zeitzler at the OKH conference concerning Soviet offensive
plans.

Zeitzler and Gehlen only recognized these troop

concentrations as preparations for diversionary or feint attacks
while the main offensive would occur against Army Group North
Ukraine.
General Peter Von der Groeben, an operations officer, at Army
Group Center stated:
After May 1944 ... a systematic concentration to front of
the arc-shaped line held by Army Group Center was
evident. Aerial reconnaisance, agents' reports and
especially radio intelligence furnished Army Group
Center with a clear and pertinent picture of the
assembly of Russian forces. 11
Groeben claimed that there was no doubt on the part of Army Group
Center's High Command that the attack would fall on Army Group
Center because of the tremendous concentrations that the Soviets
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had deployed opposite the front. 12 Field Marshal Busch had made it
repeatedly clear in reports and in personnal discussions at the
Fuehrer's Headquarters the grave situation of the Army Group. 73

He

requested adequate reserves, mobile units and heavy weapons.
However, despite all requests no reserves were released to Army
Group Center until June 16th when the 20th Panzer Division was
transferred from Army Group North Ukraine to the 9th Army in
Army Group Center.
The Army Group continued to observe hopelessly the
indications of a major, impending offensive.

On June 18, 1944,

signal intelligence indicated the possible appearance of the 5th
Guards Tank Army but FHO and OKH rejected this evidence even
though Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander of the 5th Guards Tank
Army, had supposedly been seen near Yartsevo (northeast of
Smolensk).

The Army Group intelligence summary prepared by

Oberst Worgitzky on June 19, 1944 took a much different view than
FHOandOKH:
The enemy situation has changed considerably since the
2nd of June. Up till then the local attacks were going
on, accomplished by regrouping and concentration of
available forces, suggested that the enemy had an
operational-level holding attack in mind. Now activity
opposite the Army Group's salient, notably in the Gomel
area and east of Orsha, indicates that his intentions are
rather more far-reaching ... ln sum it must be said that
the enemy attacks to be expected on Army Group
Center's sector--on Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, and
possibly northeast of Vitebsk will be of more than local
character. All in all the scale of ground and air forces
suggests that the aim is to bring about the collapse of

41

Army Group Center's salient by penetrations on several
sectors ... 74
The intelligence summary of June 19, 1944 remained largely
unchanged till the beginning of the offensive.

The railway sabotage

on the night of June 19-20th was regarded as an indicator that "the
opening of the offensive must be regarded as imminent."75
The commander of the Ninth Army, General Hans Jordan,
summed up the feeling of the Army Group in his Kriegstagebuch
entry of June 22, 1944:
Ninth Army stands on the eve of another great battle,
unpredictable in extent and duration. One thing is
certain: in the last few weeks the enemy has
completed an assembly on the very greatest scale
opposite the army, and the army is convinced that that
assembly overshadows the concentration of forces off
the north flank of Army Group North Ukraine ... The army
has felt bound to point out repeatedly that it considers
the massing of strength on its front to constitute the
preparation for this year's main Soviet offensive, which
will have as its object the reconquest of Belorussia.
The army believes that even under the present
conditions, it would be possible to stop the enemy
offensive, but not under the present directives which
require an absolutely rigid defense ... there can be no
doubt.. .if a Soviet offensive breaks out the army will
either have to go over to a mobile defense or see its
front smashed ...
The army considers the orders establishing the
"fortified places" particularly dangerous.
The army, therefore, looks ahead to the coming battle
with bitterness, knowing that it is bound by orders to
tactical measures which it cannot in good conscience
accept as correct and which in our own earlier
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victorious campaigns were the causes of the enemy
defeats--one recalls the great breakthrough and
encirclement battles in Poland and France.
The Commanding General and Chief of Staff presented
these thoughts to the army group in numerous
conferences, but there, apparently, the courage was
lacking to carry them higher up, for no
counterarguments other than references to OKH orders
were given. And that is the fundamental source of the
anxiety with which the army views the future.76

SOVIET SECRECY AND ALLIED DECEPTIONS
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944

According to General John Deane, the military attache in
Moscow a plan was developed for the summer of 1944 that would be
mutually beneficial to the Soviets and the western allies.

The plan

was codenamed "Bodyguard" and involved Soviet feints against
Scandinavia and Rumania to deceive the Germans into thinking some
coordinated allied operations were to take place on the Axis flanks
to draw off German units from northern France. 11

The Joint Chiefs

of Staff of the United States were particulary concerned that the
Red Army launch its summer offensive to facilitate the "Overlord"
operation.
The Joint Chiefs agreed on March 27, 1944 to inform the
·Soviet General Staff of the target date for Operation Overlord.78
General Deane's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of February 27,
1944 made it very clear that the Soviets would require a date for
Overlord in order to plan their offensive, and that the Soviet front
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was too fluid for them to inform the allies as to where their main
effort would be.79

Deane's memorandum was submitted to the

Combined Chiefs of Staff.
On April 3, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff sent a
telegram to the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow giving
the date for Overlord as "May 31st with two or three days margin
on either side to allow for weather and tide. "80

The British Chiefs

of Staff were particulary concerned that the Russians fulfill the
obligation Marshal Stalin made at Teheran to launch "a large scale
Russian offensive in May with a view to containing the maximum
number of German divisions in the East."81

Stalin on April 22, 1944

informed Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet General Staff had
been informed of the appointed time of the attack and the strength
of it by Generals Deane and Burrows.

Stalin then made a pledge to

fulfill his commitments made at Tehran:
As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new
offensive at the same time so as to give maximum
support to the Anglo-American operations.82
Nevertheless, the Soviets violated this pledge by beginning a
secondary offensive against Finland four days after the Normandy
landings.

The Soviets failed to launch their offensive at the same

time and then the offensive launched against Finland was not the
main offensive thereby denying the maximum support promised to
the allied landings.
The Soviet plans continued to remain a secret from even their
western allies.

Despite the British request for for an offensive in
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May prior to Overlord a lull settled over the Eastern Front except in
the Crimea.

On May 25, 1944, the western allies were still

ignorant of Soviet plans while the Soviets were fully aware of the
date of the Overlord operation.

Thus, Soviet secrecy and deception

were not only working against the Germans but also their own
allies.

The London Joint Intelligence Committee report of May 25,

1944 stated:
We believe that they (Russians) will launch a general
offensive concurrently with Overlord. There is some
evidence that their main effort will be in the sector
between the Pripet Marshes and the northern
Carpathians. The dispostion of their forces, however,
makes it clear that the Russians are capable of
launching large-scale offensives in more than one
sector and may well do so. 83
It is clear that the allies were no better informed as to
Russian intentions than Foreign Armies East under Gehlen.
The Soviets were clearly waiting for the launching of
Overlord before beginning their next offensive.

And it is clear that

they were not attempting to tie down German units on the Eastern
Front to save allied lives on the beaches of Normandy.

Their

launching of an offensive against Finland on June 10, 1944, four
days after the Normandy landings may have corresponded to the
"Bodyguard" deception plan, but it was not the main offensive
agreed to at Tehran to support the invasion of France. The main
offensive was more than two weeks later which allowed the
Germans to transfer armored forces to the Western Front.

The

German High Command transferred the 11 SS Panzer Korps to the
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Western Front from Army Group North Ukraine beginning on June
12th.

Undoubtedly, the lack of pressure along the main front and

the remote offensive in Karelia facilitated the transfer of SS
Panzers to the bocage of Normandy.
Finally, the day after the Normandy landings Stalin sent
Roosevelt and Churchill a cable providing some information about
the expected Soviet summer offensive:
The summer offensive of the Soviet troops to be
launched in keeping with the agreement reached at the
Tehran Conference will begin in mid-June in one of the
vital sectors of the front. The general offensive will
develop by stages, through consecutive engagement of
the armies in offensive operations. Between late June
and the end of July the operations will turn into a
general offensive of the Soviet troops.
I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the
operations.84
Stalin on June 9, 1944 informed Churchill that:
Preparations for the summer offensive of the Soviet
troops are nearing completion. Tomorrow, June 10, we
begin the first round on the Leningrad Front.85
However, the Belorussian Operation remained a secret to the
end.

On June 21, 1944, Stalin informed Churchill and Roosevelt

that the second round of the Soviet summer offensive would
commence within a week and would "involve 130 divisions
including armored ones. "86

Thus, Stalin never did reveal the

location and exact timing of the Soviet main offensive to his
western allies.

Soviet secrecy concerning the Belorussian

Operation remained extremely well guarded.
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Meanwhile, allied disinformation was filtering through
German diplomatic channels concerning the Soviet summer
offensive.

OKW received a report through the Auswartiges Amt

(Foreign Office) in Ankara, Turkey concerning a conversation
between the Finnish envoy and the U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt.
Steinhardt apparently told the Finnish envoy on June 6, 1944 that
the Soviet offensive would begin in about 14 days on the Rumanian
Front where 8000 tanks were assembled.

This information was

confirmed by Hiesinger, a member of the Soviet embassy.87

It is

interesting to note that the date of the offensive was
approximately correct, but the location was totally inaccurate.
A telegram from the German Ankara Embassy on June 9, 1944
conveyed a conversation that U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt had with a
friendly neutral diplomatic Mission Chief.

Steinhardt was reported

to have stated that the Soviet offensive "would begin on June 15th
with a strong group against the Carpathians, a medium strength
group in the area of Jassy and a very strong group against the
Rumanian Front. "88

It is unclear where Steinhardt was obtaining

his information but one aspect of the Bodyguard Deception plans
was to make the Germans believe that the attacks would occur on
the flanks.
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SOVIET MILITARY DECEPTIONS

The Soviet deception plan to deceive the Germans can be
divided into five elements:

(1) extremely tight security; (2)

maintenance of the German preconception that the Ukraine was the
Schwerpunkt of the main Soviet offensive; (3) Elaborate measures
to conceal offensive preparations on the Belorussian Front; (4)
masking redeployments by simulating normalcy along the entire
front; (5) a major feint against Finland preceeded the main
offensive which was staggered by fronts to contuse the Germans.
The tight. security of the Soviets can be traced to the limited
distribution of the Soviet offensive plans in their entirety.
six people were aware of the Soviet summer plans.
individuals were:

Only

These

Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the

Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General
Staff, and the Chief of the Operations Division and his deputy.89
The plans were issued in single hand delivered copies for each
front.

Therefore, the majority of personnel had only a partial

knowledge of the overall plan.
The Soviets continued to simulate preparations tor an
offensive from the Ukraine.

The Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian

Front was ordered to simulate a false concentration of troops to
the northeast of Kishinev.90

Tolbukhin was specifically ordered to

simulate the arrival of nine divisions and one armored corps.

The

simulation was conducted by rail through tour main depots between
May 29th and June 14th.91

Similar use of rail deception was
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conducted elsewhere in the Ukraine.

Massive rail activity was

observed opposite Brest along the southern flank of Army Group
Center during the spring.

The greater part of the transport trains

that were reported by aerial observation were empty and only
served as a deception which was discovered only much later.92
Dummy tanks, artillery, aircraft, depots and radio nets were
established to deceive the Germans.

Stalin admitted that the

Russians constructed as many as 5000 false tanks and 2000 false
aircraft to mislead German intelligence in the past.93

The Soviets

even developed a real antiaircraft zone with complete fighter
cover.

Long range aircraft used for attacks against German

airfields and railroad junctions were based in the Ukraine to
disorient the Germans.94

However, these aircraft flew combat

missions against both Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group
Center.
Elaborate procedures were established to conceal the
Belorussian offensive.

In April 1944, STAVKA ordered a shift to a

defensive posture along the front.

According to Marshal Ivan

Bagramian, Commander of the First Baltic Front, STAVKA ordered
the creation of a defensive zone of not less than 25 miles with
three defensive lines.95

The evacuation of all civilian population

from this zone adjoining the front was carried out to prevent the
Germans from infiltrating agents into the area where they could
easily conceal themselves among the local population.96

Therefore,

thousands of families were evacuated from the 25 mile zone to
nearby districts.
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Careful procedures were utilized in the area along the
Belorussian sector to conceal the offensive preparations.

Trains

were unloaded at night and trains were dispatched to unloading
points of up to 100 km from the front line.

During the day special

camouflage nets, canvas and bales of hay were used to conceal the
buildup of supplies.97

All military units were instructed to

camouflage themselves during the day and the Soviets checked
their concealment by flying aerial reconnaissance over their own
positions to insure effective compliance.98

Commanders were

ordered to wear infantry uniforms only when conducting all
reconnaissance of the front line.

Radio silence was instituted

along the front in May and only the air force, air defense,
reconnaissance and artillery fire direction nets were allowed to
remain active.

All troop movements and unit relocations were

conducted at night.

Even artillery units were ordered to maintain

their pattern of fire.

Tractors were assigned to follow tank and

artillery units to cover their tracks by dragging tree branches to
erase evidence of their presence.

These concealment measures

proved fairly effective and the Germans only began taking notice of
the Soviet buildup after the first week in June.
The Soviets also simulated normalcy along the front.
Reconnaissance was conducted along the entire front by company
and battalion size units.
Soviet operations.

This masked the intentions of future

Probes in one sector would be matched by

probes in another sector so as to simulate normalcy along the
entire front.
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Finally, the feint against Finland distracted German attention
away from the ongoing Belorussian offensive preparations.

The

Soviet planning of the offensive called for the offensive to be
conducted in stages.

The feint against Finland combined with a

staggered offensive confused the Germans until the offensive
developed into a clear general offensive.

The 1st Baltic Front lead

off the attack on June 22-23rd, followed by the 3rd Belorussian
Front which then extended to the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts.
The offensive was staggered by approximately 48 hours from north
to south possibly because the required air power could not be
brought to bear at all the critical points simultaneously.

This

created the impression of holding attacks which confused the
German High Command until the full weight of the offensive was
joined on June 25, 1944.99
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TABLE I
DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ARMIES ON TWO FRONTS, 22 JUNE 1944
BELORUSSIAN
German
Actual
Deployment
Estimate

UKRAl~E

German
Estimate

Actual
Deployment

Tank Armies:

0

2

6

4

Other Armies:

18

22

?

?'

TOTALS:

18

24

?

?

Source: Barton Whaley, Strategm:
(1969), p. A-393.
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Current Enemy Force Deployment, June 13, 1944.
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Figure 10. Deployment of Soviet Forces by the Start of
the Belorussian Operation. Source: Colonel A.
Shimanskiy, "1944 Summer-Fall Campaign On The
Eastern Front," Joint Publications Research Service No.
46237 (20 August 1968), p. 6.
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CHAPTER Ill

GERMAN DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE IN 1944:
STANDING FAST VERSUS ELASTIC DEFENSE

The German Army defensive doctrine of elastic defense found
in the 1933 Truppenfuehrung manual remained in effect as the
standard doctrinal reference throughout the war.1

However, elastic

defense lost its elasticity due to Hitler's orders which confused
and muddled German defensive practices.

Hitler's inflexibility in

how the defense should be conducted resulted in an operational
rigidity which produced needless German losses and caused the
encirclement amd the destruction of numerous German military
formations.

In the summer of 1944, elastic defense was the only

hope for Army Group Center, but Hitler insisted on a rigid stand
fast deployment which resulted in the destruction of twenty-eight
divisions.2

HITLER'S DOCTRINE OF STANDING FAST

Hitler's standfast doctrine originated in the winter of 1941-

42. The Wehrmacht had become stalled before Moscow and the
Soviet counteroffensive threatened to overwhelm the German Army
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since it was unprepared for winter operations.

Hitler forbid a

general retreat which under the winter conditions probably saved
the Wehrmacht from the fate of the Grande Armee in 1812.
ordered the Wehrmacht to stand fast.

He

General Bock of Army Group

Center was ordered to cease all withdrawals and defend its present
positions.
dictum:

Hitler ordered that German soldiers were to follow his
"not one single step back. "3 General withdrawal was

declared out of the question.

The stand fast orders established the

framework of German defensive strategy under Hitler.

The

successful outcome of the stand fast policy in the winter of 1941-

42 persuaded Hitler that his own instincts were superior to the
collective wisdom of the front commanders and the General Staff.
Will and determination replaced sound strategy.

Hitler would order

troops to stand fast against impossible odds and this resulted in
needless loss of precious manpower in the Wehrmacht.
General Jodi described Hitler's actions after Stalingrad as
follows:
From then on, he intervened more and more frequently
in operational decisions often down to matters of
tactical detail, in order to impose with unbending will
what he thought the generals simply refused to
comprehend: that one had to stand or fall, that each
voluntary step backwards was an evil in itself.4
Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein described Hitler's belief in
will:
The will for victory which gives a commander the
strength to see a grave crisis through is something very
different from Hitler's will which in the last analysis
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stemmed from a belief in his own "mission." Such a
belief inevitably makes a man impervious to reason and
leads him to think that his own will can operate beyond

the limits of hard reality-whether these consist in the
presence of far superior enemy forces, in the conditions
of space and time, or meeting in the fact that the
enemy also happens to have a will of his own. s
Thus,

the Fuehrer's fundamental principle was "to remain at

all costs, on ground which has once been won." The new defensive
tenet became "an inflexible stand."

This principle according to

General Blumentritt became responsible for the severe handicap
under which German Commanders had to operate after 1941.
According to Blumentritt, "without free, independent strategic
resposibility--uninfluenced by pressure and fear--no general is in
a position to gain successes in the field. "6

Furthermore, the

Fuehrer even forbid the establishment of defensive lines in the rear
which could have been established to free reserves for a more
mobile defense.

Hitler apparently believed that defensive lines in

the rear exerted a magnetic force on soldiers, and that they should
never be tempted by prematurely establishing defense lines behind
them.7 He believed soldiers would fight harder knowing there were
no defensive lines to the rear, and this corresponded to his
conception of the stand fast policy.

HITLER'S WAVEBREAK DOCTRINE

The stand fast doctrine was supplemented by what Percy
Schramm, the writer of the OKW war diary, called the wavebreak
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doctrine in 1944.8

This doctrine tied the hands of the army

commanders even further making it even more difficult to conduct
an elastic defense. On March 8, 1944, Hitler issued Fuehrer Order
No. 11:

In view of various incidents, I issue the following
orders:

1. A distinction will be made between Fortified Areas
[feste Plaetze], each under a Fortified Area
Commandant, and Local Strong-points
[Ortsstuetzpunkte], each under a Battle Commandant.
The Fortified Areas will fulfil the function of
fortresses in former historical times. They will ensure
that the enemy does not occupy these areas of decisive
operational importance. They will allow themselves to
be surrounded, thereby holding down the largest
possible number of enemy forces, and establishing
conditions favourable for successful counterattacks.9
Based upon the above directive a whole series of fortresses
were established in the East.

Hitler's assumption was that the

enemy required more forces to lay siege to the fortresses than
were required for the defense.

This presupposed that the enemy

would have to take these fortresses, since he would require the
road junctions and railway depots.

In fact, the Soviets bypassed

fortresses and surrounded others with inferior units.10

The

Germans, on the other hand, tied up critical numbers of troops
which were then later sacrificed in needless encirclements instead
of being conserved and used in an elastic defense.
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ELASTIC DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL:
THE LAST HOPE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER

Elastic defense is the application of depth, maneuver,
firepower and counterattack to exhaust the attacker in the depth of
the defense.

Figure 11 delineates the concept of elastic defense as

found in the Truppenfuehrung manuel. The Germans were strong
enough in 1944 and possessed sufficient maneuvering space in
Belorussia to apply an elastic defense to wear down the Soviets.
General Wladyslaw Anders provides a description of the tactics of
elastic defense:
This defense consists of the alternative use of
premeditated retreat and sudden counter-stroke. The
retreat enables the defender to avoid the blows of the
attacker and to draw him on, while a sudden
counterattack holds the chance of defeating the
aggressor at the moment when his offensive begins to
peter out. These tactics prove practicable if the
defender has superiority over the attacker in both
command and mobility.11
Therefore, Field Marshal Busch presented two alternatives of
conducting an elastic defense:

"kleinen Loesung" (Dnjepr Solution)

and "grossen Loesung" (Beresina Solution). 12

The first solution was

a rearward adjustment to a relatively tankproof position which had
been prepared along the line Polotsk--west of Vitebsk--the Dnjepr
at Orsha--Mogilev.

This solution would require a withdrawal of 55

kilometers and would shorten the front by 80 kilometers.

The

second solution was more sweeping involving a withdrawal behind
the largely marshy length of the river Berezina between Polotsk
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and Bobruisk (see Figure 12).13

This would require a withdrawal of

140 kilometers and would shorten the front by 160 kilometers.
Field Marshal Busch proposed executing a withdrawal just prior to
the Soviet summer offensive which would then require the Soviets
to conduct an additional time consuming approach march to the next
German defensive line.

Both the "kleinen Loesung" and the "grossen

Loesung" were part of an overall elastic defense plan which could
grind down the Soviet offensive momentum, but would require the
sacrifice of territory something that was unacceptable to Hitler.
Hitler responded with the "Fuehrerbefehl Nr. 11.

He declared

certain cities in the area of Army Group Center "Festen Plaetzen":
Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk and Minsk (see Figure 13).14 This
decision by Hitler tied up large numbers of troops in exposed
positions that could be encircled thereby depriving Army Group
Center of sufficient forces to adequately conduct an elastic
defense.

The demand by Hitler to hold Vitebsk which was the most

tenuous of the cities prompted Field Marshal Busch to ironically
declare according to the Fuehrer:

"Our prestige is at stake!

Vitebsk

is the only Eastern Front town whose loss will cause the world to
sit up and take notice."15
On May 20, 1944, Field Marshal Busch approached Hitler about
shortening the front to strengthen the defense.

Hitler accused

Busch of "being another General who spent their whole time looking
over their shoulder. "16

Busch responded to Hitler's intimidation by

mindlessly carrying out his instructions to execute a rigid
positional defense. Busch held a conference on May 24, 1944 and
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instructed the army commanders and the Commander-in-Chief of
Luftflotte 6 regarding Hitler's demand to hold the existing line at
all costs.17

He demanded that all available effort be used to

prepare the army group's present positions.

Nevertheless,

army

commanders still insisted on operational freedom of action once
the offensive began.

But Busch had given up attempting to exercise

independence from the Fuehrer's will and his headquarters obeyed
the Fuehrer's orders to hold the front exactly where it was.

The

army commanders later found it necessary to undertake actions
without support of the Commander of Army Group Center.

THE LOST POTENTIAL OF ELASTIC DEFENSE

Army Group Center in March 1943 had withdrawn
appproximately 100 miles to the west because it was in an
overexposed position.
front to 200 kilometers.

This withdrawal reduced a 530 kilometer
The shrinkage of the front produced a

reserve of 15 infantry divisions, two motorized infantry divisions,
three panzer divisions, one SS cavalry division and several
headquarters units.1s

The withdrawals of 55 and 140 kilometers

proposed by Field Marshal Busch would shorten the front only 80
and 160 kilometers respectively.

Therefore, the corresponding

number of divisions released as reserves would be much less.
However, Army Group Center was in desperate need of reserves.
The entire army group only had one Panzer division and three Panzer
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Grenadier divisions as mobile forces.

Any infantry divisions that

could have been pulled out of the front line for use as reserves
would have improved the situation at the front.
The German Army was forced to fight in total defiance of
basic principles of war which had been recognized in the eighteenth
century.

Clausewitz had defined the principles of defensive war

which had influenced German thinking:
He holds his position in depth for at every level from
division to battalion, his order of battle has reserves
for unforseen events and to renew action. A substantial
reserve, however--perhaps one quarter or one third of
his whole force--is kept far to the rear, far enough to
avoid any casualities from enemy fire and, if possible
far enough to remain outside any possibility of
envelopment. This reserve is meant to cover his flanks
against any wider and larger turning movement and to
protect him against the unexpected. In the final third
of the battle, when the enemy has revealed his whole
plan and spent the major part of his forces, the
defender intends to fling this body against a part of the
enemy forces, thus opening a minor offensive battle of
his own using every element of attack--assault,
suprise and flanking movements. All these pressures
will be brought to bear on the battle's center of gravity
while the outcome still hangs in the balance in order to
produce a total reversal. 19
Thus, Hitler defied military reality which had been recognized
since the eighteenth century and supplanted it with the
psychological principle of "will."
Even the Red Army expected the Germans to pursue a more
rational defense. Colonel N. Loshchagin and Colonel A. Melnichuk
writing in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on June 17, 1944 stated:
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The German command has a tendacy to have strong
reserves, even at the cost of weakening the troops at
the front. On the Soviet-German front the operational
reserves average from one to three divisions in armies,
and from two to five divisions in army groups. They are
employed in a strictly centralized manner.20
Furthermore, in defensive operations Germans were noted to have
most of their operational reserves composed of mobile forces such
as Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions which were to be used en
masse to liquidate breakthroughs and stabilize the front.

However,

Army Group Center lacked the mobile reserves because these had
been allocated to Army Group North Ukraine and France. The Army
Group held a front of 1100 kilometers with 40 divisions (see Figure
14).21

This amounted to each division holding about 25 kilometers.

This amounted to three to four times the frontage previously
regarded as acceptable for a successful defense.22

Army Group

Center also lacked heavy artillery, assault guns and antitank
weapons to block possible tank approaches.

Hitler's refusal to

develop more defensive positions in depth caused a rigidity of
defense because once the main defenses had been breached there
were no series of defensive lines prepared to fall back on
throughout Belorussia (see figure 15).
General Kurt Von Tippelskirch, Commander of the 4th Army,
reported that all army commanders in Army Group Center begged
for permission to withdraw to the Beresina line.

This withdrawal

would have taken the punch out of the Soviet offensive, but all such
suggestions were rejected.

Nevertheless, Tippelskirch displayed
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initiative despite Hitler's orders.

He withdrew his forces back to

the Dnieper on his sector, and this action allowed him to keep his
front intact.

But the fronts of the other armies to his north and

south were ruptured producing a general collapse.

Tippelskirch

made the following assessment:
It would have been much wiser strategy to withdraw
the whole front in time. The Russians always needed a
long pause for preparation after any German
withdrawal, and they always lost disproportionately
when attacking. A series of withdrawals by adequately
large steps would have worn down the Russian strength,
besides creating opportunities for counter-strokes at a
time when. the German forces were still strong enough
to make them effective ...
The root cause of Germany's defeat was the way that
her forces were wasted in fruitless efforts, and above
all in fruitless resistance at the wrong time and place.
That was due to Hitler. There was no strategy in our
campaign.23
Finally, defenders of Hitler's stand fast policy and critics of
elastic and mobile defense argue that the loss of more territory in
a mobile defense was hardly preferable to a static defense which
produced the same result.24

However, what these apologists such

as Martin Van Creveld overlook in Hitler's conduct of the war is the
fact enormous amounts of men and material could have been
conserved which then would have been available for reserves to
prevent the collapse of the front which occurred numerous times as
a result of Hitler's stand fast policy.
summed up the situation:

General Heinz Guderian
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The more critical the situation became, the more
inflexible became the attitude of the German Command.
The advanced positions had to be defended foot by foot,
until encirclement. Heavy losses in personnel and
material were suffered as a result.25
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CHAPTER IV

AIRPOWER: THE LUFTWAFFE LOSS OF SUPERIORITY

The loss of air superiority on the Eastern Front was a result
of fragmentation of Luftwaffe efforts in an ever widening war and
the numerical and qualitative increase in the Soviet Air Force.

The

massive losses suffered by the German Army in the East required
the Luftwaffe to concentrate its effort in ground support
operations which prevented the strategic use of its assets against
the Soviet Union.

Essentially, the Luftwaffe air units had become

"Fire Brigades" in support of a Wehrmacht in trouble.1

Luftwaffe

General Hermann Plocher described the Luftwaffe dilemma this
way:
Dispersal of its forces was the cardinal weakness of
the Luftwaffe in these operations. No longer did
German air units go ahead of the advancing ground
forces. Instead, they were rapidly shifted from side to
side wherever a crisis developed, often arriving too
late to alleviate the danger. This continual
transferring of air units was a result of numerical
weakness in German air strength and the Luftwaffe's
consequent inability to accomplish its missions all
along an extended front.2
The Luftwaffe was placed at an increasing disadvantage as
the war progressed.

The Italian/Balkan front, the Western front
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and the air defense of the Reich siphoned off aircraft that would
have potentially been available for combat on the Eastern front.
The multi-front problem was described by the Military History
Division of the Luftwaff General Staff in a 1944 study:
The Luftwaffe was no longer as in the past employed in
concentration on only one front against only one enemy
within the overall pattern of the whole war. Through
its employment in a number of theaters simultaneously,
it was compelled to dispatch its forces against the
enemy in widely separated areas. This necessarily
resulted in a reduction of operable strengths available
in the individual segments of the fronts.s
General

d~r

Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann addressed the

strategic failure of the Luftwaffe:
Because of its inferior strength, the strategic
Luftwaffe was forced out of its real role in spite of a
clear realization of the adverse results which would
follow. Neither in Russia, nor in the Mediterranean and
western theaters did German air superiority continue.
As a result the initiative passed more and more to the
enemy. Our own forces, however, found themselves
implicated in air defense under the pressure of events
of the war.4

LUFTWAFFE: STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE IN THE EAST

Two main problems plagued the Luftwaffe in the East. The
failure to conduct strategic warfare against the Soviet Union and
the lack of a central command structure to unify and concentrate
Luftwaffe resources.

The strategic warfare issue had to be
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addressed early in the war to prevent the full weight of Soviet
industry and resources from being utilized in the war effort.
The Luftwaffe Field Directive on the conduct of air warfare
described three missions for the Luftwaffe:
1.
Through combat against enemy air forces, the
Luftwaffe weakens the enemy's military strength and
thereby protects its own military forces, its civilian
population, and its country.
2.
Through intervention in operations and combat on
the ground and at sea, the Luftwaffe provides direct
support for the Army and Navy.
3.
Through warfare against
military strength and through
communication between these
the Luftwaffe seeks to subdue

the sources of enemy
cutting off
sources and the front,
the enemy force.5

Therefore, the Luftwaffe regarded strategic warfare as at least as
important as the other two missions of the Luftwaffe.

However,

this was not recognized by OKW and OKH. The German Air Force
became tied to Army support when the goals should have been the
destruction of the Soviet. Air Force, armament works and the
transportation network. 6

Even the production of aircraft indicated

the lack of a strategic outlook.

The Germans lacked a long range

four-engine bomber and the plans for a "Ural bomber" had been
dropped during 1936.7 The Luftwaffe as a result never had a
satisfactory long-range bomber before or during the war.a
Finally, in late 1943 the Luftwaffe was to commence
strategic bombing operations against the Soviet Union but it was
already too late. The suicide of General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of
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the General Staff of the Luftwaffe resulted in the promotion of
General Guenther Korten to this position in September 1943. Korten
initiated reforms to reduce Luftwaffe operations in support of the
army.

His goals were the creation of a strategic bomber force and

a strategic fighter defense.9

Korten's reforms, however, weakened

the Eastern Front. Zerstoerergeschwader 26 and 76 (twin-engine
fighter units) and Jagdgeschwader 3, 11, 53 and 27 were recalled
from the Eastern Front for defense of the Reich.10 A Geschwader
normally contained 150 aircraft.11
Geschwader were at full strength.

But it is doubtful if these
On November 26, 1943, General

Korten issued the directive which created a strategic bomber force
known as IV Air Corps.

The mission of this Air Corps was stated in

the directive:
In order to carry out systematic bombardment of
Russian armament industries, I intend to unite the
majority of the heavy bomber units assigned in the
East--together with other special duty bomber units-under the command of the Headquarters, IV Air Corps.
These units will be assigned the mission of conducting
air attacks against the Russian armaments industry
with a view to destroying Soviet material resources-tanks, artillery, and aircraft--before they can be put to
use at the front. In this way, the Luftwaffe will be
able to provide greater relief for our hard pressed
Eastern armies than by its commitment in groundsupport operations alone.12
In December 1943, eight bomber Gruppen were withdrawn
from the Eastern Front and assigned to Flieger Korps IV which
became independent of Luftflotte 4 with 250 aircraft for strategic
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employment.13

Previously, these bomber aircraft had not only been

used for combat operations in a ground-support role but also
served as troop carrying transports.14
The Minister of War Production and German Intelligence
produced a comprehensive plan for attacking Soviet industry and
resources.

It was calculated that by selective bombing of key

targets that 50-80 percent of Soviet productive capacity could be
eliminated.15

German Intelligence estimated that such bombing

could eliminate 3,500 tanks and 3000 front-line aircraft per
month.16

The new strategic thinking followed this reasoning:

Each Russian tank, each gun, each airplane, each railway
locomotive which could be destroyed while still in the
factory saved the German Army serious losses ... a single
successful air attack on the Russian tank factories
would have destroyed the product of several weeks'
work all at once and would have been sufficient to stop
any further production for some time. It is difficult to
stop a rushing stream; its source, however, can be
dammed up with relatively little effort.17
During the spring of 1944, the Flieger Korps IV conducted a
series of attacks and some participants described the results as
successful. 1a However, 1944 was too late to begin strategic
bombing with any hope of success.

The fallacy of strategic

bombing at this time was that the German lines had been pushed
back so far that a major portion of the targets were out of range to
German bombers.19 The aircraft engine works in Kuybishev, Kasas,
and Ufa were critical to the increased production of Soviet
aircraft.20

However, these production centers were outside the
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range of German bomber aircraft and attacks had to be restricted
to the Moscow-Yaroslavl area (see Figure 16) .21
Luftwaffe General Deichman made the following observation
concerning the belated attempts at strategic warfare on the
Eastern Front:
The attempt to achieve lasting results by means of
strategic air operations was nevertheless repeated
frequently. Attacks were directed occasionally at
militarily important factories in Gorki, Jaroslavl,
Rybinsk, Moscow, and Leningrad. However, no telling
results were achieved because the forces dispatched
were too small and because the attacks took place at
too long intervals.22
In fact, the withdrawal of these Bomber Geschwader from ground
support only served to accelerate the loss of territory on the
Eastern Front.23

In March 1944, the IV Air Corps had a strength of

350 bombers consisting mostly of He-111's and Ju-88's.24
The collapse of Army Group Center brought an end to
strategic air operations in the East.

The last strategic operation

of IV Air Corps coincided with the beginning of the main Soviet
summer offensive, Operation Bagration.

The Luftwaffe's last

strategic victory in the East was not against the Soviets, but
surprisingly against the Americans. On June 21, 1944, the
Americans landed 140 B-17's at Poltava and 56 P-51 's at Mirgorod
airfields (see Figure 17).25
destroy the American force.

The IV Air Corps was ordered to
The Germans successfully bombed

Poltava on June 22, 1944 and destroyed 47 B-17's and damaged 26
without a single German loss.26

Thus, ended the Strategic Air
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Force on the Eastern Front because with the coming of the Soviet
summer offensive the German army desperately needed every
aircraft in ground-support operations to stave off further collapse.
Flieger Korps IV was disbanded to provide ground support

LUFTWAFFE AND SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL

Another major problem for the Luftwaffe was the lack of
coordination and concentration of its air power.

The Luftwaffe

was divided into several Luftflotten on several fronts (see Figure
18).

The Luftflotten constituted the central organization of the

Luftwaffe in its command structure (see Figure 19).
were in fact independent air fleets.

Luftflotten

However, these Luftflotten

were tied to the support of the German Army (see Figures 20 & 21 ).
This was especially true in the East where these air fleets were
committed deep in enemy territory which dissipated the air
strength of the Germans.

Luftwaffe General Deichman stated the

solution to this problem:
After 1941 it would have been wise to withdraw the
bomber wings from control by the individual air fleet
headquarters and place them under suitable command
staffs under a centralized bomber command. This was
the only possible way to secure their commitment in
concentration at decisively important points when
necessary in support of the Army. Only if this had been
done would the Luftwaffe have been in a position to
exercise a decisive influence on military events.21
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However, the Germans realized this only after it had become too
late in 1944 to effect the course of events on the Eastern Front.
The Soviet Air Force (WS:

Voenno-vozdushnye sili)

recovered from its disastrous defeats in 1941 and 1942 to gain
numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe by the end of 1943.

The

Soviets deployed 13 air armies on the German-Soviet Front:

1st,

2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th
Air Armies.28
aircraft.29

Each air army contained approximately 660

Therefore, 13 air armies at full strength would contain

8,580 aircraft as compared to 2,312 aircraft deployed by the
Germans on the Eastern Front.30 The Soviet Air Force was to
increase its strength further in 1944 with increased aircraft
production and lend lease aircraft.

Meanwhile, Luftwaffe strength

was dissipated on several fronts which prevented its forces from
being used in a decisive manner against the Soviet Air Force.

This

resulted in a loss of air superiority on the Eastern Front during the
summer of 1944 which proved critical to the German defeat.

NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE
LUFTWAFFE AND THE SOVIET AIR FORCE

The Luftwaffe maintained an average of 42.SO/o of its total
strength on the Eastern Front from August 1943 to November
1944.31

The number of Aircraft on the Eastern Front averaged

2,881 between August 1943 and November 1944.32 These
statistics delineate the dilemma of the Luftwaffe fighting on
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several fronts.

The Luftwaffe could not even concentrate half its

strength on the Eastern Front.

In August 1943, the Luftwaffe

aircraft strength was distributed to the various fronts as
delineated in Table II.

In June 1944, Luftwaffe aircraft strength

was deployed as listed in Table Ill
The Luftwaffe in August 1943 had 56.4% of its forces against
the Anglo-American forces in the West.

The situation remained

approximately the same in June 1944; 56% of the Luftwaffe
continued to be engaged in the West.

Therefore, the Soviet Air

Force only had to engage less than half of the total available
German airpower.

This aided the Soviets in gaining air superiority

on their only front.

Meanwhile, the Germans were spread thin on

six different fronts.
The Luftwaffe strength on the Eastern Front was divided
between the various Luftflotten (see Figure 22).

In June 1944, the

various types of aircraft were distributed in the Luftflotten as
delineated in Table IV.

Table IV also reveals the lack of combat

aircraft that could be used to counter the Soviet summer offensive.
Luftflotten 5, 1, 6, and 4 constituted the Luftflotten of the Eastern
Front (see Figure 22).

The four Luftflotten of the Eastern Front

contained 3,267 aircraft in June 1944.

However, this figure is

deceptive because only 61% of the aircraft were combat aircraft.
The following analysis shows the actual combat strength as
delineated in Table IV:
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Single-Engine Fighters:

Night Fighters:

Twin-Engine Fighters:

Ground Attack
Aircraft:

Night Ground Attack
Aircraft:

LF 5
LF 1

29
91

LF 6

137

LF 4
Total:

li.1.

LF 5
LF 1
LF 6
LF 4
Total:

0
5
47

408

~
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LF 5
LF 1
LF 6
LF 4
Total:

19
0
0

LF 5
LF 1
LF 6
LF 4
Total:

10
74
152
374
610

LF 5
LF 1
LF 6
LF 4
Total:

22
201
72

Q

19

9.1.
392

LF 5
O
LF 1
9
LF 6
398
LF 4
5-5_
Total:
462
Total Combat Aircraft on the Eastern Front:
Bomber Aircraft:

1,988

Even the 1,988 combat aircraft employed in the four Eastern
Front Luftflotten does not reveal the complete picture of
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Luftwaffe weakness.

This figure accounts for aircraft but does not

indicate the operational status of the aircraft.
not operational because of needed repairs.

Many aircraft were

Furthermore, when the

Normandy invasion began 50 single-engine fighters were
transferred from the central front to Germany.33

Bombers were

also routinely used as transports instead of in a strategic bombing
or close support role.34
The lack of single-engine fighters in the East assured the
Soviet Air Force of gaining superiority.

The increased production

of single-engine fighters (see Figures 23 & 24) was absorbed by
the Anglo-American Fronts.

Table IV denotes a single-engine

fighter strength of 1,104 on the Anglo-American Fronts as
compared to 408 on the Eastern Front.

Therefore, the Luftflotten

of the Eastern Front lacked fighter reserves and was forced to
fight with an inadequate number of aircraft at a time of Soviet
numerical superiority in the air and on the ground.
On July 3, 1944, the collapse of Army Group Center caused a
redeployment of Luftwaffe resources to help plug the gaping hole
in the front in Belorussia.

Aircraft were thrown in from various

fronts to stabilize the situation.

Luftflotte Reich transfered 40

single-engine fighters to the central front.

The Italian front

yielded 85 FW 190's and 40 FW 190's were taken from the critical
Normandy front.

Another 70 FW 190's were transferred from

Luftftotte 4 to Luftflotte 6.

Luftflotte 4 was nearly stripped of all

ground attack aircraft by the end of July 1944.35

In June 1944,

Luftflotte 4 contained 37 4 ground attack aircraft, but by August
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1944 it retained only 59 ground attack aircraft (see Table IV &
Table V).
The catastrophes on the Eastern Front did increase the
overall percentage of Luftwaffe strength deployed in the East.

In

August 1944, 46.5% of German aircraft were employed on the
Eastern Front compared to 44% in June 1944.

However, the actual

numbers of aircraft deployed shrank because the number of
Luftwaffe aircraft after replacements declined by 1,078 aircraft
in two months.36 This indicated heavy Luftwaffe losses during this
summer period.

In June 1944, 3,267 aircraft were on the Eastern

Front in Luftflotten 5, 1, 6, and 4 compared to 2,948 in August
1944 (see Tables IV & V).
The Soviet Air Force according to Luftwaffe Commanders had
achieved a large numerical superiority in air power by the end of
1943.37
war.

This superiority increased continually till the end of the

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was forced onto the defensive with

decreasing operable strength in front line units compounded by a
growing German shortage of fuel (see Figure 25).38

Nevertheless,

the Germans assert that absolute air superiority was not achieved
by the Soviets because Soviet fighter pilots remained inferior to
their German counterparts in air combat.39

This inferiority

allowed German bomber and dive-bomber units to execute their
assigned missions.

Therefore, the Luftwaffe could assert local air

superiority for brief periods of time, but overall lacked air
superiority since the Germans could not prevent the Soviet Air
Force from executing its primary function of ground support.
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The quality of Soviet aircraft almost equalled the Germans by
the summer of 1944.40

Numerically, the Soviets had clearly

surpassed the German Luftwaffe.

The Soviet Air Force or VVS

(Voenno-vozdushnye sili) grew in strength from 8,818 aircraft in
January 1944 to 14,787 aircraft by June 1944.41

This amounted to

an increase of 5,969 aircraft or a 68% increase in strength.

The

twelve frontal air armies contained 8, 798 operational combat
aircraft and 1,046 R-5 and P0-2 light night bombers.42

Therefore,

the Soviets had achieved more than a 7:1 advantage in total
aircraft, 6:1 in operational aircraft, and more than 10:1 in fighters
when compared to the operational front line strength of 2,085
aircraft. 43

THE LUFTWAFFE ANTI-TANK SUPPORT

The effect of Soviet dominance in the air proved deterimental
to the Luftwaffe and to the Wehrmacht.

It became extremely

hazardous for JU 88, HE 111 and JU 87 aircraft to operate except at
night. 44

The Wehrmacht which could formerly call on the "Fire

Brigades" of the Luftwaffe for assistance was put under even
greater pressure by the lack of Luftwaffe support and the
increased attacks by the Soviet Air Force. The HS 129 and JU 87G
had been important ground attack aircraft which had been in the
past used to destroy Soviet tank formations.45 The JU 87G was
equipped with two 3.7 cm cannon and the HS 129 was fitted with a
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3 cm, 3.7 cm or 7.5 cm cannon.46 These anti-tank cannons all fired
solid-shot armor-piercing rounds.

The most outstanding examples

of this air support occurred during the summer of 1943 in
Operation Zitadelle (see Figures 26 & 27).47
However, this powerful striking force had its effectiveness
reduced with the advent of massive Soviet aerial supremacy.

The

Panzerjaegerstaffeln were employed in the spring of 1944 to
contain Soviet armored breakthroughs in the Ukraine (see Figure
28).

These units suffered heavy losses during the Soviet spring

offensive.48

Focke Wolfe 190's were adapted to the ground support

role by equipping them with rockets known as Panzerschreck and
Panzerblitz.49

In 1944 the production of FW 190's increased to

allow conversion of the Schlachtgeschwader from JU 87 to the FW
190. The rate of conversion was 2 Gruppen every six weeks.
Therefore, only one Gruppe (53 aircraft) (111/StG 2) of JU 87's
remained active as a Schlachtgruppe for day operations at the end
of 1944.50 The JU 87's were transferred to
Nachtschlachtgeschwader (night close-air-support units).5 1

These

aircraft, however, were not numerous enough to stem major Soviet
offensive operations.

Thus, German anti-tank support during the

Soviet Belorussian campaign was weak.
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SOVIET AIR FORCE OBJECTIVES IN THE BELORUSSIAN
CAMPAIGN AND COMPARISON OF GERMAN AND
SOVIET SORTIE RATES

The Soviet Air Force in the Belorussian operation employed
mass to overwhelm ground and air defenses.

Five air armies (1st,

3rd, 4th, 6th and 16th) deployed a total of 5,683 operational
aircraft or 64.6% of all frontal aircraft.S2

An additional 1000

bombers were deployed from the Long Range Air Arm known as ADD
(Aviatsiya dal'nevo deistviya) which brought the total to 6,683 or
49.8% of all Soviet operational aircraft for the support of the the
Soviet summer offensive.s3
The Soviet Air Force was assigned the following tasks:

(1)

firmly retain air superiority; (2) support the ground forces during
the breakthrough; (3) encirclement and destruction of the enemy
units at Vitebsk and Bobruisk; (4) encirclement and destruction of
Army Group Center west of Minsk; (5) interdiction of enemy
movement of reserves; (6) disorganize the westward retreat of
German units; and (7) provide continuous aerial reconnaissance.s4
The skill of WS commanders and planning was marked by
maneuvering and redeployment of air strength along the entire
front to achieve the desired concentrations of air power at the
moment of critical offensive operations.

This support was

achieved along the front and in depth.ss
In May and June 1944, the Luftwaffe was capable of 1000
sorties per day.ss

However, the fuel situation (see Figure 25) and
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the increased Soviet air superiority reduced the number of sorties
by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. On September 11, 1944, only
250 German sorties were flown against a Soviet sortie rate of
2,000-2,500.57

The Soviet Air Force sortie rate revealed

overwhelming Soviet air power compared to the German sortie
rate.

The Soviet Air Force flew 153,545 sorties between June 22,

1944 and August 29, 1944 which was an average of more than
2,250 sorties daily.58

This Soviet effort was unmatched in any

other wartime operation.59

Thus, Soviet air superiority was firmly

established with the onset of the Soviet summer offensive.

COMPARISON OF EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS

The air war in the Soviet Union while significant to the
outcome of the war in the East was overshadowed by the AngloAmerican air war in the West where 53.5% of the Luftwaffe was
concentrated.so

The Luftwaffe total losses and damaged aircraft

for the period of June to October 1944 demonstrate the
effectiveness of the Anglo-American air war.

Table VI delineates

the German losses by front. The defense of the Reich involved
36.90/o of all losses during this period. The defense of Western and
Northern Europe accounted for 31.7% of Luftwaffe losses.

The

Italian and Balkan Theater involved only 6.8% of total air losses.
The total Luftwaffe losses inflicted by Anglo-American
forces during the period of June to October 1944 amounted to
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11, 182 aircraft destroyed or damaged. 61 This amounted to 75.4% of
all Luftwaffe losses during this period (see Table VI).

The losses

incurred on the German-Soviet Front amounted to 3,650 aircraft or
24.60/o of total Luftwaffe losses for the same period (see Table VI).
Therefore, Anglo-American efforts can be credited with assisting
the Soviet Union in achieving air superiority on the Eastern Front.
The success of the Soviet summer offensive caused a
readjustment of German Luftflotten on the Eastern Front as the
Wehrmacht fell back into Eastern Europe.
consolidated into three Luftflotten:

The Luftflotten were

Luftflotte I isolated in

Couriand; Luftflotte 11 covering East Prussia to Slovakia; and
Luftflotte IV defending Austria, Hungary and northern Yugoslavia.
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TABLE II
LUFTWAFFE AIRCRAFT DISTRIBUTION BY FRONT,

AUGUST 1943
FRQNT
German-Soviet Front:
Western European Front:
Italian Front:
Balkan Front:
Norwegian Area:
Reich Air Defense:
Total~:

AIRCRAFT
2,896
744
841
451
203
1 .498
6~3

PERCEM:
43.6%
11.3%
12.7%
6.8%
3.00/o
22.6%
100.QO/o

Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste
der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer
Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 328.

TABLE Ill
LUFTWAFFE AIRCRAFT DISTRIBUTION BY FRONT,
JUNE 1944
FRQNT
German-Soviet Front:
Western European Front:
Italian Front:
Balkan Front:
Norwegian Area:
Reich Air Defense:
Tot~:

AIRCRAFT
3,267
1,450
353
567
204
1 .572
7~

PERCENT
44.0%
19.6%
4.8%
7.7%
2.7%
21.2°/o
100.0%

Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste
der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer
Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 328.
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Fighters
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Fighters
Twin-Eng.
Fighters
Ground
Attack
Aircraft
Nt. Ground
Attack
Aircraft
Bomber
Aircraft
Transport
Aircraft
47

32
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396

--

9
90

55
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--

--

45

51
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--

--

201

148

--
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374
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45
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LF=Luftflotten

10

--

22

10

19

--

29

15
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32

47

398

152

--
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--
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TABLE IV

168

--

183

461

429

110

42

21

24

55

15

--

--

Luftwaffe
Command
SQutbeast
34

LF
BeiQh

11th
Air
(!Qrps

.....
0
0'1

l45Q

--

--

-353

35

--

--

--

580

58

15

18

3

1266

8

154

51

40

74

21
25

16
5

--

--

4

13

--

3

25

LF4

11
4

25

--

--

LF3

LF2

LF1

152

--

--

22

1269

2Q4

1572

--

14

42

-145

219

7
6

--84

39

::!6Z

28

28

12

109

53
4

32
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A~ich

4

Luftwaffe
Command

LF

--

23

LF6

--

--

21

7

-12

45
9

--

5

(WEST)
LF5

7
5

--

7

(OST)
LF5

Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im
Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 325.

TQtal:

Corps
Transport
Aircraft
Mine Sweep
Aircraft
Sea Planes
Weather
Recon
Aircraft
Liason Com
Aircraft
Sea Rescue
Aircraft
Troop
Glider
Cargo
Glider

LF=Luftflotten

DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FORCES IN THE INDIVIDUAL
LUFTFLOTTEN, JUNE 1944
(continued)

TABLE IV

385

124

11th
Air
CQ[QS

.....
0
O>

Close Recon
Aircraft
Long Range
Recon
Aircraft
Single-Eng.
Fighters
Night
Fighters
Twin-Eng.
Fighters
Ground
Attack
Aircraft
Nt. Ground
Attack
Aircraft
Bomber
Aircraft
Transport
Aircraft
50

514
106

30

51

---32

21
14

24

77

--

197

124

12

--

32
55

87

41

34

-293

59

--

36

--

-12

--

45

289

80

365

--

94

202

66

140

LF6
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Sn
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--

43
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--

(WE
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--

--

--

--

35
7
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17
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37
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(OST)
LF5
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22
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36

LF3

LF2

LF1

LF=Luftflotten
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TABLE V

--

--

--

--

566

437

--

--

Rei~b

LF

94

41

14

23

24

43

19

176

Luftwaffe 11th
Air
Command
SQutheast CQrgs
39

.......

.......

0

-

LF1

569

6
42

4
7

42
12

..

..
..
14

-

..

189

..

.

..

..

..

33

565

-11JQ

89

12
16

11

LF4

25

LF3

..

LF2

1136

218

.

.
.

.-

18

--

16

5

..

.

51
11

.

..

(WEST)
LF5

8
7

3

6

(OST)
LF5

1628

25

80

1

85

4

..

..

38

LF6

1261

..

14

51

138

26
9

39

Reich
4

LF

566

28

30

8

86

51
4

53

Luftwaffe
Command
S2utbeast
9

Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im
Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 326.

I2tal;

..
Corps
Transport
Aircraft
Mine Sweep
3
Aircraft
Sea Planes
10
..
Weather
Recon
Aircraft
Liason Com
51
Aircraft
Sea Rescue
3
Aircraft
..
Troop
Glider
.
Cargo
Glider

LF=Luftflotten

DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FORCES IN THE DIFFERENT
LUFTFLOTTEN, AUGUST 1944
(continued)

TABLE V

4

167

C2r~

11th
Air

.....
0
00

1014
6.8

4696
31.7

1046
170
16
158

WESTERN AND
NORTHERN EUROPE
63
150
2662
332
52
23
24

5472
36.9

442
148
9
279

REICH AIR
DEFENSE
37
37
3162
914
257
186
1

3650
24.6

289
159
10
270

GERMAN-SOVIET
FRONT
341
133
1058
73
7
1119
191

Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im
Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 333.

Total:
Percent:

ITALIAN/BALKAN
AIRCRAFT
PENINSULA
91
Close Recon Aircraft
Long Range Recon Aircraft
62
Single-Engine Fighters
275
Night Fighter Aircraft
25
Twin-Engine Fighters
4
15
Ground Attack Aircraft
Night Ground Attack
100
Aircraft
Bomber Aircraft
60
Transport Aircraft
280
Sea Planes
7
Liason, Communications,
95
and other Aircraft

DISTRIBUTION OF LUFTWAFFE FRONTAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES
(TOTAL LOSSES AND DISABLED AIRCRAFT)
JUNE TO OCTOBER 1944

TABLE VI
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Figure 25. Aviation Gasoline Production, Consumption
and Stocks, January 1940-April 1945. Source: The
United States.Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division
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CHAPTERV

LEND-LEASE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COLLAPSE OF
THE WEHRMACHT IN THE EAST IN THE SUMMER OF
1944

Lend-Lease contributed greatly to the military success of the
Red Army in 1944. Lend-Lease supplies which the Soviet Union had
received in 1941 and 1942 had not contributed significantly to the
military successes of the Soviet Union.

However, Lend-Lease

supplies that reached the Soviet Union in 1943 and 1944 were
significant to Soviet military success and consequently the
collapse of the German Army in the East in the summer of 1944.
Soviet writers fail to credit Lend-Lease with helping the
Soviets achieve military victory over the Germans. They contend
that Lend-Lease amounted to only 4 percent of Soviet industrial
production although the proportion of western tanks is credited
with 7 percent and 13 percent of aircraft. 1 Soviet writers take the
position that "deliveries of this size could not have possibly had
any marked effect on the course of the war," and Lend-Lease was
"an insignificant supplementary source" of supplies.2

The supplies

received after Stalingrad were "no longer needed," but during the
critical first 6 months of the war Lend-Lease supplies amounted to
only 0.1 percent of total Soviet production.3
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Despite Soviet disclaimers about Lend-Lease aid, the
importance of this aid can be readily established in the years
1943-1945.

Lend-Lease aid was supplied by several routes (see

Figure 29). The Northern Russia convoy route was the most
dangerous and difficult (see Figure 30).

The opening of the "Persian

corridor, facilitated the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies (see
Figure 31 ).

In 1943, shipments through the "Persian corridor"

included 920 tanks, more than 5000 aircraft, and almost 145,000
motor vehicles or nearly five times more than in 1942.4

The Soviet

Union had received 173,000 vehicles and 4,300 tanks from the
United States by the end of 1943.5 The gross tonnage had almost
doubled and reached the level of 27 percent of all U.S. Lend-Lease
(see Table VII).
According to Table VII, 63 percent of all Lend-Lease arrived
during 1943 and 1944.

In the last 14 months of the war the Soviets

received almost 11.1 million tons of Lend-Lease supplies. s

The

Lend-Lease shipments of 1944 were approximately 30 percent
greater than in 1943. 1

However, the dollar value of the Lend-Lease

supplies received during the twelve months ending in June 1944
exceeded the previous 12 months by 81 percent (see Table VIII &
IX).8 This level of assistance can be seen to have contributed to
Soviet military power when the types of supplies are examined.
There are various opinions as to which Lend-Lease supplies
contributed most to Soviet victory.

The United States supplied the

U.S.S.R. with 15,000,000 pairs of boots between March 1941 to
October 1945.9 The U.S.S.R. received 6 million pairs of boots by
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1944.10

Therefore, the Red Army marched in boots primarily

provided by the United States and boots were essential to the
mobility of Red Army infantry. Food has been ranked as also
important.

American Lend-Lease food could have provided one

pound of concentrated ration per day for 6 million soldiers for the
length of the entire war.11

Lend-Lease food prevented a substantial

reduction in civilian food supplies.

It has been estimated that

average civilian caloric consumption would have declined by at
least one-third without Lend-Lease.12

According to Secretary of

State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. in 1944:
The best-fed group in Russia today is the Red Army.
Everything has been sacrificed for the soldiers, and
Lend-Lease food shipments have helped to keep their
fighting strength high.13
Furthermore, Stettinius declared in 1944:
Planes and tanks are the most dramatic part of our
Lend-Lease aid to Russia, but in the last analysis they
are probably not the most important. As Admiral Akulin
said soon after he arrived in this country, "by sending
us raw materials and manufacturing equipment, you
actually increase the combat strength of the Red Army
considerably more than you do by the number of planes
and tanks you send us."14

LEND-LEASE AIRCRAFT IN THE SOVIET UNION

It is evident that Lend-Lease supplies assisted the Soviets in
numerous areas.

However, in the summer of 1944 the Red Army

130

required mobility and air power to defeat the German Army in the
Lend-Lease made significant contributions in both of these

East.
areas.

Lend-Lease aircraft comprised about 15 percent of the

Soviet Air Force in 1943.15

The Soviet Union had received 6,430

aircraft from the United States and 5,800 aircraft from Britain
between June 22, 1941 and April 30, 1944.16

By October of 1944,

Lend-Lease aircraft amounted to 8,734 U.S. and 6,015 British
aircraft.17

Soviet combat losses amounted to 1,500 per month or

18,000 aircraft per year.is

According to Table X most of the U.S.

Lend-Lease aircraft that arrived between June 22, 1941 and
October 1944 were delivered after July 31, 1943.

Therefore,

between August 1943 and October 1944 the Soviet Union received
5,087 U.S. Lend-Lease aircraft or 58 percent of all U.S. aircraft
deliveries made since June 22, 1941. The increased deliveries of
aircraft assisted the Soviet Union in replacing its combat losses of
1,500 aircraft per month and in establishing air superiority in
1944.

THE IMPACT OF LEND-LEASE MOTOR VEHICLES
IN THE SOVIET UNION

The most significant impact of Lend-Lease on the collapse of
the German Wehrmacht in the East was the delivery of motor
vehicles to the Soviet Union which made it possible to motorize the
Red Army.

Table XI delineates in detail the number of vehicles

delivered to the Soviet Union.

Analysis of certain vehicle
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categories shows how important Lend-Lease was to the
motorization of the Red Army.

The following vehicle categories are

summarized based upon the actual vehicles which arrived in the
Soviet Union from U.S. Lend-Lease:
Jeeps
Trucks
Ordnance Service Vehicles
Light Tanks
Medium Tanks
Self-Propelled Guns
Half-Tracks
Armored Scout Cars
Motorcycles
Locomotives
Railway Cars

47,238
362,288
2,293
1,239
4,957
1,807
1, 104
3,054
32,200
1,966
11,075

The vehicle totals given above represent the total U.S. Lend-Lease
arrivals in the Soviet Union for the entire war.

But most of the

motor vehicles had reached the Soviet Union by the end of the Third
Protocol period on June 30, 1944. Table XII shows the distribution
of tonnage for trucks, other vehicles and railroad transportation
equipment as shipped by period and protocol.
Railroad equipment played only a minor role since only 70,466
tons or 15 percent of Lend-Lease railroad equipment was shipped
between July 1, 1943 and June 30, 1944. No other railroad
equipment had been furnished prior to the third protocol period.
The analysis of motor vehicle tonnage revealed that a total
tonnage of 1,406,564 tons was shipped to the Soviet Union by June
30, 1944.

This constituted 61 percent of all motor vehicle tonnage

shipped to the Soviet Union.

A total of 883,387 tons or 39 percent
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was received after June 30, 1944 and of this amount 238, 11 7 tons
or 10.4 percent was received after Germany had surrendered.
Approximately 61 percent of all Lend-Lease vehicles were
furnished to the Soviet Union before July 1, 1944.

Between July 1,

1943 and June 30, 1944 approximately 742,337 tons or 32 percent
of all Lend-Lease motor vehicles were received.

The Soviet Union

received 645,270 tons or 28 percent of all Lend-Lease vehicles
Between July 1, 1944 and May 12, 1945. Therefore, the bulk of
Lend-Lease motor vehicles were available for the Soviet summer
offensive of 1944.
Lend-Lease motor vehicles "put the Red Army infantry on
wheels for the first time in its history."19

Previously, the Red

Army infantry had to march into battle and during the course of
offensive operations would lag behind the armored formations.

The

German Army would then isolate the exposed armored units and cut
them off and seal the breach in their lines before the advancing
Soviet infantry could reach the exposed armored units.

However,

with Lend-Lease trucks and vehicles the infantry could advance
with the Soviet armored formations and effectuate strategic
breakthroughs.

According to the historian John Erickson:

In the offensive operations of 1942-3 the Red Army had
been severely inhibited by the lack of lorries. Here
Lend-Lease Supplies which pumped in 183,000 lorries
and jeeps by mid-1943 (and a grand total of 430,000 by
1944), certainly relieved some of the Red Army's
chronic lorry starvation. Every operation, both in
preparation and execution, had been impeded by the
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shortage of lorries; every armored formation needed
more lorries than it could muster.20
Red Army Officers told U.S. Ambassador William Averell
Harriman in the summer of 1944 that without Lend-Lease American
trucks the Red Army could not have advanced so rapidly.21

The

retreating Wehrmacht had systematically destroyed railways and
bridges.

Therefore, the advancing Red Army was extremely

dependent on motor vehicles to move their troops around and
through devastated areas.

According to an American official report

Lend-Lease trucks carried "half of the highway-borne supplies for
the advancing Soviet armies in the great offensives of this (1944)
spring and summer on the Eastern Front. "22 British observers noted
that Lend-Lease vehicles were important to the Red Army's
success.23

The British observed that the success of the Red Army

artillery was dependent on transport which was primarily LendLease trucks.24

The British believed that of all the Lend-Lease aid,

"the most valuable was probably the vast number of trucks. "25
U.S. Military Attache, General John R. Deane claimed that
truck transportation and combat vehicles were the most" important
Lend-Lease items.26 On a trip to the Russian front in July 1944,
General Deane noted:
We encountered American trucks everywhere. They
appeared to be the only sort of vehicles used for convoy
work. The roads were jammed with transportation of
all descriptions, but except for American trucks there
did not appear to be enough of any one kind to set up
convoys which could be moved as units. They were
easily recognized by the blue "U.S." and the American
serial number stenciled on the hood of each ... We saw
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thousands of American trucks on the road. They were
the only vehicles which appeared to be organized into
transportation units.

Many of them carried troops ... 27

General Deane delineated the significance of Lend-Lease aid
by comparing the Soviet and German armies:
It was apparent that the Russian victories were won by
superior mobility. The combined bomber offensive of
the Western Allies was taking its toll of German oil,
and the German artillery and much of the transport we
saw was mostly horsedrawn. The Russians with their
preponderance of motorized and mechanized equipment
were thus able to outmaneuver the Germans. Here again
one could see the results of American assistance.2s
The large numbers of four and six wheeled American trucks
enabled the Soviet tank and motorized formations to move crosscountry while the German armor and motorized units were tied to
the roads because of the lack of motorization in these
formations.29 Many Panzer divisions were forced to rely on horsedrawn panje columns for supply and baggage transport.Jo

According

to historian Albert Seaton:
The German equivalent to the Red Army quarter-ton
jeep for commander or messenger remained the horse.
The counterpart of the Studebaker or Dodge six-wheeled
drive truck was the horse-drawn panje wagon.JI
Thus, the Red Army had achieved not only numerical superiority but
also a superiority in motorization and mechanization over the
Wehrmacht.
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SOVIET AND GERMAN MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION

The importance of Lend-Lease trucks in the Red Army
becomes more apparent when Soviet and German truck production is
compared.

Soviet domestic production averaged 8000 trucks per

month while Lend-Lease imports averaged 11,500.32 Lend-Lease
allowed the Soviet Union to de-emphasize vehicle production so
that it could concentrate on tank and aircraft production.

German

truck production averaged 9,500 trucks per month (see Figure 32).33
However, according to OKW records 109, 113 trucks were lost on
the various fronts between January and August 1944.34

This

amounted to 39 percent of the entire military stock available and
was the entire production for 1943.35

Despite allied bombing

German production of motor vehicles in 1944 was considerable (see
Table XIII).

Germany also received motor vehicles from the

industries of occupied countries in Europe (see Table XIV).

It

becomes clear from Table XIV that Germany was the primary
producer of German Army vehicles.

The production of motor

vehicles by the Soviet Union remained inferior to Germany and its
supply from the occupied countries.

Therefore, Lend-Lease

provided the margin of superiority to the Red Army so that it
achieved mechanized and motorized superiority over the
Wehrmacht.

The significance of this motorized superiority in the

summer of 1944 was noted by one historian:
It is also doubtful that the Soviet Union could have
conducted its immense offensives without Western aid.
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The assistance to transport and communications
systems gave the Soviet forces a special advantage in
massing their forces quickly, sustaining them during

the "buildup" phase of an attack, and supporting them
during offensives which ranged 300-400 miles in depth .
.. .Without Western aid in this phase of the war the
Soviet Union would still have survived, and probably
eventually would have won. But without Lend-Lease,
victory would have been postponed, and the Soviet share
of victory and presence in eastern and central Europe
reduced.36
Soviet truck production was very inadequate and was cut in
half during the war.37

When American trucks became abundant

Soviet production was scaled back even further. Soviet domestic
truck production from 1942-1945 was approximately 197, 100. 38
The tremendous numbers of Lend-Lease trucks, jeeps, motorcycles
and other vehicles provided not only the mobility for the Red Army,
but permitted the Soviet Union to concentrate productive capacity
in the manufacture of tanks and aircraft.39

SOVIET AND GERMAN TANK PRODUCTION

Soviet industry freed from the constraints of having to
produce masses of trucks was able to concentrate on tank
production.

The Soviet Union produced 79,611 tanks compared to

25,006 produced by Germany.4o

The total number of tanks and self-

propelled guns produced by the Soviet Union was approximately
112,952 (see Table XV).41

Total German production of tanks and

self-propelled guns amounted to 46,742 vehicles or 41 percent of
the total Soviet production (see Table XVl).42

Table XVII delineates
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the Soviet superiority in tank production as compared to German
tank production during the war.

lend-Lease armored vehicle

shipments to the Soviet Union were extremely small (see Table XI)
when compared to motor vehicle shipments.

Thus, Lend-Lease aid

permitted the Soviets to maintain and increase their tank strength
(see Figure 33) by continued concentration on tank production since
trucks and other motor transport were provided mostly by the
United States.
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TABLE VII
ANNUAL LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION
(THOUSANDS OF TONS AND PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET TOTAL)

Y.e.ar
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Totals

T~

404
2,747
5,370
6,964
4.115
19&QO

Percent
2
14
27
36
21
100

Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M.
University, December 1986), p. 105.
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TABLE VIII
LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, JULY 1942-JUNE 1943
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Lend-Lease Shipments
Ordnance and ammunition
Aircraft and parts
Tanks and parts
Watercraft
Motor Vehicles and parts
Machinery and parts
Agricultural products
TQtal

Cost
$266,684
$400,362
$101,135
$52,281
$256, 120
$524,295
$330.200
$1.931.077

Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M
University, December 1986), p. 132; U.S. President,
Reports to Congress Lend-Lease Operations, No. 16
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-45),
p. 30.
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TABLE IX
LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, JULY 1943-JUNE 1944
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
Lend-Lease Shipments
Ordance and ammunition
Aircraft and parts
Tanks and parts
Motor Vehicles and parts
Industrial machinery and parts
Agricultural products
Naval equipment
TQtal

~

$398, 502
$659,732
$134,795
$500,607
$1,094,483
$610,114
$91.519
$3.489.752

Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M
University, December 1986), p. 135; U.S. President,
Reports to Congress Lend-Lease Operations, No. 16
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-45),
p. 30.
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TABLEX
AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION
1 OCTOBER 1941 • 31 JULY 1943
I~

Pursuit planes
Bombers
Other aircraft
Total

Number
1,555
1,901

1il
3.647

Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M
University, December 1986), p. 133.
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TABLE XI
VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION
UNDERTHELEND-LEASEPROGRAM
Items
Jeeps:
1/4 ton
4x4
amphib.
Total
Trucks:
3/4 ton
1 1/2 ton
2 1/2 ton
2 112 ton
amphib.
5 ton plus
special
purpose
Truck
tractors
w/o
trailer
Total

Lend-Lease
ExgQrt

Total
Ex122rts

Arrived

Lost
En RQ!Jte

Diverted

47,993

48,993

43,728

3,657

1,378

3,510
51,5.03

3,510
52,503

3,510
47,238

0
3,657

0
1,378

25,240
153,415
190,952
589

25,240
159,494
193,603
589

24,564
148,664
182,938
586

78
6,660
4,300
3

598
1,826
1, 130

852
2,792

858
2,792

814
2,784

0
8

0

1,941

1,960

1,938

6

0

375, 781

384,536

362,288

11,055

3,554

0
0
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TABLE XI
VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION

UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM
(continued)
Items
Ordance
Service
Vehicles:
Field
repair
trucks
Tank
recovery
units
Tank
transporters
Total
Combat
Vehicles:
Light
tanks
Medium
tanks

Lend-Lease
EXQQrt

Total

Arrived

EXQQrl~

Lost
En RQute

Diverted

1,543

1,543

1,543

9

0

130

130

130

0

0

655

655

629

26

0

2,328

2,328

2,293

35

0

1,682

1,682

1,239

443

0

5,374

5,374

4,957

417

0
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TABLE XI
VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION

UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM
(continued)
Items

Selfpropelled
guns
AT
75mm
AT
57mm
AT 3in.
AT
37mm
AA
50cal.
Halftracks
Armored
scout
cars
Total
Motorcycles
Tracklaying
tractors

Lend-Lease
Export

Total
Exports

Arrived

Lost
En Route

Diverted

5

5

5

0

0

650

650

650

0

0

52
100

52
100

52
100

0
0

0
0

1,000

1,000

1,000

0

0

1, 158

1, 158

1, 104

54

0

3,282

3,282

3,054

288

0

13,303

13,303

12,161

1, 142

0

35, 170

35, 170

32,200

1,870

1, 100

8,071

8,074

7,570

253

0
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TABLE XI
VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION

UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM
(continued)
Items

Lend-Lease
ExgQrt

Railway
Units:
Steam
1,911
locomotives
Diesel
70
electric
locomotives
Flat cars 10,000
Tank
120
cars
Dump
1,000
cars
Heavy
35
machine
cars
TQJal
13.136

Total

Arrived

Ex~

Lost
En RQute

Diverted

1,911

1,900

11

0

70

66

4

0

10,000
120

9,920
120

80
0

0
0

1,000

1,000

0

0

35

35

0

0

13J..36

131041

~

0

Source: Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States
Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1969), Appendix A, Table IV; U.S.
Department of State. Protocol and Area Information Staff
of the U.S.S.R. Branch of the Division of Research and
Reports. "Report on war Aid Furnished by the United States
to the U.S.S.R." Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign
Liquidation, Department of State, November 28, 1945, pp.
19-21.
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TABLE XII
MOTOR VEHICLES AND RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
JUNE 22, 1941 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1945
Time PeriQd
June 22, 1941-Sept.
30, 1941

Oct. 1, 1941-June
30, 1942

July 1, 1942-June
30, 1943

July 1, 1943-June
30, 1944

T~ge of Cargo
Trucks and other
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment

Trucks and other
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment
Trucks and other
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment

TQtal Tonnage
1,575
0

214,164
0

448,488
0

Trucks and other
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment

742,337

July 1, 1944-May 12, Trucks and other
1945
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment

645,270

70,466

355,739
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TABLE XII
MOTOR VEHICLES AND RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
JUNE 22, 1941 • SEPTEMBER 2, 1945
(continued)
Time Period
May 13, 1945-Sept.
2, 1945

Type of Cargo
Trucks and other
Vehicles
R.R. Transportation
Equipment

Total Tonnage:
Trucks and other Vehicles
R.R. Transportation Eguipment

Total Tonnage
238, 117
41,380

2,289,951
467.585

Source: Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States
Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1969), Appendix A, Table I; U.S.
Department of State. Protocol and Area Information Staff
of the U.S.S.R. Branch of the Division of Research and
Reports. "Report on war Aid Furnished by the United States
to the U.S.S.R." Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign
Liquidation, Department of State, November 28, 1945, pp.
1-8.
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TABLE XIII
GERMAN PRODUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES 1944
Product
Trucks:
Up to & incl. 1.5-ton
3-ton (incl. "Mules")
4.5-ton & up (incl. "Mutes")
Caterpillar truck (RSO)
Total

Quantity
22,383
43,062
10,711
11.942
88,088

Half-tracks and special vehicles 17, 736
21,656
Automobiles
30,372
Motorcycles
4,490
Motorcycle half-tracks
1._013
Tractors
Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor
Vehicles Industry Report, Munitions Division, January
1947, p. 13.
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TABLE XIV
MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES
Country and Type

1943

1944

FRANCE:
2-Ton Trucks
3.5-Ton Trucks
4.5-Ton Trucks
Total Trucks

3,228
4,757
1.374
9,359

ITALY:
3-Ton Trucks
4.5-Ton Trucks
Total Trucks
Tractors

0
0
0
0

5,402
.HQ.
6,048
172

CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
3-Ton Trucks
Automobiles
Motorcycles

1,376
1,261
498

1,920
0
0

0
3,674
If!.4_

4,458

Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor
Vehicles Industry Report, Munitions Division, January
194 7, Exhibit E, pp. 1-2.
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TABLE XV
SOVIET ARMORED VEHICLE PRODUCTION
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
TygB
194Q
125
Misc.
T-26
1,549
BT-8
706
T-28
12
T-40
T-50
T-60
T-70
T-80
T-34
117
T-3485
T-44
KV-1
141
KV-2
102
KV-1S
KV-85
IS-2
SU-76*
SU-122
SU-85
SU-100
SU-152
ISU-122/
ISU-152

1941

1942

41
48
1,818

181
15
4,474
4,883

3,014

12,553

194~

1944

1945

3,343
120
15, 712
100

3,723
11,000

18,330
200

1, 121
232

1,753
780

26
25

452
130
102
1,928
630
750
704
35

2,252
7, 155
493
1,300
500

1,500
3,562

2,510

1,530

1, 175

Tgtals
24.006
261297
61274
2.752
241690
26.933
*SU-76 figures include small number of ZSU-37 production; 1945
figures refer only to first six months.
Source: Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Sgviet Tanks And
CQmbat Vehicles of WQrld War Two (London: Arms and
Armour Press, 1984), p. 225.

151

TABLE XVI
GERMAN PANZER PRODUCTION: TANKS, ASSAULT GUNS

AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS

PANZERS
Mark I and II
Mark Ill
Mark IV
Tank Destroyer
IV
Assault Gun
Ill/IV
Panther
Jagd-Panther
Tiger I
Tiger II
Jagd-Tiger
Self-Propelled
Guns
Total German
Panzers
Jagd-38
38 t
Total Panzers

194Q
9
895
280

1941
233
1,845
480

1942
306
2,555
964

1943
77
349
3,073

1944
7

1945

3,371
1,764

417
458

184

550

828

3,319

5,884

1,061

1,850

3,964
215
623
377
51
1,248

469
166

75

647

1,248

2
2,557

112
26
87

1,368

3,108

5,979

11,874 17,504 2,796

275
1,643

698
3,806

195
6,174

1,598 1, 136
124
87
11,961 19,226 3,932

*German 1945 figures refer only to the first three months.
Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tank Industry
Report, Munitions Division, January 1947, Exhibit A.
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TABLE XVII
COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND GERMAN
ARMORED VEHICLE PRODUCTION
1940-1945
Soviet Production
German Production
1940
2,752
1,643
1941
6,274
3,806
1942
24,690
6, 174
1943
24,006
11 ,961
1944
28,933
19,226
1945
26.297
3.932
T~
1.l.b952
4~742
*Soviet 1945 figures refer only to the first six months;
German 1945 figures refer only to the first three months.
Yfta[

Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tank
Industry Report, Munitions Division, January 1947, Exhibit
A; Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and
Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and
Armour Press, 1984), p. 225.
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CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND FRONT: THE IMPACT ON
GERMAN MOBILE RESERVES

The necessity of fighting on several fronts reduced the
concentration of military forces on any one front.
benefited from the dispersion of German forces.

The Soviet Union
Both the Soviet

and Anglo-American forces had the good fortune to only have to
fight against a portion of the German Army on any given front while
the Germans had to face the full brunt of each of the allied armies
on their respective fronts.

In the summer of 1944, the Soviets

would have had to confront a much larger and more mobile German
Army if there had not been an active Anglo-American second front.
The Anglo-American forces tied down sufficient German infantry,
Panzer Grenadier and Panzer divisions that the Soviet summer
offensive achieved much of its success because the German
reserves which could have been used to halt the offensive were
engaged against Anglo-American forces.

The most significant

reserves the Wehrmacht had to prevent Soviet breakthroughs were
its mobile formations and 49 percent of these units were located in
the West.

However, if the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division and the

1st Rumanian Panzer Division are excluded and only German mobile
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units are compared then the ratio becomes 51 percent in the West
and 49 percent in the East when the Soviet summer offensive began
(see Tables XVIII & XX).

If the mobile formations in the West had

been available in the East during the summer of 1944 the outcome
of the Soviet summer offensive would have been different.

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST AND THE EAST
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944

The German military had 79 infantry divisions, 9 Luftwaffe
field divisions, 5 parachute divisions, 1 air landing division, 5
Jaeger divisions, 5 mountain divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 8
Panzer Grenadier divisions, and 15 Panzer divisions located in the
West in June 1944 (see Tables XVIII & XIX). The German and Axis
order of battle in the East contained 130 German infantry divisions,
4 German Luftwaffe field divisions, 7 German Jaeger divisions, 5
German mountain divisions, 6 German Panzer Grenadier divisions,
16 German Panzer divisions, 11 Hungarian infantry divisions, 1
Hungarian Panzer division, 18 Rumanian infantry divisions, 2
Rumanian mountain divisions, 1 Rumanian Panzer division and 1
Slovakian infantry division (see Tables XX & XXI).
A comparison of non-mobile divisions in the West and the
'East as delineated in Table XIX and Table XXI show the bulk of nonmobile divisions to be in the East. According to Tables XIX and XXI,
58 percent of German non-mobile divisions were located in the East
and 42 percent were in the West in June 1944. However, when all
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Eastern European Axis divisions are also calculated into the total
axis military force then the percentage of military power in the
West declines in comparison to the East. A ratio of German and
Axis Allies in the East when compared to the West shows that 63
percent of all German and Axis non-mobile divisions were in the
East compared to 37 percent in the West.
Therefore, the majority of German and Axis divisions were
deployed in the East.

However, 51 percent of all German mobile

divisions and 42 percent of all non-mobile German divisions were
located in the West.

This military deployment in the West

amounted to 128 divisions of which more than half would have been
available to fight in the East if there had been no second front.
Soviet success in the East was achieved because of German
weakness and German weakness resulted from fighting a two-front
war.

If the German forces in the West had been mostly available to

fight in the East then the outcome of the war in the East would
have been different.

German mobile reserves were absolutely

critical to the success of German defense against Soviet
breakthroughs and half of these reserves were needed to prevent an
Anglo-American breakthrough in the West.

Therefore, the second

front pinned down the critical reserves needed to prevent the
Soviet breakthrough in the East in the summer of 1944.
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TABLE XVIII
GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS,
ORDER OF BATILE IN THE WEST
JUNE 1944

Country and Army

DENMARK

Mobile Divisions
233rd Reserve Panzer Division

0.B.WEST
NETHERLANDS

19th Panzer Division

FRANCE:
Army Group B

15th Army:

7th Army:

Army Group G:

1st Army:

2nd Panzer Division
116th Panzer Division
9th SS Panzer Division
"Hohenstaufen"
10th SS Panzer Division
"Frundsberg"
1st SS Panzer Division
"Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler"
21st Panzer Division
12th SS Panzer Division
"Hitlerjugend"
17th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division "Goetz Von
Berlichingen"
Panzer Lehr Division
2nd SS Panzer Division "Das
Reich"
9th Panzer Division
11th Panzer Division

0.B. SOUTHWEST
ITALY

14th Army:

10th Army:

3rd Panzer Grenadier Division
29th Panzer Grenadier Division
90th Panzer Grenadier Division
26th Panzer Division
1st Fallschirm Panzer Division
"Herman Goering"
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TABLE XVIII
GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS,

ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST
JUNE 1944
(continued)
Country and Army
10th Army:
Army Detachment Von Zangen:
0.B. SOUTHEAST

Mobile Divisions
15th Panzer Grenadier Division
16th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division "Reichsfuehrer SS"
18th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division "Horst Wessel"

Anny Group E

GFEECE
Total Mobile Divisions:
Panzer Grenadier Divisions
Panzer Divisions
Total Mobile Divisions

4th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division "Polizei"

8 Divisions
15 Divisions
23 Divisions

Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V.
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr.
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorjsierten
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: PodzunPallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej,
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11,
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown,
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46;
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. 10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T -78 Roll
136.
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TABLE XIX
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE,
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN,
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS
IN JUNE 1944
Country and Army
OOFNIAY

Divisi_ons
89th Infantry Division
196th Infantry Division
199th Infantry Division
230th Infantry.Division
269th Infantry Division
270th Infantry Division
274th Infantry Division
280th Infantry Division.
295th Infantry Division
702nd Infantry Division
710th Infantry Division
14th Luftwaffe Field Division

DENMARK

160th
166th
363rd
416th

0.B.WEST
NETHERLANDS

Reserve
Reserve
Infantry
Infantry

Infantry Division
Infantry Division
Division
Division

34 7th Infantry Division
719th Infantry Division
16th Luftwaffe Field Division

FRANCE
15th Army:

4 7th Infantry Division
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TABLE XIX
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE,

AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN,
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS
IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Country and Army
15th Army:

7th Army

Division~

48th Infantry Division
49th Infantry Division
84th Infantry Division
85th Infantry Division
165th Reserve Infantry Division
182nd Reserve Infantry Division
245th Infantry Division
326th Infantry Division
331 st Infantry Division
344th Infantry Division
346th Infantry Division
348th Infantry Division
711th Infantry Division
712th Infantry Division
17th Luftwaffe Field Division
18th Luftwaffe Field Division
77th Infantry Division
91 st Air Landing Division
243rd Infantry Division
265th Infantry Division
266th Infantry Division
275th Infantry Division
319th Infantry Division
343rd Infantry Division
352nd Infantry Division
353rd Infantry Division
709th Infantry Division
716th Infantry Division
2nd Parachute Division
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TABLE XIX
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE,
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN,
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS
IN JUNE 1944
(continued)

Country and Army
7th Army
Army Group G
1st Army

19th Army

Divisions
3rd Parachute Division
5th Parachute Division
189th Reserve Infantry
158th Reserve Infantry
159th Reserve Infantry
276th Infantry Division
708th Infantry Division
148th Reserve Infantry
157th Reserve Infantry
242nd Infantry Division
244th Infantry Division
271 st Infantry Division
272nd Infantry Division
277th Infantry Division
338th Infantry Division

Division
Division
Division

Division
Division

0.8. SOUTHWEST
ITALY
14th Army

10th Army

715th Infantry Division
65th Infantry Division
92nd Infantry Division
162nd Infantry Division
356th Infantry Division
362nd Infantry Division
19th Luftwaffe Field Division
20th Luftwaffe Field Division
4th Parachute Division
71 st Infantry Division
94th Infantry Division
278th Infantry Division
305th Infantry Division
334th Infantry Division
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TABLE XIX
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE,
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN,
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS
IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Country and Army
10th Army

Army Detachment Von Zangen
0.B. SOUTHEAST

2nd Panzer Army

Army Group E
GFEECE

Divi.siQns
1st Parachute Division
5th Mountain Division
114th Jaeger Division
42nd Jaeger Division
19th Luftwaffe Field Division
98th Infantry Division
1st Mountain Division
8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian
Geyer"
181 st Infantry Division
264th Infantry Division
297th Infantry Division
369th Infantry Division
373rd Infantry Division
392nd Infantry Division
1st Cossack Cavalry Division
11 Sth Jaeger Division
"Brandenburg "
7th SS Mountain Division "Prinz
Eugen"
13th SS Mountain Division
"Handschar" (Croation #1)
21st SS Mountain Division
(Albanian #1)
22nd Infantry
41 st Fortress Division
133rd Fortress Division
104th Jaeger Division
117th Jaeger Division
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TABLE XIX
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE,
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN,
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS
IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Country and Army
Army Group E
GFEECE

TOTAL DIVISIONS:
Infantry Divisions:
Luftwaffe Field Divisions:
Parachute Divisions:
Air Landing Divisions:
Jaeger Divisions:
Mountain Divisions:
Cavalry Divisions:
Total:

Divisions
440th Assault Division "Rhodos"
11th Luftwaffe Field Division

79
8
5
1
5
5

2
105

Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V.
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr.
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: PodzunPallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej,
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11,
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown,
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46;
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. 10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll
136.
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TABLE XX
GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, ORDER OF BATTLE

IN THE EAST JUNE 1944
Army Group and Army
AP.MY GROUP NORTH
Army Detachment Narva

Mobile Divisions
12th Panzer Division
11th SS Panzer Grenadier
"Nordland"

AP.MY GROUP CENTER

60th Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle"
18th Panzer Grenadier Division
25th Panzer Grenadier Division
20th Panzer Division

4th Army
9th Army
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE
1st Hungarian Army
1st Panzer Army

4th Panzer Army

ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE
6th Army

8th Army
4th Rumanian Army

16th Panzer Division
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division
1st Panzer Division
7th Panzer Division
8th Panzer Division
17th Panzer Division
20th Panzer Grenadier Division
4th Panzer Division
5th Panzer Division
1st Rumanian Panzer Division
3rd Panzer Division
10th Panzer Grenadier Division
13th Panzer Division
23rd Panzer Divsion
Panzer Division
"G rossdeutschland"
3rd SS Panzer Division
"Totenkopf"
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TABLE XX
GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, ORDER OF BATTLE

IN THE EAST JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group and Army
4th Rumanian Army

TOTAL MOBILE DIVISIONS
Panzer Greandier Divisions
Panzer Divisions
Total German Mobile divisions
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division
1st Rumanian Panzer Division
Total Mobile Divisions

Mobile Divisions
14th Panzer Division
24th Panzer Division

6 divisions
1.Ldivisions
22 divisions
1 division
1 division
24 divisions

Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
1O (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V.
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr.
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: PodzunPallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej,
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11,
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown,
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46;
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. 10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll
136.
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TABLE XXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
Army Group
FINLAND
20th Mountain Army

ARMY GROUP NORTH
16th Army

Divisions
163rd Infantry Division
169th Infantry Division
210th Infantry Division
2nd Mountain Division
6th Mountain Division
7th Mountain Division
Field Training Division "Nord"
21st Infantry Division
23rd Infantry Division
24th Infantry Division
30th Infantry Division
32nd Infantry Division
69th Infantry Division
81 st Infantry Division
83rd Infantry Division
87th Infantry Division
93rd Infantry Division
121 st Infantry Division
126th Infantry Division
132nd Infantry Division
205th Infantry Division
207th Infantry Division
212th Infantry Division
215th Infantry Division
21 Sth Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
16th Army

Army Detachment Narva

ARMY GROUP CENTER

3rd Panzer Army

Divisions
263rd Infantry Division
281 st Infantry Division
285th Security Division
290 Infantry Division
300th Division Z.B.V.
329th Infantry Division
389th Infantry Division
15th SS Waffen-Grenadier
Division (Latvian #1)
19th SS Waffen-Grenadier
Division (Latvian #2)
12th Luftwaffe Field Division
21st Luftwaffe Field Division
11th Infantry Division
58th Infantry Division
61 st Infantry Division
122nd Infantry Division
170th Infantry Division
225th Infantry Division
227th Infantry Division
285th Security Division
20th SS Waffen-Grenadier
Division (Estonian #1)
390th Field training Division
14th Infantry Division
707th Infantry Division
95th Infantry Division
197th Infantry Division
201 st Security Division
206th Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
3rd Panzer Army

4th Army

9th Army

2nd Army

Di~ions

221 st Security Division
246th Infantry Division
252nd Infantry Division
256th Infantry Division
299th Infantry Division
391 st Security Division
4th Luftwaffe Field Division
6th Luftwaffe Field Division
12th Infantry Division
31st Infantry Division
57th Infantry Division
78th "Sturm" Division
110th Infantry Division
260th Infantry Division
267th Infantry Division
286th Security Division
337th Infantry Division
6th Infantry Division
35th Infantry Division
36th Infantry Division
45th Infantry Division
102nd Infantry Division
129th Infantry Division
134th Infantry Division
292nd Infantry Division
296th Infantry Division
383rd Infantry Division
7th Infantry Division
137th Infantry Division
203rd Security Division
211 th Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
2nd Army

ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE
4th Panzer Army

1st Panzer Army

Divi.s.!Qns
251 st Infantry Division
5th Jaeger Division
1st Hungarian Infantry Division
5th Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division
12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division
23rd Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division

26th Infantry Division
72nd Infantry Division
88th Infantry Division
131 st Infantry Division
183rd Infantry Division
214th Infantry Division
217th Infantry Division
253rd Infantry Division
291 st Infantry Division
339th Infantry Division
340th Infantry Division
342nd Infantry Division
361 st Infantry Division
454th Security Division
1st Ski Jaeger Division
28th Jaeger Division
1st Infantry Division
75th Infantry Division
96th Infantry Division
168th Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
1st Panzer Army

1st Hungarian Army

ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE

Army Group General Dumitrescu
3rd Rumanian Army

Di vi~
208th Infantry Division
254th Infantry Division
349th Infantry Division
357th Infantry Division
359th Infantry Division
367th Infantry Division
371 st Infantry Division
1OOth Jaeger Division
20th Hungarian Infantry
68th Infantry Division
101 st Jaeger Division
16th Hungarian Infantry
18th Hungarian Reserve
Division
19th Hungarian Reserve
Division
24th Hungarian Infantry
25th Hungarian Infantry
27th Hungarian Infantry

Division

Division
Infantry
Infantry
Division
Division
Division

153rd Field Training Division
1st Slovakian Infantry Division
8th Rumanian Infantry Division

9th Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
3rd Rumanian Army

6th Army

Army Group General Woehler
8th Army

Divisions
304th Infantry Division
2nd Rumanian Infantry Division
9th Rumanian Infantry Division
15th Rumanian Infantry Division
21st Rumanian Infantry Division
4th Rumanian Mountain Division
15th Infantry Division
17th Infantry Division
38th Infantry Division
62nd Infantry Division
106th Infantry Division
123rd Infantry Division
161 st Infantry Division
25 7th Infantry Division
258th Infantry Division
282nd Infantry Division
293rd Infantry Division
294th Infantry Division
302nd Infantry Division
306th Infantry Division
320th Infantry Division
335th Infantry Division
355th Infantry Division
370th Infantry Division
384th Infantry Division
97th Jaeger Division
4th Mountain Division
14th Rumanian Infantry Division
79th Infantry Division
376th Infantry Division
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR

INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
8th Army

4th Rumanian Army

TOTAL DIVISIONS:
GERMAN DIVISIONS:
Infantry Divisions
Luftwaffe Field Divisions
Jaeger Divisions
Mountain Divisions
Total German Divisions
AXIS DIVISIONS
SLOVAKIA
Infantry Divisions
HUNGARY
Infantry Divisions

Divisions
3rd Rumanian Infantry Division
5th Rumanian Infantry Division
11th Rumanian Infantry Division
46th Infantry Division
76th Infantry Division
198th Infantry Division
8th Jaeger Division
3rd Mountain Division
1st Rumanian "Guards" Division
1st Rumanian Infantry Division
4th Rumanian Infantry Division
5th Rumanian Infantry Division
6th Rumanian Infantry Division
7th Rumanian Infantry Division
8th Rumanian Infantry Division
13th Rumanian Infantry Division
20th Rumanian Infantry Division
18th Rumanian Mountain
Division

130
4
7
5
146

1
11
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TABLEXXI
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR
INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944
(continued)
Army Group
RUMAN IA
Infantry Divisions
Mountain Divisions
Total Axis Divisions
Total German and Axis Divisions

Division.s
18
2
32
178

* Note Finnish military divisions have been omitted from table.

Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V.
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr.
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: PodzunPallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej,
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11,
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown,
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46;
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. 10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll
136.

CHAPTER VII

PRELUDE TO THE BELORUSSIAN SUMMER OFFENSIVE:
THE WINTER BATILES OF THE FOURTH ARMY
AND THIRD PANZER ARMY IN THE
WINTER OF 1943-1944

The Soviet High Command had attempted during the winter
battles of 1943-1944 to push back the Belorussian salient
occupied by Army Group Center without much success.

Army Group

Center had achieved for the most part a defensive success by the
use of mobile reserves and a creative shifting of troops in the
front lines along lateral roads and railways to prevent enemy
breakthroughs.

Therefore, the Soviet High Command was forced to

adopt new tactics and a more coordinated offensive plan so as to
prevent the German shifting of mobile reserves and army level
reserves to prevent breakthroughs.

The evolution of the

operational planning for the Summer Belorussian Offensive
stemmed from the previous Soviet failures to breakthrough Army
Group Center's Belorussian salient in the winter battles of 19431944.

An examination of the German 4th Army's defense of the

Orsha-Mogilev sector and 3rd Panzer Army's protracted defense of
the Vitebsk-Polotsk sector during the winter of 1943-1944
delineates the problem the Soviet High Command faced in trying to
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penetrate well prepared defensive positions backed up with mobile
reserves.

FOURTH ARMY

The German Command of Army Group Center anticipated a
major Soviet offensive during November 1943 against the 4th
Army. On November 4, 1943 the Kriegstagebuch of Army Group
Center noted that all signs of a major enemy offensive were
present in the 4th Army sector. 1 The enemy was noted to have 22
Rifle Divisions, 1 Guard Tank Corps and 1 Artillery Corps
concentrated in this sector (See Appendix B for Soviet corps,
divisional, and non-divisional unit structures).2

The German order

of battle on October 26, 1943 in the 4th Army sector contained
roughly 16 divisions although some were not at their authorized
strength (see Table XXll).

Ten days later the long awaited

offensive began along both sides of the river Dnieper and the
autobahn in the 4th Army area (see Figure 34).

November 14. 1943
The Soviets attacked after strong artillery preparation with
15 Rifle Divisions supported by numerous tanks.3 The German 4th
Army had only 12 divisions in the 4th Army sector as of November
8, 1943 (see Table XXlll) to meet this attack.

This attack achieved

several breakthroughs which were liquidated in a counterattack.
But the Soviets achieved two breakthroughs which resisted the
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German counterattacks at Kostjany and north of the autobahn at
Nowoje Sselo.

The Kostjany penetration was 3 kilometers wide

and 2 kilometers deep extending into the German main battle line.4

November 15. 1943
The Soviets continued their attack with heavy
reinforcements but all attacks from Bobrowa to Kirijewo were
repulsed.5

The breakthrough position at Kostjany was sealed off

and the position at Nowoje Sselo was reduced by the capture of the
town.6

November 16. 1943
The Soviet attacks were repulsed and the breakthroughs
moped up.

Penetrations north of Guraki and Chandogi were thrown

back in a counterattack. 1 The enemy attacks in the area around
Nowoje Sselo were defeated.

The Kriegestagebuch of Army Group

Center reflected that the German defensive success was achieved
at the cost of high casualties and the situation was becoming
strained as a result of German losses, enemy numerical
superiority, and the continuous intensity of the tank attacks.a

November 17. 1943
The Soviets renewed their battle along both sides of the
Dnieper river in full strength with 30 Rifle Divisions and strongly
massed tank forces.9
breakthrough at Orsha.

The objective of the attack was to force a
The main concentration of the attack was
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against Nowoje Sselo which was lost in the course of the battle
but in general all other attacks were repulsed.10

The Soviets lost

94 tanks in this attack before they were repulsed.11

The

Headquarters of Army Group Center noted that despite the
defensive victory achieved the loss of strength of German units and
the exhaustion of the troops made the situation critical in the 4th
Army sector.12

November 18-21 . 1943
The Soviets continued their major attack without success
and they lost 31 tanks. 13

Soviet attacks decreased in strength on

November 19th and an attempted breakthrough in the XXVI I Corps
sector was defeated.14 On November 20th there was a general
decrease in Soviet attacks and the German line was held.

Major

Soviet attacks ceased on November 21, 1943 after seven days of
non-stop breakthrough attempts.

The Kriegstagebuch of Army

Group Center noted that the 4th Army had achieved a defensive
success in the third Battle of the Smolensk Autobahn.1s

November 22-29. 1943
A nine day lull settled in on the 4th Army sector.

The Soviets

launched local attacks against the front of the 337th Infantry
Division in an attempt to prevent the breakthrough at Asarowa
from being liquidated and the disengagement from the front by the
95th Infantry Division.16

However, by November 29th the Asarowa
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position had been cleared up and the 95th Infantry Division
disengaged from the front.

November 30. 1943
The fourth Battle of the Smolensk Autobahn commenced with
the renewal of the major Soviet offensive against the left flank of
the 4th Army east of Orsha. 11

The main concentration of effort

was south of the Dnieper river and north of the Autobahn in the
XXVI I Corps sector.

Despite considerable numerical superiority the

Soviets were repulsed and only achieved a breakthrough position at
Chandogi and Bobrowo in the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division's
sector.1s

December 1. 1943
The Soviets attacked along both sides of the Autobahn with
28 divisions in an attempt to breakthrough to Orsha.19

The Soviets

failed to make a breakthrough toward Orsha and penetrations north
of the Dnieper river were eliminated by German counterattack.

December 2. 1943
The Soviets resumed the attack on both sides of the Autobahn
and the Dnieper river with 31 divisions.20

In the 18th Panzer

Grenadier Division's sector the Soviets broke into Krassnaja
Ssloboda.21

In the sectors of the 78th Sturm Division and the 25th

Panzer Grenadier Division all Soviet attacks were smashed.22
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December 3. 1943
The Soviets continued their offensive east of Orsha on both
sides of the Autobahn.

However, the Soviets lost Krassnajea

Ssloboda to a counterattack by the 18th Panzer Grenadier
Division.23

The 4th Army was achieving defensive success against

Soviet attacks but the strength of the Army was reduced to 9
divisions as of December 3rd (see Table XXIV).

December 4. 1943
The Soviets ceased offensive operations after four days of
offensive battles which resulted in high Soviet casualties and
failure to breakthrough to Orsha.24

Army Group Center's

Kriegstagebuch noted that the 4th Army had achieved a defensive
victory in the 4th Battle of the Smolensk Highway.2s

The

Kriegstagebuch noted that the Soviets still had considerable tank
forces which had not yet been employed in battle and that the
enemy had probably not given up his objective of taking Orsha.26

December 14. 1943
Therefore, the 4th Army was reinforced as indicated by the
December 14, 1943 order of battle (see Table XXV). The XXlll Corps
was transferred from the 9th Army to the 4th Army.
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THIRD PANZER ARMY

The Third Panzer Army was in an extremely exposed position
during the winter of 1943-1944.
Army Group Center.

It was the northern most army in

One of the Soviet major goals of the 1943-

1944 Winter Campaign was the routing of German forces at Vitebsk

see Figures 35 & 36)

21

The German forces in the Third Panzer

Army amounted to 8 Infantry Divisions, 4 Luftwaffe Field
Divisions, and 1 Panzer Division (see Table XXVI).

Severe battles

were waged by the Soviets against the Third Panzer Army from
December 13, 1943 to February 17, 1944.

Despite tremendous

Soviet pressure and some loss of ground the Third Panzer Army
held Vitebsk and a line between Orsha in the southeast and Polotsk
to the northwest (see Figure 37).

December 11 . 1943
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group Center noted that the
Soviets were prepared to attack from recognized concentration
points along the front of Third Panzer Army.2s

December 12. 1943
Soviet reinforcements were reported to have arrived in the
area east of Vitebsk.29
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December 13. 1943
The major Soviet offensive commenced against the northeast
front of the Third Panzer Army.30

The numerically superior Soviet

forces attacked the front of the 129th Infantry Division's sector in
the Puljachi-Krizkije area (see Figure 38).3 1

The Soviets achieved

a breakthrough onto the highway Pobki in the west.

The attack

between Bernewo and Tschernowo Lake was successful (see Figure
38). The northern bank of Tschernowo lake was reached on the
right and the left attack group broke through in the direction of
Wyrowljca (see Figure 38).32 The 20th Panzer Division in a
counterattack brought the Soviet attack to a halt on the line
Krelina-Chobnja-Jakuschenki-Radtschenki.33

December 14. 1943
The IX Army Corps front was in danger of collapsing. The
Soviets penetrated the front of the 129th Infantry Division at
Puljachi and could not be repulsed till the Soviets had reached the
intersection south of Wjasowki. 34

The local command had

exhausted its reserves placing the IX Army Corps in a critical
situation.

The following day the Soviets attacked the sectors of

the 129th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division and the 20th
Panzer Division.

The Soviets enlarged the breakthrough from the

northeast and southwest where the spearheads of their forces
joined in the area of Bytschicha encircling the 87th Infantry
Division and part of the 129th Infantry Division (see Figure 39).35
Both divisions were ordered to breakout to the southeast.

The
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129th Infantry Division was pressed back to the hills south of
Mechewoje where the counterattack of the 20th Panzer Division
located in the town Malaschenki secured the hills south of
Mechewoje.

Soviet attacks were supported by an unusually high

number of aircraft sorties which exceeded 11 OQ.36

December 16. 1943
The Soviets succeeded in pinching off a large portion of the
Nevel salient.

The 129th Infantry Division withdrew along the line

Dobrino-Mechowoje and the Soviets pursued the retreating Germans
taking Dobrino, Mechowoje, and in the evening they occupied
Bytschicha.37

The remnants of the 87th Infantry Division broke

through the encirclement to Malaschenki (see Figure 40) on the
same afternoon.38 The division had been reduced in strength to
5000-6000 men without heavy weapons and almost no vehicles.39
The 20th Panzer Division was able to hold their positions along the
rail line stretching from Malaschenki to the Tschernowo lake (see
Figure 40).

December 17. 1943
The Soviets pushed back the 129th Infantry Division to the
line Dobrino-Kleschowo-Schilakowo causing it to lose contact with
the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division on its right flank.40

The 20th

Panzer Division engaged in heavy battles along the rail line lost
Schljuchi, Blochi, and Ambrossenki on the same day (see Figure
40).41

The crisis on this front even attracted the attention of
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Adolf Hitler and a Fuehrerbefehl was issued on December 17th
allowing the Third Panzer Army to withdraw to the line
Trofimenki-Tscherny-Wyschedki-Kusmino.42

The withdrawal of

the IX Army Corps would free 1-2 divisions which could be used to
strengthen the front while reserves were brought up to the area of
Vitebsk-Polotsk.

The 5th Jaeger Division and the 60th Panzer

Grenadier Division were transfered to the 3rd Panzer Army area. 43

December 19. 1943
The Soviets shifted their attack to the northeast of Vitebsk
against the right flank of the 14th Division between Borok and
Wymno Lake achieving deep breakthroughs in five places (see
Figure 41 ).4 4 The withdrawal of the Liii Army Corps on the night of
December 18th resulted in the Soviets attacking the 6th Luftwaffe
Field Division and breaking through to occupy part of the new main
battle line northwest of Ssmolowka.

The breakthrough east of the

Tschernowo Lake could not be sealed off.

The Soviets attempted to

breakthrough on the road. Surash-Vitebsk and to cross the road
south of Bitowka with tank support.

However, the Germans

employed their last reserves and knocked out 60 Soviet tanks in
the course of blocking the Soviet attack.45

Between Ssmolowka

and the Koscho Lake all attacks were repulsed. A deep
breakthrough on both sides of the Tschernowo Lake was repulsed.
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December 20. 1943
During the night the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the
129th Infantry Division were withdrawn under the cover of
darkness to the Gorodok blocking position.

December 21. 1943
The Third Panzer Army was attacked from two sides.

Heavy

attacks were launched against the right flank of 14th Infantry
Division, but despite Soviet pressure the road Vitebsk-Surash was
cleared.

The Soviets succeeded in breaking through the 3rd

Luftwaffe Field Division's sector at Rudnja, Gribali and
Lapuschnizy.46

A Soviet night attack brought about the loss of

Wystawka, Mischutki and Karmolity which the Germans had just
recaptured during the day.47

According to the Kriegstagebuch of

Army Group Center, the Third Panzer Army had from December 1321, 1943 destroyed 247 Soviet tanks and 8 assault guns.48 The
14th Infantry Division was responsible for destroying 116 of the
247 Soviet tanks.49

December 23. 1943
The Soviets shifted their attack to the southeast against the
VI Army Corps.

The attack was launched against the boundaries of

the German 246th Infantry and 206th Infantry Divisions between
the Liosno-Vitebsk road and the railroad (see Figure 42).50

Despite

a German counterattack with reserves the front remained torn open
with a 1 kilometer gap opened by the Soviets.51

The Liii Army
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Corps faced powerful Soviet attacks between Ssjubowowka and the
Koscho Lake.

The 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the 129th

Infantry Division were pulled back from Gorodok (see Figure 42)
while the Soviets continued an attack from the area north of
Ssirotino.

December 24. 1943
The 3rd Panzer Army faced another day of crisis on the front.
The Soviets ruptured the boundaries of the 246th and 206th
Infantry Divisions and reached the Liosno-Vitebsk railroad and
proceeded west and cut the vehicle road.52 In the north Gorodok
was given up by the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the 129th
Infantry Division.

On the right flank of IX Army Corps the Soviets

advanced on both sides of Filipenki on the road Vitebsk-Polotsk.
The 20th Panzer Division in a counterattack blocked a Soviet
advance on Ssirotino (see Figure 42). The Fuehrer ordered the
withdrawal of the 14th Infantry Division to the Loswiza blocking
position on the night of December 24-25.53

The 60th Panzer

Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" and the 5th Jaeger Division
were released from Army Group Center reserve status and placed
at the disposal of the 3rd Panzer Army to restore the situation
southeast and northeast of Vitebsk (see Figure 42).

December 25. 1943
The "Feldherrnhalle" Panzer Grenadier Division prevented a
deep breakthrough on the right flank of the 246th Infantry Division
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on Christmas day thereby momentarily stabilizing the southeastern
front.54

The 6th Luftwaffe Field Division lost Grabniza and a hole

was punched through the inner flanks of the Liii and IX Corps which
permitted the Soviets to cross the road Vitebsk-Ssirotino to the
south (see Figure 42).55 The right flank of the IX Army Corps was
pressed back clinging to both sides of the Gorodok-Ssirotino road
up to the town lgumenschtschina.

December 26. 1943
The critical situation on the northern flank of the 3rd Panzer
Army caused the Army High Command OKH to transfer the 16th
Panzer Division from the south flank of the 9th Army to the 3rd
Panzer Army. 56 The Soviets achieved a deep breakthrough south of
Duena and rolled up the front line to the "Bear Position" located on
left flank of the 14th Infantry Division and the right flank of the
4th Luftwaffe Field Division.57

The Soviets widened their

breakthrough in the southeast by collapsing the right flank of the
6th Luftwaffe Field Division so that it had to withdraw to the edge
of the woods south of Ssilki.58

The 3rd Panzer Army despite

continued Soviet pressure contained the Soviet attacks with its
new reinforcements (see Table XXVll).

December 27-28. 1943
German intelligence noted the Soviet strength in the area of
Vitebsk to be 42 Rifle Divisions, 2 Rifle Brigades, 15 Tank
Brigades, 4 Tank Regiments, and 4 Mechanized Brigades.59 The
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Soviets continued to attempt a breakthrough between the vehicle
road and the Liosno-Vitebsk road (see Figure 43).

A counterattack

by the Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" repulsed the
Soviet breakthrough group at Roshnowo and threw it back over the
railroad track.

A breakthrough into the main battle line of the

206th Infantry Division was cleared up by deployment of the last
reserves.

The Soviets achieved a penetration through the

occupation of the strong points in the main battle line of the 129th
Infantry Division and the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division in the
wooded terrain southeast of Zygany.

The 5th Jaeger Division was

tied down by a ·soviet attack in the flank at Masurino.
The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" threw the
Soviets back across the vehicle road and retook the controlling hill
219.s.so

In the sector of the 129th Infantry Division and the 6th

.

Luftwaffe Field Division the Soviets penetrated the wooded terrain
to the west bank of the Loswiza Lakes. The road had to be cleared
from the village Losswida to the south so parts of the 129th
Infantry Division could be withdrawn to a new defensive position.

December 29. 1943
All Soviet attacks against the Liii and IX Army Corps were
repulsed.

The 3rd Panzer Army from December 13-19, 1943 had

destroyed 520 Soviet tanks, disabled 29 tanks, and captured 2
tanks. 61
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December 30. 1943
The focal points of the defensive battle of Vitebsk continued
to be in the breakthrough areas southeast and northeast of the city.
The Soviets attacked on a wide front against the northern front of
the 246th Infantry Division, Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle," and the right right flank of the 206th Infantry
Division.

The Soviets broke through between Dymanowo and

Roshnowo to the vehicle road.62

In the afternoon the road was

finally cleared by the counterattacks of the last reserves with
assault guns.

A breakthrough toward Gribuny was blocked by a

counterattack.

December 31. 1943
The Germans made further progress in a counterattack by the
Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" supported by
reinforcements from the 4th Army in pressing the Soviets further
back to the East away from the vehicle road (see Figure 44). The
Soviet attack between Loswiza Lake and the road Vitebsk-Polotsk
was repulsed.63

The 5th Jaeger Division on the right flank of the IX

Army Corps gained control of the hills southeast of Tschisti
bringing the Soviet penetration area up to Saronowskoje Lake under
fire by German guns (see Figure 44).

January 1-8. 1944
On January 1, 1944, the Soviets cut the vehicle road
southeast of Vitebsk and held onto a stretch of the road through
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January 2nd. 64

Northwest of Vitebsk the Soviets captured

Jermatschki on January 3rd.

Between January 4-6, 1944 the

Soviets attempted breakthroughs to the southeast and northwest of
Vitebsk which were thrown back in German counterattacks (see
Figure 45). On January 5th 42 Soviet tanks were destroyed. 65 On
January 7, 1944, the main offensive of the Soviet forces shifted to
the northwest of Vitebsk between Loswiza and Saranowskoje Lake.
The Soviets achieved success against the 206th Infantry Division
and captured Lushino, Saranowskoje Lakes and Sslobodka.66 The
Soviet attack on January 8th achieved a breakthrough in the wooded
area north of Kossatschi which crossed over the vehicle road to
Makarowo and proceeded on to Lutschessa and Perewos. On this day
Soviet tank losses amounted to 159.67

January 11. 1944
The Germans launched a major counterattack to recapture the
vehicle road which was only partly successful (see Figure 46).

The

299th Infantry Division lead the counterattack and recaptured
Makarowo and the 131st Infantry Division retook Majaklowo (see
Figure 46).68

According to the Kriegstagebuch of Army Group

Center 945 Soviet tanks were destroyed and 7 4 disabled in the 3rd
Panzer Army area from December 13, 1943 to January 11, 1944.69

January 12. 1944
German counterattacks in the southwest and to the west of
the vehicle road attained an improvement in the front.

The 299th
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Infantry Division's counterattack reached the high terrain east of
the line Makarowo-Mjaklowo in the evening.

The Soviets attacked

northwest of Vitebsk with 6 divisions and 2 tank brigades (see
Appendix B) along both sides of the Vitebsk-Ssirotino road but did
not achieved success.70 The Germans destroyed 43 Soviet tanks in
the course of the day on the 3rd Panzer Army Front. 11

January 13. 1944
The Soviets launched a counterattack against the 299th
Infantry Division in the sector of Makarowo-Mjaklowo.

The hills

northwest of Makarowo were lost in the 12th Infantry Division's
sector and the Soviets occupied the isthmus on the south end of the
Saranowskoje Lake.12

January 14. 1944
The 12th Infantry Division pushed back the Soviets and
reoccupied the isthmus on the south end of the Saranowskoje
Lake. 73

On the southeast front the Soviets attempted to envelope

Kartaschewa by an attack against the front of the 246th Infantry
Division and the right flank of the 131 st Infantry Division.74

January 15. 1944
Soviet attacks to the northwest of Vitebsk subsided.
However, Soviet attacks continued to the southeast against the
246th Infantry Division.

The Soviets acquired the woods southeast
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of Krjukowo and both sides of the communication road with a
penetration to hill Souch.

Krynki.

January 16. 1944
The northwest front of the 3rd Panzer Army remained quiet,
but the Soviets pressed their attack in the southeast with
numerous tank formations.
the 246th Infantry Division.

The focal point of the attack remained
The Soviets widened their

penetrations and acquired both sides sides of the communication
road and occupied the railroad station Krynki. 75 The Soviets tore a
hole in the front which the Germans could not close until evening.

January 17. 1944
The sector northwest of Vitebsk remained quiet while the
Soviet offensive continued southeast of Vitebsk (see Figure 47).
The Soviet attack at Kryukowo was repulsed, but a hole was
achieved in the front southwest of the railroad station Krynki.76
The Soviets broke through to Tscherkassy, but were thrown back by
a German counterattack which knocked out 36 Soviet tanks and
restored the situation. 77

January 18. 1944
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group Center noted that the first
phase of the Battle of Vitebsk appeared to be finished.78

The only

further Soviet offensive activity was an attempt to push back the
front of the 246th Infantry Division to the south.
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January 23. 1944
The Soviet resumed offensive operations on the southeast
front after a five day pause.

The 246th Infantry Division received

the brunt of the Soviet attack and the Soviets broke through south
of Krynki.

The attack reached the woods northeast of Schugajewo.

February 2. 1944
The 3rd Panzer Army Front had remained quiet for almost one
week when the Soviets resumed offensive operations.

The 87th and

12th Infantry Divisions were attacked after a 30 minute artillery
preparation by 6 Soviet divisions on a 12 kilometer wide front. 79
The Germans repelled the attack inflicting heavy losses on the
Soviets.

February 3.1944
The Soviet offensive against Vitebsk was resumed in full
strength.

Heavy artillery preparation preceded the Soviet attack

against the front of the 299th, 131 st, and the right flank of the
206th Infantry Division (see Figure 48).80

The Soviets achieved

numerous breakthroughs in the German defensive positions (see
Figure 48).

German units were surrounded and forced to conduct a

defense from all sides.

German counterattacks achieved only

limited success and both sides suffered heavy losses.

The Soviet

attack northwest of Vitebsk was preceded by a 2 hour 30 minute
artillery preparation.

The Soviets attacked with 1O divisions

supported by tanks against the Liil Army Corps (see Figure 48).81
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In extremely bitter battles the Soviets broke through the German
defensive positions and captured the rail line.a2

The Germans

threw in all available reserves to form a makeshift defensive front
in the secondary positions during the afternoon.

The Soviets

occupied the railroad to the south with the support of 20 tanks.

February 4-17. 1944
German counterattacks finally gained momentum and halted
the Soviet breakthroughs southeast and northwest of Vitebsk.

All

further enemy attacks were repulsed and all breakthroughs were
liquidated by German counterattacks along the 3rd Panzer Army's
Front (see Figure 49).

On February 17, 1944 the second Battle of

Vitebsk ended in an outstanding defensive success for the 3rd
Panzer Army. 83

The Soviets had recklessly employed 6 armies with

a total of 53 infantry divisions and 13 tank brigades with strong
artillery support to breakthrough from the southeast and northwest
of Vitebsk to destroy the German divisions in "Fortress Vitebsk. "84
The Soviets not only failed to choke off and destroy the German
forces in Vitebsk, but they also failed to sever the railroad line
Orsha-Vitebsk and the road between Vitebsk and Lepel.

The cost of

the Soviet defeat in the second Battle of Vitebsk from February 317, 1944 was tabulated as the following:

832 prisoners; 68

deserters; 352 tanks destroyed; 31 tanks immobilized; 24 artillery
pieces captured; 15 mortars captured; 266 machine guns captured;
and 40 Soviet aircraft shot down.85
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SOVIET RESOURCES AND STRATEGY IN THE
WINTER BATTLES OF 1943-1944

The Soviets continued attacks intermittently till March 29,
1944 when the Soviets finally went over to the defensive.

Soviet

attacks had failed in the 4th Army and 3rd Panzer Army areas
because of a lack of resources, concentration of forces and
coordination.

The 1st Baltic Front consisting of the 4th Shock,

11th Guards, 39th, 43rd, 51st Armies and the 3rd Air Army had
operated against the Vitebsk area.86

The Western Front contained

the 5th, 10th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 50th, 61st, 63rd, 65th Armies and
the 1st Air Army which had operated against the Orsha area. 87
Both of these fronts, however, did not receive the same
quantity of reinforcements, artillery and tanks as the fronts
operating in the Leningrad and Ukraine sectors.88

According to

Soviet sources the 1st Baltic Front, the Western Front and the
Belorussian Front received only 19% of all reserve reinforcements,
26% of all guns and mortars, and only 4.2% of the tanks and assault
guns.89 The Western Front had failed to take Orsha in the November
and December 1943 winter battles.

The 1st Baltic Front attempted

to seize Vitebsk by the employment of the 4th Shock, 11th Guards,
43rd and 39th Armies.90

However, the Soviets failed to take

Vitebsk with the 1st Baltic Front and the battle that had begun on
December 13, 1943 ended on January 18, 1944. The Soviets
eliminated the Nevel salient northwest of Vitebsk.

But the
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tenacity of the 3rd Panzer Army in holding Vitebsk required the
Soviets to change their strategy.
The Soviets tried to take Vitebsk by employing two fronts
against the 3rd Panzer Army.

The 39th Army was transferred from

the 1st Baltic Front to the Western Front.

On February 3, 1944, the

Battle for Vitebsk resumed with the 1st Baltic Front attacking
northwest and the Western Front attacking southwest of Vitebsk.
This offensive continued until February 17, 1944 when Soviet
operations subsided.

The Soviets had failed to take Vitebsk, but

they had cut the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the south of the city and
the Vitebsk-Ssirotino road to the northwest of Vitebsk (see Figure
50).91

Thus, the Soviets were faced with the problem of

overcoming the fortified, entrenched, defensive positions of Army
Group Center during the Summer of 1944.

Soviet strategy and

tactics in the planning of the Belorussian summer offensive were
shaped as a result of the Soviet failures on the Central Front.

GERMAN DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

The Germans were for the most part tied to a system of
defense in place which worked during the winter of 1943-1944
with the use of mobile reserves and the shifting of forces.

German

mobile reserves consisted of panzer units, assault gun battalions,
and motorized antitank units (see Appendix A).92

Artillery and

rocket projector regiments were also made available to meet
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Soviet attacks (see Appendix A).

The shifting of German forces to

the focal point of the Soviet attacks occurred on a battalion by
battalion basis.

When Soviet attacks were at full intensity the

Germans transferred up to two battalions per day from an
individual division in the army area. 93

During the night one or two

battalions were pulled out and the adjacent sectors extended.
These battalion sectors were extended each night as another one or
two battalions were withdrawn until the entire division was
withdrawn to the threatened sector.94

The Germans maintained

their divisional integrity by this method rather then transferring
single battalions from different divisions.95

However, when the

Soviet pressure was at its peak it was often necessary to pull
several battalions from several divisions at once temporarily
causing mixing of divisions until divisional integrity could be
restored.96

The Germans achieved remarkable results using these

defensive tactics.

In the 4th Army area the Germans consistently

defeated numerically superior Soviet forces that outnumbered
them by a 10:1 ratio.97
The Commander of the 4th Army General Heinrici attributed
his defensive success to three factors:
In my opinion, there were three main factors that
contributed to the success of the defense. First, I
formed narrow divisionsal sectors, with a high ratio of
force to space, on the actual frontage of the Russian
assault. Secondly, I managed to form a very powerful
artillery grouping, of 380 guns, to cover the threatened
sector. This was controlled by a single commander, at
Army Headquarters, and was able to concentrate its
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fire on any required point of that 20 kilometer frontage.
The Russian offensives were supported by up to a
thousand guns, but their fire was not so concentrated.
Thirdly, the losses of the German divisions engaged-which had to be reckoned as the equivalent of about one
battalion per division in each day of battle--were
compensated by a system of drawing battalions from
divisions on other parts of the Army front. I always
tried to have three fresh battalions--one for each of
the divisions holding the battle front--ready behind
this before the attack started. The other battalion of
the regiment from which it was drawn would follow,
together with the regimental staff, and in this way I
would get complete fresh regiments incorporated in the
front, and then complete fresh divisions. The temporary
mixing of divisions was inevitable, and part of the
price of tl:le defensive success, but I always tried to
restore their integrity as soon as possible.98

SOVIET TACTICAL FAILURES

A more creative Soviet plan of attack would have overcome
such German defensive tactics by diversionary attacks against the
critically extended sectors of the front outside of the main area of
attack.

The Soviets could also have shifted their attacks from one

area to another area causing confusion for the German High
Command.

Instead, the Soviets in the winter battles of 1943-1944

in Belorussia most often renewed their attacks at the identical
·spot where they had attacked previously. 99

Soviet artillery was

extremely effective on the first day of offensive operations, but
after a breakthrough had been achieved the use of artillery became
very disorganized and disjointed.100

Troops in the breakthrough
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zone were deprived of effective artillery support which caused
them to be more susceptible to German counterattack.

These

Soviet weaknesses were to be corrected in the Belorussian Summer
Campaign of 1944.
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TABLE XXll
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE,
OCTOBER 26, 1943
Army Corps
4th Army Reserve
XII Corps

XXXIX Panzer Corps

XXVll Corps

Army Group Center Reserve

Formm!Qns
286th Security Division
KG 35th Infantry Division
KG 56th Infantry Division
262nd Infantry Division
330th Infantry Division
342th Infantry Division
25th Panzer Grenadier Division
95th Infantry Division
KG 113 Infantry Division
252nd Infantry Division
337th Infantry Division
18th Panzer Grenadier Division
26th Infantry Division
52nd Infantry Division
KG 78th Assault Division
197th Infantry Division
1st SS Motorized Brigade
Cavalry Regiment

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional Unit
Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
8 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 582.

207

TABLE XXlll
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE,
NOVEMBER 8, 1943
Army Corps
4th Army Reserve
XII Corps

XXXIX Panzer Corps

XXVll Corps

Forma~

286th Security Division
Corps Detachment D: 56th
Infantry Division and 262nd
Infantry Division
KG 35th Infantry Division
342nd Infantry Division
26th Infantry Division
95th Infantry Division
337th Infantry Division
18th Panzer Grenadier Division
25th Panzer Grenadier Division
78th Assault Division
197th Infantry Division
1st SS Motorized Brigade

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional
Unit Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
8 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 586.
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TABLE XXIV
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE,
DECEMBER 3, 1943
Army Corps
4th Army Reserve
XII Corps
XXXIX Panzer Corps
XXVll Corps

Formations
286th Security Division
KG 35th Infantry Division
342nd Infantry Division
26th Infantry Division
337th Infantry Division
18th Panzer Grenadier Division
25th Panzer Grenadier Division
78th Assault Division
197th Infantry Division

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional
Unit Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 501.
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TABLEXXV
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE,
DECEMBER 14, 1943
Army Corps
4th Army Reserve
XXlll Corps

XII Corps

XXXIX Panzer Corps

XXVll Corps

Formations
286th Security Division
95th Infantry Division
110th Infantry Division
131 st Infantry Division
260th Infantry Division
267th Infantry Division
Corps Detachment D: 56th and
262nd Infantry Division
35th Infantry Division
342nd Infantry Division
18th Panzer Grenadier Division
26th Infantry Division
337th Infantry Division
25th Panzer Grenadier Division
78th Assault Division
197th Infantry Division

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional
Unit Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehryng Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 505.
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TABLE XXVI
GERMAN 3rd PANZER ARMY ORDER OF BATILE,
DECEMBER 14, 1943
Army Corps
3rd Panzer Army Reserve
IX Corps

Liii Corps
VI Corps

Formations
201 st Security Division
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division
6th Luftwaffe Field Division
20th Panzer Division
87th Infantry Division
129th Infantry Division
252nd Infantry Division
3rd Luftwaffe Field Division
4th Luftwaffe Field Division
14th Infantry Division
206th Infantry Division
211th Infantry Division
246th Infantry Division
256th Infantry Division

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional
Unit Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 505.
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TABLE XXVll
GERMAN 3RD PANZER ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE,
DECEMBER 26, 1943
Army Corps
3rd Panzer Army Reserve
IX Corps

Lill Corps

VI Corps

Formations
201 st Security Division
5th Jaeger Division
20th Panzer Division
87th Infantry Division
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division
3rd Luftwaffe Field Division
6th Luftwaffe Field Division
129th Infantry Division
252nd Infantry Division
4th Luftwaffe Field Division
14th Infantry Division
60th Panzer Grenadier Division
"F eldherrnhalle"
197th Infantry Division
206th Infantry Division
211th Infantry Division
246th Infantry Division
256th Infantry Division

*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional
Unit Structures.
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 509.
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Figure 34. German Defense In Place With Mobile
Reserves: Winter 1943-1944. Source: D~partment of
the Army, German Defense Tactics Against Russian
Break-Throughs (Washington D.C.: Department of the
Army, October, 1951 ), Map No. 6.
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Figure 35. Probable Russian Operational Objectives in
the First Battle of Vitebsk. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die
Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk vom 13.12.43 bis
17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-313
Roll 291.
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Figure 36. Probable Russian Operational Objectives in
the Second Battle of Vitebsk. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die
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Figure 37. Breakthrough At Nevel. Source: Earl F.
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CHAPTER VIII

SOVIET OPERATIONAL PLANNING, NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
AND THE USE OF MASS IN THE BELORUSSIAN SUMMER
OFFENSIVE

SOVIET OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The Soviet General Staff reviewed the situation on the
Central Front facing the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, 2nd
Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts after the failure of the
winter offensives of 1943-1944 against Army Group Center.
Stavka recognized that a fresh approach was required to break the
back of the German defense in Belorussia.

The Soviet General Staff

recognized the need to coordinate the offensive along all four
fronts simultaneously to achieve the maximum results.

Airpower

and artillery support also had to be coordinated to obtain the most
optimal conditions for offensive breakthroughs and subsequent
exploitation of breaches in the German defensive line by each of the
four fronts.

The German line had to be breached in several

locations simultaneously to tie down German reserves and prevent
the German Command from shifting their battalions to breakthrough
sites by extending the frontages held by the remaining divisions not
under extreme pressure.

If this could be achieved the Soviet
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breakthroughs were certain to be successful and could not be
blocked effectively.
On April 17-19, 1944, Stavka issued orders for all the fronts
to go over to the defensive except for the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian
Fronts.1

The order stated:

"the transition to the defense is a

temporary measure to prepare the troops for the subsequent
advance operations.2 The input and analysis of Front Commanders
was considered in the formation of the plan for the Belorussian
Summer offensive.
A preliminary plan was formulated under General A.N.
Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on May
20, 1944.3 The plan was code named "Bagration" after General
Peter Bagration, the hero of the Battle of Borodino in 1812.4 This
plan consisted of two phases.

It advocated three main thrusts on

the flanks of Army Group Center to liquidate the German salient in
the region of Vitebsk-Orsha-Bobruisk-Minsk.5

The 3rd Belorussian

Front in the north and 1st Belorussian Front in the south were
designated to conduct a major pincer movement to encircle most of
Army Group Center east of Minsk (see Figure 51 ).6 The third major
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet plan was to be conducted by the 1st
Baltic Front with an advance northwest of Vitebsk to take
Molodechino (see Figure 51).7 Once the destruction of the German
forces in the German salient of Vitebsk-Orsha-Bobruisk-Minsk had
occurred the Soviet advance was to reach the line of Disna,
Molodechno, Stolbsty and Starobin.s
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During the May 22-30, 1944 period the initial "Bagration" plan
was modified to reflect the lessons learned from the winter
battles of 1943-1944 in Belorussia.

Three significant changes

were made to the original "Bagration" plan:
1. The 1st Baltic Front instead of advancing to Molodechno
was to advance along the Western Dvina river to prevent German
Army Group North from reinforcing Army Group Center.

This action

would help complete the Soviet encirclement of German forces east
of Minsk.
2.
west.

The depth of the operation was extended further to the

The phase one objectives to be completed by July 15th were

moved further west to the line Druya-Svencionys-StolbtsyZhitkovichi (see Figure 52).9

Phase two objectives provided for the

left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front to join the offensive and the
combined fronts were to reach the line Rezekne-DaugavpilsGrodno-Lublin by August 15, 1944 (see Figure 52).10

The total

operation was projected for an advance of 550 to 600 kilometers to
the west.11
3.

The number of divisions was increased in the main

breakthrough areas from 77 to 97 divisions.12

The 1st Baltic, 3rd

and 1st Belorussian Fronts were to first surround and destroy the
flanks of Army Group Center in the area of Vitebsk and Bobruisk.
The 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were to attack in the center
toward Ors ha and Mogilev. Once the flanks had been destroyed the
three Belorussian Fronts were to converge on Minsk surrounding the
German 4th and 9th Armies east of the city.13

Finally, Stavka
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decided that six breakthroughs in the German front in widely
separated sectors were required.14

The six separate breakthroughs

were to dismember the German defense; breakup the German forces;
and scatter the German reserves so they could not concentrate to
repel the Soviet breakthroughs.

The four attacking fronts each

were assigned a breakthrough area with the 3rd and 1st Belorussian
Fronts receiving two assigned breakthrough areas.

First Breakthrough Sector
The 1st Baltic Front was to breach the German defense line
with two armies southwest of Gorodok and take the area of
Beshenkovichi.15

A portion of this force was to assist the right

flank of the 3rd Belorussian Front in seizing Vitebsk.

Once this

front was secure then the advance on Lepel was to proceed.

Second and Third Breakthrough Sectors
The 3rd Belorussian Front was assigned two breakthrough
points.

Two armies were to penetrate from the area west of Liozno

to take Senno and then proceed to take Vitebsk in cooperation with
the 1st Baltic Front.16 The second area was also assigned two
armies which were to advance along the Minsk main highway and
take Borisov. Once the cities of Senno and Orsha had fallen the
Front's mobile forces were to break through to the western bank of
the Berezina river in the area of Borisov.
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Fourth Breakthrough Sector
The 2nd Belorussian Front was assigned the task of taking
Mogilev and breaking through to the Berezina river in cooperation
with the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts.1 1

This front was to

employ one reinforced army to take Mogilev and then advance along
the Mogilev-Minsk highway to the Berezina.1s

Fifth and Sixth Breakthrough Sectors
The 1st Belorussian Front was assigned two breakthrough
areas.

The fifth breakthrough was to be made by two armies from

the area of Rogachev to Bobruisk-Osipovichi.19

The sixth

breakthrough was to employ two armies from the area of Ozarichi
in an advance toward Slutsk.20 The Front was to surround and
destroy the Germans in Bobruisk and seize the region of BobruiskGlusha-Glusk.21

The advance was then to proceed to Osipovichi-

Pukhovichi and on to Slutsk.
The Soviet plan utilized two combined armies to make each
penetration except for the penetration on the 2nd Belorussian Front.
Therefore, a total of 11 armies were to make the initial
penetrations against Army Group Center (see Figure 53).

The

combined effect of this offensive by 11 armies with mechanized
and tank forces in reserve to exploit the initial breakthroughs was
.certain to shatter the German main defense line.
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Soviet Reinforcements
The Soviet General Staff made the decision to reinforce the
four fronts for the Summer Belorussian Offensive. During a twomonth period the Soviets redeployed three combined armies and one
rifle corps (totaling 28 to 30 divisions), two tank armies, three
tank corps, one mechanized corps and two cavalry corps to the four
fronts assigned to Operation "Bagration."22
transfered to the 1st Baltic Front.

The 1st Tank Corps was

The 11th Guards Army and the

2nd Guards Tank Corps were added to the 3rd Belorussian Front.
The 2nd Belorussian Front was reinforced with the 81 st Rifle
Corps.

The right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front received the

28th Army, the 9th and 1st Guard Tank Corps, the 1st Mechanized
and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps.

The left wing of the 1st

Belorussian Front received the 8th Guards, 2nd Tank Army and the
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the
5th Guards Tank Army.23

Stavka reserves from the Crimea

consisting of the 2nd Guards and 51 st Armies were moved to the
Smolensk area.24

The airpower in the 4 air armies supporting the

four fronts were increased.

Eleven air force corps and five air

force divisions were added to the four air armies.
The four Soviet fronts had a total of 166 divisions, 9 rifle
brigades and fortified regions, 31,000 artillery guns and mortars
(76-millimeter and above), 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns,
6000 frontal aircraft, and approximately 1000 aircraft from the
Long Range Air Force.2s

If the southern wing of the 1st Belorussian

Front is not counted because it would not participate in the first
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phase of "Bagration" then the actual number of Soviet divisions
participating in the start of the offensive drops to 124 divisions, 9
rifle brigades and fortified regions, 24,400 artillery weapons and
mortars (76-millimeter and above), 4,000 tanks and self-propelled
guns, and 5,300 frontal aircraft (excluding the aircraft of the Long
Range Air force).26

According to Soviet sources the Soviet High

Command had concentrated 38% of its rifle and 40% of its tank and
mechanized formations, and 47% of all frontal aircraft in the four
Soviet fronts which were to launch Operation "Bagration. "27

This

commitment of resources would permit the Soviet fronts to
achieve the success that they had failed to achieve in the winter of
1943-1944 in Belorussia.

FINAL STAVKA PLAN

The Stavka plan emerged as summarized in Figure 54.

Stavka

issued formal directives to the four attacking front commanders
and they made the decisions on how to execute the directives in
operations on their respective fronts.2s

1st Baltic Front
General Bagramyan, Commander of the 1st Baltic Front
assigned the 6th Guards Army under General Chistyakov and the
43rd Army under General Beloborodov to breach the German defense
line southwest of Gorodok along a 25 kilometer sector.

The armies

were to occupy Beshenkovichi and cross the Western Dvina. A
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portion of the 43rd Army would participate with the 39th Army of
the 3rd Belorussian Front in surrounding and capturing Vitebsk.29
Once the Polotsk-Vitebsk railroad had been seized the 1st Tank
Corps was to exploit the breach and cross the Western Dvina and
attack Beshenkovichi along with the advancing armies.Jo

Lepel was

also assigned to be captured.

3rd Belorussian Front
General Chernyakhovskiy, Commander of the 3rd Belorussian
Front formed two strike groups within the front.

The northern

group consisted of the 39th, 5th Armies, and a mounted mechanized
group which contained the 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Mechanized Guard
Corps.31

The southern group consisted of the 11th Guards and 31st

Armies (see Figure 55).32
The northern strike group was assigned to breach an 18
kilometer sector southeast of Vitebsk.

The 39th Army under

General Lyudnikov on the right flank was to take Gnezdilovichi and
in cooperation with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front surround
and seize Vitebsk.33 The 5th Army under General Krylov was to
advance along the Bogushevsk-Senno axis and in cooperation with
the 11th Guards Army destroy the German 4th Army at Orsha.34 Once
this objective was achieved the 5th Army was to emerge at the
Berezina river.

When the 5th Army had secured the Luchesa river

the Mounted Mechanized group under General Oslikovskiy was to
exploit the breakthrough and secure crossings on the Berezina river
northwest of Borisov.Js
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The southern strike group was ordered to break a 15
kilometer sector of the German front before Orsha with the 11th
Guards Army under General Galitskiy and the 31st Army under
General Glagolev.36 Both armies were assigned to seize Orsha and
advance along the Minsk highway to Borisov. The mobile group of
the 11th Guards Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were to
exploit the breakthrough and advance to the Berezina near
Chernyavka.
The 5th Guards Tank Army commanded by Marshal Rotmistrov
was to exploit the advance of the 11th Guards Army and advance
along the Minsk main highway to Borisov or advance through the
breach created by the 5th Army toward Bogushevsk-TolochinBorisov.

Rotmistov's 5th Guards Tank Army would be employed

along either axis depending on which route offered the most
opportunity for advancing.

2nd Belorussian Front
General Zakharov, Commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front
assigned the 49th Army under General Grishin to liberate Mogilev
and then advance to the Berezina river.37 The 50th Army under
General Boldin and 33rd Army under General Kryuchenkina were
ordered to hold their present lines.

However, the 50th Army was to

have one rifle corps in reserve to exploit any breakthrough by the
49th Army toward Chausy or Blagovichi.
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1st Belorussian Front
General Rokossovskiy, Commander of the 1st Belorussian
Front divided his armies into northern and southern strike groups.
The northern group was assigned to penetrate a 17 kilometer sector
north of Rogachev.3s The southern group was ordered to
breakthrough on a 15 kilometer front to the south of Parichi.39 The
coordinated attacks by these two groups were to achieve the
encirclement and destruction of the German 9th Army at Bobruisk
with a subsequent advance toward Pukhovichi and Slutsk.
The northern group assigned to attack north of Rogachev
consisted of

th~

3rd Army under General Gorbatov and the 48th

Army under General Romanenko.4o The 9th Tank Corps under General
Sakharov constituted the Mobile Group of the 3rd Army.

It was

assigned to move into the Bobruisk area and cut off the German
lines of communication after a breakthrough in the main German
defensive line had been achieved.
The southern strike group contained the 65th Army under
General Batov, the 28th Army under General Luchinskiy and the
Mounted Mechanized group which included the 4th Guards Cavalry
and the 1st Mechanized Corps under the command of General
Pliyev.41 The Mounted Mechanized group was assigned to enter the
breach achieved at the boundary of the 65th and 28th Armies.

It

·was to advance on Slutsk, Osipovichi or Bobruisk depending on
circumstances.
Meanwhile, the forces on the left flank of the 1st Belorussian
Front were to conduct active operations to prevent German units
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from being transferred to the Minsk sector as reinforcements.

This

group of forces was to be held in reserve for the subsequent
advance toward the Kovel-lyublin direction.

Dnieper Military Flotilla
The Dnieper Military flotilla was assigned the task of
assisting the southern strike group of the 1st Belorussian Front.

It

was to serve as floating artillery and as transport for the 48th
Army in crossing over to the west bank of the Berezina.42

It was

also assigned to block the Germans from retreating behind the
Berezina at river crossings.

Soviet Airpower
The four fronts undertaking the summer offensive in
Belorussia were supported by air armies assigned specifically to
each front and by Long Range Aircraft.
3rd Air Army.
Air Army. 43

The 1st Baltic Front was supported by the 3rd

The 3rd Air Army's air assault division was assigned

to neutralize the German artillery and mortar positions.

The

fighter aircraft were to provide air cover for the advancing ground
forces.
1st Air Army.
the 1st Air Army.44

The 3rd Belorussian Front was supported by
The 1st Air Army was divided into two air

force groups: one air force group supported the northern strike
group and the southern strike group was supported by the larger air
force group which was to assist the troops advancing toward Orsha.
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The 1st Air Army was also tasked to help breach German lines;
destroy the German forces surrounded at Vitebsk; and support the
Mobile Group operating in depth in the German rear.4s
4th Air Army.

The 4th Air Army supported the 2nd

Belorussian Front. 46

The 4th Air Army operations were planned for

ohly the first day of the offensive.

One night bomber division and

two bomber corps of long distance aircraft were to bomb the
forward edge of the German defense line the night preceding the
offensive.

The advancing strike group on the ground was to receive

support from one fighter and two assault air divisions.
16th and 6th Air Armies.

The 16th Air Army assigned to

support the 1st Belorussian Front was divided into two air force
groups: one northern group which was to be the strongest group and
the southern group.47

This division of airpower reflected the

division of ground forces into their two respective groups.

In

addition the 6th Air Army was transferred from the general reserve
to the 1st Belorussian Front. 48

Two night bomber divisions and

long distance aircraft were to bomb the main centers of German
defense on the night preceding the offensive.
Long Range Aviation.

The long range aircraft held in the

general Soviet reserve were also employed in the Belorussian
offensive.

1000 aircraft were committed to the task of

neutralizing the German Luftflotte 6 at the following airfields:
Belostock, Brest, Luninets, Baranovichi, Bobruisk, Minsk, and Orsha
which comprised 60 per cent of the 6th Air Fleets aircraft. 49
days before the start of the Belorussian Operation long range

Ten

246

aviation conducted a night air operation lasting four nights
between June 13-18, 1944 where heavy bombers flew 1,472
sorties to neutralize the German 6th Air Fleet.so
lines were also targeted for bombing.

The German rail

The long range aircraft were

assigned to bomb the German defenses in the six breakthrough
sectors on the night preceding the Soviet main offensive.s1
The total Soviet aircraft deployed in the five Soviet air
armies amounted to 6,000 planes including more than 1, 100 day and
night bombers and 2,000 ground attack aircraft.52

In addition,

1,000 bombers from Long Range Aviation were included in the
Soviet offensive operations.

Ten air corps and eight air divisions

were dispatched to reinforce the five Soviet air armies during the
first half of June 1944 which required the additional construction
of 70 airfields.SJ
The 1st Air Army in the 3rd Belorussian Front and the and the
16th Air Army in the 1st Belorussian Front received 70 per cent of
all planes and all day bombers.54 Three air corps and two
independent air divisions were massed in the 1st and 16th Air
Armies.

The 16th Air Army was divided into two groups: 13 air

divisions in the northern group and 7 air divisions in the southern
group.SS

The 1st Air Army was also divided into two groups:

6 air

divisions were to operate in the Bogushevsk sector and 11 air
divisions in the Orsha sector.56

The Soviet High Command desired

to maximize the effect of their air power resources by postponing
the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front by one day so that
aircraft of the Long Range Aviation could be concentrated totally in
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support of the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, and 2nd Belorussian
Fronts on the first day of offensive operations.57 On the second day
of the offensive the long range aircraft were transferred to support
the 1st Belorussian Front which commenced its offensive.58

Soviet Partisans
The partisans were assigned several tasks in the German rear
areas.

The main tasks were to attack the German lines of

communication, cut and hold certain roads and railroad junctions,
capture bridges, seize river crossings and hold them till units of
the Red Army arrived.

Specifically, the partisan units behind the

German lines opposing each of the four fronts: 1st Baltic, 3rd
Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian were to attack
German lines of communication.

Railroads were the chief means of

moving supplies throughout the Russian campaign for both the
Germans and the Soviets.59

Therefore, an attack on the railroads

constituted a significant threat to German defensive and offensive
operations (see Figure 56).
Partisan units with approximately 71,000 members located
directly in the rear area of Army Group Center in June 1944 (see
Figure 57) constituted a serious threat.

There were approximately

143,000 Belorussian partisans organized into 150 brigades and 49
separate detachments throughout Belorussia. 60

Figure 58

delineates the partisan strength in Belorussia as of March 1944.
However, the partisan strength was reduced by German antipartisan
operations between April and June 1944.

Operations Regenschauer,
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Fruehlingsfest, and Kormoron (see Figure 59) eliminated
approximately 27,000 partisans with several thousand escaping the
areas of German antipartisan operations.61

This weakened the

partisans prior to the start of the Belorussian Offensive.

The

partisan bands generally were organized into groups of 3000 to
5000 men each.62

Partisan operations were almost always

conducted at night.

Such operations included:

(1) mining main

highways; (2) demolition of railroad tracks; (3) mining railroad
beds; and (4) surprise attacks on trains and truck convoys.63 The
partisan units were ordered to attack and completely paralyze
German rail activity beginning on June 20, 1944 with massive
demolition of the main rail lines.64

The main railroad targets were

the Polotsk-Molodechno, Glubokoye-Vilnius, Minsk-Orsha, MinskBrest and Pinsk-Brest rail lines.65
The partisan attack on the night of June 19-20, 1944
constituted the largest attack of the war by partisans against the
German lines of communication.66

The partisans attempted 15,000

demolitions on the railroad lines behind Army Group Center (see
Figure 60) on the night of June 19-20, 1944.67
were successful in the course of one night.68

10,500 demolitions

This number of

demolitions on one night amounted to 213 of the total demolitions
for the month of May 1944.69

The double-tracked rail lines were

blocked for 24 hours and single-tracked rail lines were interrupted
for over 48 hours. 10 The Commander of the Railroad Engineer
Brigade #2 in Army Group Center on June 20, 1944 reported 600
demolitions on the Orsha-Mogilev rail line and 580 demolitions on
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the Minsk-Orsha rail line.11
immediately.

Reconstruction was undertaken

On June 21, 1944 at 1300 the railroad engineers had

restored the eastward railroad line between Orsha and Mogilev.n
The Minsk-Orsha rail line had one rail line open as of 2030 on June
20, 1944.73

Both eastern and western rail lines between Minsk and

Orsha were operational by 1800 on June 22, 1944.74
The partisans struck again on the night of June 20-21, 1944.
However, there were 90 per cent fewer rail line demolitions. 1s
There were no demolitions on the night of June 22-23, 1944.76
Apparently, the partisans ran out of explosives thereby allowing
the Germans a 48 hour period to restore their rail lines prior to the
start of the Soviet offensive in Belorussia.77

The German rail lines

Dvinsk-Molodechno, Minsk-Orsha and Minsk-Bobruisk were all open
as of June 27, 1944.78

Reinforcements and supplies were moving

from one sector to the next sector.

Thus, Soviet planning of

partisan action against German lines of communication was poor.
Soviet directives should have targeted the rail lines
simultaneously with the general offensive to achieve the maximum
effect.

NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY

The Soviets had achieved numerical superiority on the
Belorussian Front. The Soviets had massed 14 combined arms
armies, 1 tank army, 8 tank and mechanized Corps, 2 cavalry corps
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and 4 air armies (see Table XXVlll).79

Soviet equipment amounted

to 30,916 artillery guns, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft
guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self propelled guns (see Table
XXIX), and 5,327 aircraft in addition to over 1000 long range
aircraft (see Table XXX).so Between January 1, 1944 and June 1,
1944 the number of German troops opposing the Soviets declined by
900,000.81

Soviet sources put their overall superiority at 1. 7:1 in

troops; 1.8:1 in Guns and Mortars (antiaircraft artillery excluded);
1.6:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.9:1 in operational aircraft.82
However, on the Belorussian Front Soviet superiority reached levels
that exceeded 2: 1 in all categories of military manpower and
equipment. (see Figure 61) This level of numerical superiority does
not reflect the actual situation on the respective Soviet Fronts
facing German Army Group Center.

On the 1st Baltic and 1st

Belorussian Front troop strengths reached 3:1 and on all fronts tank
strength exceeded 3:1 (see Figure 61 ).
The order of battle of German forces as of June 22, 1944
showed the Soviets being opposed by only 39 infantry divisions, 3
Panzer Grenadier divisions, I Panzer division, and 6 security
divisions.83

This German strength contrasted with the Soviet

strength in Table XXVlll delineates a substantial Soviet numerical
superiority in Soviet formations.

The actual numerical strength of

the Soviet Fronts is enumerated in Table XXIX.

Soviet numerical

superiority was clearly established by numbers, but it was the
concentration of this Soviet mass that was to produce such
spectacular success in the Belorussian Operation.
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CONCENTRATION AND MASS IN THE SOVIET
OFFENSIVE IN BELORUSSIA

German Defensive Concentration
The German formations in Army Group Center were forced to
hold sectors of the front line which were too wide to be effectively
defended. The 29 divisions in the front line each had to hold a
frontage of between 24 and 32 kilometers. 84

There were few

divisions which had a smaller sector to hold.

The 25th Panzer

Grenadier Division had the smallest sector to hold which was 17
kilometers. 85

According to German sources there was an average

density of 80 men per kilometer .86

German divisional artillery had

ranges of 12.3 km and 13.3 km for their light and heavy guns.
Therefore, German divisional artillery was not able to mass their
fire on every sector of the divisional front line.

In addition, there

was a shortage of artillery ammunition which prevented really
effective artillery bombardments.87

German infantry was

supported on an average by two to three artillery tubes and one or
two assault guns or tanks per kilometer of front.88

Soviet Concentration of Mass in the Offensive
The Soviets achieved an overwhelming superiority in the
breakthrough sectors despite an overall 3:1 superiority of forces
along the front.

It was the bold concentration of forces that

permitted the Soviets to shatter even the most formidable German
defenses (see Figure 62 for an example of German defenses that
could be found on the Belorussian Front). 89 The four Soviet
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attacking fronts had an average total divisional frontage of 5.8
kilometers per division (see Table XXXI) compared to 24 to 32

kilometers for the German divisions.9o

The concentration of Soviet

forces was compressed further in the breakthrough sectors.

The

average divisional frontage of 5.8 kilometers was compressed to
1.5 km per division in the breakthrough sectors (see Table XXXI).
Soviet divisions were organized into two echelons (see Table XXXll)
in order to use mass in the breakthrough sectors. The use of more
than one echelon was a main factor in determining the success of
the breakthrough operation and in maintaining the rapidity of the
tempo in the attack. The second and succeeding echelons were
committed once the fighting in the first defensive positions had
been completely liquidated.91

The second echelon would then be

committed to battle which facilitated the forward movement of the
breakthrough.

This allowed the Soviets to follow up the initial

attacks of the first echelon with fresh follow on attacks from the
second echelon.

The overwhelming superiority achieved by the

Soviets can be best described in terms of an attacking rifle
division.

A leading rifle division in the breakthrough sector with

nine rifle battalions of 380 men each each attacking on a frontage
of 2.5 to 3 kilometers would achieve a superiority of 1O:1.92

The

first wave of infantry would put 750 Soviet infantrymen in battle
with 80 German soldiers.93
The Germans in the past had been able to withstand such
pressure and defeat the Soviets.

However, the concentration of

artillery, armor, airpower, and coordinated flank attacks would
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prove too much for the tenacious German defenders.

In many cases,

the Soviet attacking frontage was actually 1.5 kilometers, and
Soviet troop superiority reached 15:1 in the breakthrough sectors.94

Soviet Armor
The Soviet superiority in armor in the breakthrough sectors
amounted to 20:1. 95 The Soviets had allocated 38% of the available
armored vehicles for close support of the infantry in the
breakthrough sector.96

The remaining 62% of the armored forces

were located in the four tank corps, two cavalry/mechanized
groups, and the 5th Guards Tank Army.97 These formations were
formed into mobile groups which were held in reserve until a
breakthrough had been achieved. These mobile groups would then
exploit breakthroughs to penetrate the front in depth to encircle
German forces and reach deep objectives in the German rear area.
Soviet armor concentrations in the breakthrough area were
massive. The number of tanks in the breakthrough area averaged
35.6 tanks per kilometer (see Table XXXlll).

However, the range of

Soviet armor concentration varied from 22 per kilometer in the 1st
Baltic Front to 45 tanks per kilometer in the 1st Belorussian.98

Soviet

Artillery

The majority of the Soviet Artillery was concentrated on the
breakthrough sectors.

In fact, 71 % to 80% of all artillery in the 1st

Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts targeted the
breakthrough sectors which covered only 11-20% of the general
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offensive area.99

In the 2nd Belorussian Front's attack sector only

50% of the artillery was concentrated in the attack sector.100
Soviets developed an artillery superiority of 35: 1.101

The

On the

average 5 German guns and rocket launchers opposed 178 Soviet
artillery guns or rocket launchers.102

The Soviet artillery density

per kilometer ranged from 151 to 204 tubes per kilometer
depending on the attacking front (see Table XXXIV).103 Thus, Soviet
artillery was used on a massive scale compared to German
artillery.

Soviet Artillery Preparation
The artillery preparation was of a weight and intensity not
previously experienced in this war .104

Artillery and mortar

preparation lasted from 120 to 140 minutes.1os

The northern

fronts commenced firing between 0600 to 0700 and the 1st
Belorussian Front commenced firing a day later between 0400 and
0500 hours.

The fire plan called for three areas of concentration:

(1) 15 minute concentration on defensive positions 3 km in depth;
(2) 90 minutes of fire on preplanned, observed targets, artillery
and heavy weapons positions; (3) 20 minutes of concentration on
the main defensive works starting with 25% of the guns firing with
5 minute incremental increases in intensity till 100% of the guns
were firing intensely.106

When the troops were to launch an attack

they were to be preceded by a rolling barrage reaching out to 2
kilometers.101

The Soviet advance was closely coordinated with

the artillery preparation so that the gap between the artillery
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preparation and the beginning of the infantry assault could be
avoided.

The intensity of the artillery barrage increased toward

the end and when the fire was at its most intense moment the
tanks and infantry were already approaching the wall of fire.

The

tanks maintained a distance of 80-100 meters from the wall of
fire while the infantry maintained a 150 to 200 meter distance.10s

Soviet Use of Mass in the Four Attacking Fronts
The overall frontage of the four attacking fronts was 690
kilometers, but the six major breakthrough areas only made up 112
km or 16.3% of. the total front.109

In this area the Soviets had

concentrated 65% of their rifle divisions, 72.3% of their guns and
mortars, and 86.60/o of their tank and mechanized Brigades.110 This
permitted an attack with the use of echelons in depth.

The 1st

Baltic Front was to attack on a 25 kilometer front with 16
divisions, 151 guns and mortars per km, and 22 tanks per km.111
The 3rd Belorussian Front was attacking on northern and southern
sectors.

The northern breakthrough sector was 17.5 km wide.

rifle divisions were assigned to this sector.

Ten

The southern

breakthrough area was 19.5 km wide with 15 rifle divisions, 175
guns and mortars per km, and 44 tanks per km.i12 The 2nd
Belorussian Front's attack sector was 12 km with 10 rifle
divisions, 181 guns and mortars per km, and 19 tanks and assault
guns per km.113 The 1st Belorussian Front's northern group was
attacking on a 17 kilometer sector with 13 divisions.

The southern

group employed 13 divisions on a 21 kilometer sector.

Both groups
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had approximately 204 guns and mortars and 45 tanks per
kilometer.114

Thus, the Soviets had achieved the mass and

concentration of forces in the six breakthrough areas necessary to
overcome the German defenses in Belorussia.
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TABLE XXVlll
SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE,

JUNE 1944

SOVIET FRONTS
1st Baltic Front

3rd Belorussian Front

2nd Belorussian Front

1st Belorussian Front
(right wing)

SOVIET FORMATIONS
4th Shock Army
6th Guards Army
43rd Army
1st Tank Corps
5th Army
31st Army
39th Army
11th Guards Army
2nd Guards Tank Corps
5th Guards Tank Army
Cavalry/Mechanized Group:
3rd Guards Cavalry Corps
3rd Guards Mechanized Corps
3rd Guards Tank Corps
29th Tank Corps
33rd Army
49th Army
50th Army
Front Mobile Group
3rd Army
28th Army
48th Army
65th Army
9th Tank Corps
Cavalry/Mechanized Group:
1st Guards Tank Corps
4th Guards Cavalry Corps
1st Mechanized Corps

Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1987), p. 48.
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TABLEXXIX
MEN AND EQUIPMENT OF SOVIET FRONTS
JUNE 20, 1944

Men

227,000

389,500

Machine
Guns
Tanks
Assault
Guns
AntiGuns (4557mm)
Field
Guns
(76mm
and
larger)
Mortars
(82mm
and
120mm)
MRLs
AAA Guns
Aircraft
Trucks

8,432

13,214

1st
Belorussian
2nd
Belorussian (!1. wing)
TQtal
434,900
1,254,30
202,900
0
5,750
16,035
43,431

561
126

1, 169
641

102
174

883
414

2,715
1,355

778

1, 175

833

1,444

4,230

2,133

2,893

1,768

3,769

10,563

2,213

3,552

1,957

3,792

11 ,514

604
420
902
19,537

689
792
1,864
16,208

264
329
528
7,727

749
762
2,303
17' 177

2,306
2,303
5,327
60,649

Men And
Egyipm~nt

1st
Balti~

3rd
B~lgryssian

Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, Great Battles on the
Eastern Fmnt: The SQviet-German War 1941-1945 (New
York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1982), p. 157.
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TABLEXXX
SOVIET EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT STRENGTH IN THE SOVIET AIR ARMIES

PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE
BELORUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

Air~raft

Fighters
Ground
Attack
Bombers
Night
Bombers
Recon
Long
range
Bombers
Total
Aircraft

~

Air Army 1 Air Army 4 Air Army 16 Air Army Total
196
2318
403
767
952
1744
547
193
368
636

-79

392
81

--

121

263
150

52

77

18

32

179
1007

528

2033

6334

902

1864

655
431

Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1987), p. 64.
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TABLEXXXI
OPERATIONAL DENSITY OF SOVIET TROOPS

ON THE BELORUSSIAN FRONT

Tgtal ErQntag~
Frontage Rifle Divs. Density
(km)
(nQ)
(km/div)
FrQnt
1 Baltic 160
24
6.6
3 Belo- 140
4.2
33
russian
7.3
2 Belo- 160
22
russian
1 Belo- 230
5.8
39
russian
(right)
118
Total/
690
5.8
Average

Atta~ls S~~tQr

Frontage
(km)
25
37

Rifle Divs Density
(kmldiv)
(OQ)
1.5
16
25
1.5

12

10

1.2

38

26

1.5

112

77

1.46

Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense ·
Publishers, 1987), p. 53.
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TABLE XXXll
SOVIET ATTAC KING ECHELONS AGAINST
ARMY GROUP CENTER

Armies
Within Front
Front
1 echelon
1st Baltic

3rd Belorussian

1 echelon

2nd Belo1 echelon
russian
1 echelon
1st Belorussian
(right wing)

Corps
Within Armi~s
39th Army
2 echelons
43rd Army
1 echelon
39th Army
2 echelons
5th Army
1 echelon
11th Guards
Army
1 echelon
31st Army
1 echelon
49th Army
1 echelon
3rd Army
2 echelons
48th Army
1 echelon
65th Army
1 echelon
28th Army
1 echelon

Regiments
Divisions
Within Divs
Within Corgs
1 to 2
2 echelons
echelons
1 to 2
2 echelons
echelons
2 echelons 2 echelons
2 echelons

1 echelon

2 echelons

1 echelon

2 echelons

2 echelons

3 echelons

1 echelon

2 echelons

2 to 3
echelons

2 echelons

1 echelon

2 echelons

1 echelon

2 echelons

2 echelons

Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of
Army Groug Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1987), p. 54.
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TABLE XXXlll
SOVIET ARMORED DENSITY OPPOSITE

ARMY GROUP CENTER,
JUNE 20, 1944

Frontage (km)
Total
Attack
SectQr
160
25

FrQnts
1st
Baltic
3rd
140
Belorussia
2nd
160
Belorussia
1st
230
Belorussia
(right)
Total/ 690
Aver.

Tanks & SU Guns
Density (AFVs/km)
Total
Attack
Overall Attack
SectQr % Total
Sectgr
687
77.8
4
535
22

33

1810

1466

80.9

13

44

12

276

227

82.2

2

19

29

1297

1297

100.0

5.6

45

99

4070

3525

86.6

5.9

35.6

--

*SU Guns are assault guns or self-propelled guns.
Source: Gerd Niepold, Battl~ For White Rus~ia: The Destruction of
Arm~ GrQyg C~ntre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1987), p. 60.
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TABLE XXXIV
SOVIET ARTILLERY DENSITY AND FRONTAGES
OPPOSITE ARMY GROUP CENTER,
JUNE 20, 1944

Frontage (km)
Total
Attack
Sectgr
160
25

Frgnts
1st
Baltic
3rd
140
Belorussia
2nd
160
Belorussia
1st
230
Belorussia
(right)
Total/ 690
Aver.

Guns & Mortars
Density (Tubes/km)
Total
Attack
Overall Attack
Number % Tgtal
SectQr
4,950 3,768 76.1
31
151

33

7, 134

5,764

80.1

51

175

12

3,989

2, 168

54.3

30

181

29

8,310

5,929

71.3

36

204

99

24,383 17,629 72.3

35

178

-

*Multiple Rocket Lauchers are included in figures.
Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Rul2sia: The Destru~tion of
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1987), p. 60.
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Figure 51. Basic Concepts And Phases, Planning
Memorandum, 20 May 1944. Source: Lt. Colonel Charles
G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," Military Review,
Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 64.
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Figure 52. Final Stavka Concept Of Operation. Source:
Lt. Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration,"
Military Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 65.
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MAJOR ELEMENTS OF FRONT PLAHS

front

Total
Width of
Frontage

Width
of
Penelra-

(hi/a.

lion
(I\ ile>-

meter)

meter)

Formation•
Making
Ptntlrationa

Ezploitation
Foret

I st
Bailie

IGO

25

6th Guards
Army; 43d
Army

1st Tank
Corps

Jd
llelorussia n

130

18

a. Northtrn
Shock
Group
39lh Army;
6th Army

Mechanized
Cavalry
Group (Jd
Cavalry and
3d Guards
Mechanized
Corps)

15

b. Southern
Shock
Group
11th Guards
Army; 31st
Army

2d Guards
Tank Corps

Rtma~kl

6th Guards Tank
Army to be com·
milted as the
front's main exploiting force in
zone of group
enjoying greater
saccess

2d
Belorussian

IGO

.16

49th Army

1st Rifle
Corps

Initially, this
front had limited
objective of seiz·
ing l\log"ilev

I !t
Belorussian

650
(250)

17

a. Northtrn

9th Tank
Corps

16

b. Southern
Shock
Group
65th Army;
28th Army
Met:hanized
Cavalry
Group

Initially, only
ri~ht win~ of
this front (four
armies) were to
be committed.
Four armies had
a frontage of
250 kilometers.

Shock
Group
3d Army;
48th Army

1st Guards
Tank Corps

Figure 53. Major Elements Of Front Plans. Source: Lt.
Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration,"
Military Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 67.
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TIME TABLE: OPERATION BAGRATION
17-1!.I April

Sl11Pl•11 lransmiltct.I directives to all f1 ont conirnnndcrs lo ussu111c

the Jdensc.
JU April
. 1-7 Muy

I
I

St1111k11 complclcJ i11iliul Jruft of co11ccpt of opcruliu11 .

l'la1111i11g t.lireclives bused on Slul'ku concept issued lo front cu111-

mu !Hiers.

I 1s

r.1ay

Four fro11t com111unJers submitted their plans lo .';1111·/, u.

20

r.1 ny

St11d•11

i

draft pl1111 ru111pll'led 1111d iss111,,·d us n pla1111i11i: 111<'11111rn11·
du111 sig11cd by Army (;,~11cral A. I. A11tonuv, Deputy Chief of
Slaff for Opcralions of the General Staff of llic Hcd Army and
Navy.

~~-:!:!

lll uy

Plan revil'wed liy Supn·111c \.0111111andcr Joseph Stalin and his
dt·1111lii·s ulung with the fuur front commanders and their d1ids
of staff.

I~~-:IU

llluy

Sta Pku revised draft plu11 .

I

. I .II lllay

1 15 Ju11c

!~u Ju11c
I~:1 J ""l'

Stu11!.11 issued revised planning directives lo fro11l co111m11111lers.
Frurrt pla11s finalized and reviewed by Slu1•k11.

lly this date the four fronts hat.I

rec~ived

all their 1ei11fun-ing

trnups 1111d rn111plctcd training.
/:11!1n1!11111 la11nched---lhrl'e yt·ars and 011<' Jay uftl'r 1;l'n11an., had
first allucked l!clurussiu.

Figure 54. Time Table: Operation Bagration. Source:
Lt. Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration,"
Military Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 67.
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Figure 58. Partisans in the Army Group Center Rear
Area, November 1943-March 1944. Source: Edgar M.
Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, August
1956), Map 9.

272

.... 10

\..

._

. : · ·-.=
;

•

,

n

\~ -."'f ~ ~:~·
a.

-- ~~
,,Y
-~-,~~\:: ·:
-

..

·

&

u:·

~U•'-<M•. "I=~~~•
ff· : 'f' I
A,,;,, • ·
-J<./- : V · y

•

'-:

-

-

L1>
~""
I /, •
• - . ~"T •. ~'
f7-'•···
·-.\'_ I~~.;\
·f:-'/
--->'~,,v:::
~ T ~""' ~ rt
..!J 1...!..

'(' .!..!

.=

-

.

:

_:

-..

a:*' .

..J--___..-~·.../\--+'""

""

. ~. . . . -.:rl:r~- ...,":·1~0
1-, ~'. I.:_; •)'y
l

~
C

\

·-~- ,~~
'

.

t··\_ ; .

:

,,.

.

I

... I •

! \

-.ti

~ y/ . . . . _-.

c0JJ~
~.<: ~

/'/.

'::

;"\.:.l_-~d
-

·~, }->-\\

~1

.

J

.""I...;.

- <5/

'·.

(

:

'";." __!..-

w . . . . . -----

,;

')

r
(

l

•

-

_-

•

-

-.

-

~~·-'-" •;-::!>
<~ ~'~b''
I (
I

rAU(~l•"'CH(Sf.

Cl'
>)
I

l

l J,

"'~(tlAU[

•""

~::'..!

"',, I

,'!

•

RATIONS RfG(

-

_.

:<1.,,72

~
·

orr

\

('( )l (
n.

.

'J

-

~oRuQHQrf,

All'llltl ·JU Oil 1• • •

••\.I I

Figure 59. Operations Regenschauer, Fruehlingsfest,
and Kormoron, April-June 1944. Source: Edgar M.
Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, August
1956), Map 10.

273

~11'l

~

<>""'

.,,.,-~

,,..,/~

...
- ---- ...... ___
o. ___ _
-~

~

_
...,,

0

-~·~

.._.

7-

......

OS-.

aa!.

!>.
0

~..,

"---

0

__

0

....,...,___,.,

g,._
0

-

--

·--

.-

"'

---.

0

Os..,.

0

,..,...,_
0

.._...
0

0

,.

"""""

a~
... ~

·-

.......... '- ... 'lr- .....

_~°"""
Oi•OU
0

f:§.entxJ hrrverondungro

c:.,,,...._.""

~-""'°""""",.,_...°' "4N,SX-~crt""4

r---,_ ......

t---_____ ....., ...

----- .........

' .... ,~,

le.,.,,oa~Wlr'o..,...•dlllJI

,.._
I

'.,

O

Jl

,I)

..

11-

"'

I

I/;

;s Ll 16 '5 Ji a,._

Figure 60. Rail Lines Behind Army Group Center.
Source: Rolf Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch der
Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944 (Stuttgart:
Motorbuch Verlag, 1980), p.21.

274

FORCE RELATIONSHIPS
Suviet
Troop strength

2

Rifle and cavalry divisions (based on 43 German divisions between Lake Neshcherdo and Mozyr)

3

Artillery and mortars (76-millimeter and above)

2.9

Tanks and self-propelled guns

4.3

Combat aircraft

4.6

German
:

1

:

1

:

1

SOVIET FRONT SUPERIORITY

i Troop

strength

! Artillery

i
I

I

and mortars

Tanks ant.I self-pro-

l&t

3d

2d

Jst

Baltic

Belorussian
(on both axt/J
of main efT orl)

Beloruuian

Belorussian

:1: 1

2.2: 1

2: 1

3:1

2.3: 1

·2: 1

3: 1
10: 1

6:1

10:1

4:1

6:1

7. 7: 1

5: 1

3: 1

pclle<.l guns
Aire raft

'

8: 1

Figure 61. Soviet-German Force Relationships And
Soviet Front Superiority. Source: Lt. Colonel Charles G.
Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," Military Review, Vol.
XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, pp. 68-69.
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CHAPTER IX

THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944

The collapse of Army Group Center was the most decisive
blow inflicted on the German Army during the summer of 1944.
The collapse of Army Group Center precipitated the defeats and
collapses elsewhere on the Eastern Front.

It was necessary to fill

the vacuum left by the collapse of Army Group Center with the
transfer of 46 divisions and 4 brigades to Belorussia. 1

This

transfer of military units weakened the remaining three army
groups on the Eastern Front and set the stage for their subsequent
retreat or defeat.
Furthermore, the collapse of Army Group Center was a
catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in the East.

The annihilation

of Army Group Center resulted in the destruction of 28 divisions
and the loss of more than 350,000 men.2 Hermann Gackenholz, an
historian and the officer in charge of the war diary for Army Group
Center during 1944-1945, stated that this disaster "was twice as
great as the Stalingrad disaster. "3

The German 6th Army destroyed

at Stalingrad contained only 4 army corps, 1 Panzer corps, 14
infantry divisions, 3 motorized divisions, 3 Panzer divisions, 1
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Rumanian infantry division, and 1 Rumanian cavalry division.4

The

6th Army had approximately 300,000 men but only 220,000 were
encircled with 100 tanks, 18,000 guns and 10,000 vehicles.s

In the

final collapse of the 6th Army 1 Field Marshaf, 24 Generals and
90,000 men were taken prisoner but only after having resisted
while surrounded in the asiatic cold from November 22, 1942 till
January 31, 1943.6

The 6th Army had resisted total collapse for

more than two months compared to Army Group center which
collapsed in less than three weeks during the summer of 1944 with
losses of 31 Generals and 350,000 to 400,000 men.7
On July 18, 1944, the Organization Section of Army Group
Center issued a report on the losses of Army Group Center from the
period June 22, 1944 to July 15, 1944. The wounded and sick that
were transported off the front amounted to 100,000.a
of missing and dead were calculated at 300,000.9

The number

The standing

strength of the Army Group had fallen by at least 400,000 men
since the beginning of the Soviet major offensive.10

Therefore, the

collapse of Army Group Center was the single most significant
defeat of the German Army in the summer of 1944 and represents
the first stage of a collapse of the German Army in the East.
In contrast, the Anglo-American forces had been bogged down
in Normandy since June 6, 1944. The American forces did take the
port of Cherbourg by July 1, 1944 inflicting losses on the Germans
of 47,070 in killed, wounded or captured soldiers. 11

6 German

generals and 826 officers were also captured in this operation. 12
It was not until August 19th that Anglo-American forces had
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encircled the remnants of the German 5th Panzer and 7th Armies in
the Falaise pocket.13

The allies had failed to close the pocket

tightly and even with total air superiority elements of six or seven
Panzer divisions managed to breakout of the Mortain-Falaise
encirclement.14

However, the Germans did suffer the loss of

50,000 killed and 200,000 captured.15

Nevertheless, the Anglo-

American victories while important in the West were still not as
large as the enormous Soviet victories in the East which inflicted
staggering losses on the German Army throughout the summer of
1944.
Soviet and German sources disagree on the date of the
beginning of "Operation Bagration."

The German accounts claim

that "Bagration" started on June 22, 1944.16

The Soviet accounts

claim "Bagration" started on June 23, 1944.17

The differences are

based upon the Soviet reconnaissance conducted in battalion
strength by the 1st Baltic Front and the 3rd Belorussian Front on
June 22, 1944.18

The Germans claim that this constituted the

beginning of the major offensive while the Soviets claim that the
following day, June 23, 1944, was the beginning of "Operation
Bagration."

The staggering of the six offensive thrusts (see Figure

63) into Army Group Center created some confusion as to when the
overall offensive began.

The analysis for the purpose of this study

will examine the collapse of Army Group Center beginning on June
22, 1944.
The forces of Army Group Center (see Table XXXV) faced the
reinforced strength of four Soviet Fronts:

1st Baltic, 3rd
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Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian.

The 1st Baltic

and the 3rd Belorussian Fronts initiated a reconnaissance in force
to ascertain the strength of the German defenses and identify
German gun positions. The 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army bore
the brunt of the Soviet reconnaissance before the main offensive
began on June 23, 1944 (see Figure 64).

JUNE 22, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The 3rd

~anzer

Army commanded by Colonel General

Reinhardt consisted of 3 corps: IX Corps, Liii Corps, and VI Corps
(see Figure 65).

These 3 corps contained approximately 9 infantry

divisions (see Figure 65).

The 3rd Panzer Army also had two more

infantry divisions in reserve (see Figure 65).

The IX Corps held the

sector northwest of Vitebsk; the Liii Corps held the enclave
containing Fortress Vitebsk; and the VI Corps held the sector south
of Vitebsk (see Figure 64).
The 1st Baltic Front began the attack in the early morning
beginning with a 24 minute artillery barrage.19 The reconnaissance
detachments of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies attacked the IX
Corps front with strong armored and tactical air support.20

The

·soviets main effort was directed at Sirotino and both sides of
Obol.

The Germans estimated at least 6 Soviet divisions were

attacking.21

The Soviets achieved an 8 kilometer wide and 5

kilometer deep penetration of the 252nd Infantry Division's front
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(see Figure 66).22 In the VI Corps sector the Soviets managed a
breakthrough in the 299th Infantry Division's sector.

This

breakthrough to the south was widened up to 3 km (see Figure 67).
The situation was regarded seriously by OKH and the 24th
Infantry Division and Assault Gun Brigade 909 were transferred
from Army Group North to the 3rd Panzer Army to clear up the
breakthrough at Obol.23

Even the 201 st Security Division was

ordered to commit no further units to the anti-partisan Operation
"Kormoran" and security regiment 606 was placed at the disposal
of the 3rd Panzer Army.24
IX Army Corps.

A tactical withdrawal at Sirotino could

improve the defensive situation, but Field Marshal Busch forbid the
IX Corps Commander, General of Artillery Wuthmann from executing
any withdrawals.

General Wuthmann requested to withdraw to the

secondary defense line, but Field Marshal Busch forbid it stating:
"Sirotino must be held, abandon only under enemy pressure. "25
Field Marshal Busch advised Wuthmann further that "nothing was to
be abandoned that could be lost in battle."26 Field Marshal Busch
was clearly applying Hitler's "stand fast" doctrine that would prove
disastrous to Army Group Center.

By evening the Soviets had

achieved a penetration west of Sirotino 12 km wide and 7 km
deep.27

Soviet air supremacy was demonstrated in the VI corps

with 249 sorties and in the IX Corps with 381 sorties registered.28
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4th Army
The 4th Army was commanded by General of Infantry von
Tippelskirch who had assumed command on June 5, 1944 since
Colonel General Heinrici had become ill.29

The 4th Army consisted

of 3 Corps: XXVll Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, and XII Corps (see
Figure 68).

These 3 corps contained 8 infantry divisions and 2

Panzer Grenadier divisions.

The 4th Army reserve was the 286th

Security Division and the Heavy Tank Battalion 501 which
contained 29 Tiger tanks. 30 The XXVll Corps covered the area north
of Orsha, east of Orsha and south to the area of Gorki. The XXXIX
Panzer Corps defended Mogilev and north to Gorki and east of
Mogilev. The XII Corps extended south to the boundary of the 9th
Army northeast of Bobruisk.
The Soviet attacks in the morning against the left flank of
the XII Corps and the XXVll Corps in the sector of the 78th Assault
Division were repulsed.

In the XXXIX Panzer Corps the Soviets made

a breakthrough on the left flank of the 110th Infantry Division near
Gorki (see Figure 64).31

Soviet attacks were launched in the

afternoon against the 78th Assault Division and the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Division after heavy artillery preparation.

A total of 3

regimental, 12 battalion and 9 company strength attacks supported
by continuous close air support were repulsed.

9th Army
The 9th Army commanded by General of Infantry Jordan
consisted of 3 Corps: XXXV Corps, XXXXI Panzer Corps, and LV Corps
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(see Figure 69).

These 3 Corps contained 1O infantry divisions.

The 9th Army had no reserve divisions at its disposal.

But there

were two Army Group reserve divisions in its operational area:
20th Panzer Division and the 707th Infantry Division.

the

The 9th

Army boundary extended northeast from Bobruisk to the area
northwest of Rogachev; and in the center to the east of Parichi; and
in the southwest to the Pripyat marshes.32

On June 22, 1944, the

9th Army reported no significant activity on its front.33

2nd Army
The 2nd Army commanded by Colonel General Weiss contained
3 corps: XXlll Corps, XX Corps, and VIII Corps (see Figure 70). The 3
corps consisted of approximately 6 divisions and 2 brigades (see
Figure 70).

The 2nd Army also had the 2nd Hungarian Infantry

Division, 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, and the 4th Cavalry
Brigade in reserve.
The 2nd Army reported two regimental strength attacks
against the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.
the other against Rytschew.

One attack was against Stolin and

Both attacks were repulsed.

JUNE 23, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The situation northwest and southwest of Vitebsk developed
into a crisis.

The Soviets had broken through the German positions

in the IX corps in the area south of Shumilino and had achieved
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freedom of movement in the direction of the Dvina River.34

The VI

Corps southeast of Vitebsk had been penetrated in the area of the
Pskov-Kiev road north of Boguschevsk to the west and south.35 The
encirclement of Vitebsk appeared imminent (see Figure 71 ).
IX Army Corps.
Obol.

The Soviets continued their pressure south of

The Soviets in the area of Sirotino pushed units of the 252nd

Infantry Division back to Ossinowka-Jurgewo.

The Soviets

renewed their major attack at 0400 hrs after heavy artillery
preparation.36 The commander of the IX Army Corps reported at
0900 hrs that the 24th Infantry Division had assembled on the
south bank of the Dvina at Obol to assist with the blocking of the
Soviet advance. The IX Corps received the order at 1000 hrs to hold
a new line along the rail line including Shumilino.

Major-General

Heidkaemper briefed Field Marshal Busch about the necessity of the
IX Corps to occupy the secondary defense position.

Field Marshal

Busch responded by ordering the "IX Army Corps to hold all its
positions tenaciously that were currently occupied."37

Moreover,

"the 24th Infantry Division had earlier closed the existing hole
with one regiment and assault guns."38

Field Marshal Busch ordered

an attack to restore the integrity of the front.
Colonel Praefke, Chief of Staff of the IX Corps reported that
in the Corps Detachment D sector the Soviets had forced their way
over the rail line to Chotilowo and units of Corps Detachment D
under the personal leadership of the division commanders were
attacking the Soviet penetration.39

Nevertheless, the Germans

were thrown back across the rail line by a massive attack on a
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wide front (see Figure 71).

The Soviets captured the rail station at

Lowsha and attacked Spasskoje and Krizkije with armor and
mounted infantry.

Major General Heidkaempfer had the impression

that the Soviets would turn their attack toward Vitebsk.
Therefore, it was especially important that Corps Detachment D
hold the Tiger Line.

General of Artillery Wuthmann, Commander of

IX Corps, reported at 1835 hrs and 2020 hrs that the blocking of
the lake sector up to Moslino Lake could no longer be held.

It was

reported that only remnants of Corps Detachment D were
retreating.

Wuthmann doubted that the troops of Corps Detachment

D would be abte to conduct further significant resistance.40

Corps

Detachment D had only 20 light and 8 heavy field howitzers
remaining and lacked ammunition.
Colonel-General Reinhardt criticized the fighting abilities of
his troops.

He stated:

the commanders are therefore responsible for seeing
that the troops now fight as one demands. It is a
scandal to speak of the loss of ability to resist after
two days of battle. The Tiger Line is to be held at all
costs.4 1
Meanwhile, further north the 24th Infantry Division lost Rowenz
for the second time and the Soviets were advancing further to the
southwest.
Liii Army Corps.

Colonel Schmidt, Chief of Staff of the Liii

Corps, recognized the need to withdraw to the secondary defense
position in order to create more reserves and possibly disengage
one complete division as early as 0500 hrs.

There were no infantry
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attacks during the day but the situation on the flanks of the Liii
Corps was appearing desperate as the encirclement of Vitebsk was
beginning to appear imminent (see Figure 72).

General of Infantry

Gollwitzer, Commander of Liii Corps, requested to withdraw to the
secondary defensive positions at 1700 hrs.
agreed but he had to get Hitler's approvaf.42

Field Marshal Busch
Meanwhile, Field

Marshal Busch issued the following order:
The position was to be held under all circumstances,
therefore, regardless of the consequences everything
possible was to be carried out so far as the situation
permitted.43
General Gollwitzer in a conversation with Colonel General
Reinhardt expressed the concern that there must be a withdrawal
to the rear positions of Vitebsk to create reserves since the corps
rear was completely open (see Figure 73).44

Meanwhile, alert units

in Vitebsk reported Soviets west of the 246th Infantry Division
advancing toward the Dvina river.

Hitler approved the withdrawal

of the Liii Corps to the secondary defense position and this order
was received at 1850 hrs.45

During the late afternoon the

encirclement of Vitebsk appeared even more distinct.

General

Gollwitzer received an order at 1945 hrs to assemble the 4th
Luftwaffe Field Division in Ssossnowka for an attack in the
direction of VI Army Corps.

A further advance of Soviet armored

forces to the west and northwest must be prevented.

General

Gollwitzer reported at 2200 hrs that weak Soviet forces had
crossed the Dvina River at Komli and had been destroyed. The
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Corps reportedly had no further forces to secure the area further to
the west. Furthermore, General Gollwitzer was of the opinion that
Corps Detachment D had not occupied the Tiger Line which granted
the Soviets appearing on the west bank of the Dvina River complete
freedom of movement.46

The highway from Vitebsk to the west

was already under antitank artillery fire.

Four Soviet tank

brigades were reported south of Vitebsk.
VI Army Corp.
throughout the night.

Strong Soviet attacks were reported
Heavy artillery and mortar fire preparation

was laid down along the entire front between the left wing of the
256th Infantry Division and Makarowa in the 197th Infantry
Division's sector.
open.

The hole in the line at Starobobylje remained

The Soviets also achieved a breakthrough in regimental

strength between Schnitki and Lepeschino to the Pskov-Kiev (PK)
road at Juschkowo.
hrs.

The Soviets were firing on Bogushevsk by 0830

During the morning in the 256th Infantry Division's sector the

Soviets took the villages Ordesh, Ossipowa and Juschkowo.
their attack shifted to Sselenki and Stryganzy.

Then

The Soviets also

broke through the 299th Infantry Division and were already on the
rail line in Samostotschje.

The right wing of the 197th Infantry

Division collapsed under a Soviet attack preceded by an artillery
barrage.

The Soviets pushed over the Lutschessa River and the rail

line to the west (see Figure 74).

In the evening Ustche and Schilki

were lost so that the 197th Infantry Division was separated from
the VI Army Corps (see Figure 74).
command of the division.

Therefore, the Liii Corps took
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Colonel-General Reinhardt briefed Field Marshal Busch at
2305 hrs on the situation of the 3rd Panzer Army.

He especially

stressed the hole in the front on the boundary between the Liii
Corps and the IX Corps.47 Field Marshal Busch demanded the closing
of the hole. Reinhardt referred to the anticipated new danger when
the Soviets continued their attack on June 24th and the 5th Guards
Rifle Corps entered the battle from the area of Sirotino.48

Field

Marshal Busch ignored the reality of the impending encirclement of
Vitebsk thereby endangering the entire Liii Army Corps.

4th Army
The Soviets began their attack against the 4th Army after the
heaviest artillery barrage that had ever been experienced in the
entire war. 49

The massive Soviet thrusts against the center of the

4th Army were conducted with strong armored forces and close
support aircraft.

The Soviets had to use massive force on this

front because the 4th Army had the strongest defensive forces
deployed (see Table XXXVI).
XXVll Army Corps.

The Soviets broke through the middle of

the 78th Assault Division's sector north of the highway and pushed
through to Orechi.50 The area northeast of Ramaldowo was also
penetrated.
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Soviets advanced along both sides of
the road Rjassna-Mogilev up to 6 km in depth into the 337th
Infantry Division's sector.51

The Soviets had attacked this sector
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with 5 divisions.

In the afternoon, the Soviets broke through

northwest of Radomlja.
Meanwhile, General Tippelskirch repeated in vain his request
to withdraw behind the Dnieper river.52

The Army Group responded

to his request by releasing a reinforced regimental group from the
Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" to reinforce the front
east of Mogilev.

The remainder of the understrength division was

only permitted by Army Group Headquarters to be deployed in the
Dnieper covering position.

General Tippelskirch was not satisfied

with these measures and requested at 2050 hrs either unrestricted
use of the entire Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" or
authorization to withdraw into the Dnieper covering position and
the Hassen line.53

This would shorten the front considerably which

had been lengthened still more since the beginning of the battles
that lead to the Soviet breakthroughs in the XXXIX Panzer Corps and
the XXVll Army Corps sectors.54
Field Marshal Busch did not grant approval for the
withdrawal, but assigned the complete Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle" to the 4th Army with the restriction that it could
only be used in the Dnieper covering position.55 Busch also ordered
the 14th Infantry Division out of the 4th Army sector to the north
into the 3rd Panzer Army sector to be employed in the Tiger line on
both sides Bogushevsk.
reserve division.

This deprived the 4th Army of a potential

The 4th Army had only the 286th Security

Division and the Heavy Tank Battalion 501 with 29 Tiger tanks
available for reserves.56

Field Marshal Busch demanded that the
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4th Army "stand fast" holding an overextended front with
inadequate reserves against a numerically superior enemy.

The use

of flexible defense was denied.

9th Army
The Soviets opened their offensive against the 9th Army in
the XXXXI Panzer Corps and the XXXV Army Corps sectors. In the
XXXXI Panzer Corps sector the Soviets attacked across the entire
front in battalion to regimental strength and were generally
repulsed.

In the XXXV Army Corps sector the left flank of the

296th Infantry

C~>ivision

Soviets were repulsed.

was attacked in battalion strength and the
The main weight of the Soviet offensive

would fall on the 9th Army sector beginning on June 24, 1944.

JUNE 24, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Soviet offensive achieved several critical objectives.

In

the south, the Soviets widened their breakthrough over the rail line
to Bogushevsk and to the south. The Soviets continued their
advance with strong armored and motorized formations to the west
and northwest through the hole between the VI and Liii Army Corps.
Units of the 3rd Guards Corps reached the area of Ostrovno and
blocked the last connection of the Liii Corps to the west. 57
forces from the north also reached the Dvina river.

Soviet

Therefore,

Vitebsk was completely encircled (see Figures 75 & 76).

The Liii
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Corps received the order to attack to the southwest to restore the
connection to the Tiger line and hold it open.
IX Army Corps. The Soviets broke through on both sides of
the Leskowitschi lakes with armor and mounted infantry pushing in
the direction of Uwoloki-Pissarewo.

The IX Corps was ordered to

occupy the line along the Dvina river between Komli and Ulla.

After

the Tiger line was penetrated on a wide front the IX Corps was to
fight its way back to the Dvina river and prevent the Soviets from
crossing between Budilow and Ulla.

The defensive position north of

Beshenkovichi was to be held by Corps Detachment D. Between Ulla
and the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division Soviet units were
advancing west.

The Soviets broke into the 252nd Infantry

Division's defensive line and took Latkowo and were continuing to
advance with numerically superior infantry and armor forces.

The

290th Infantry Division was transferred from Army Group North
and placed under command of the IX Corps along with the 24th
Infantry Division.58

The 290th Infantry Division and a motorized

artillery battalion were in transport to close the hole between the
Dvina river at Kordan and the right wing of the 24th Infantry
Division.

All available forces which included retreating divisional

units, construction and security units of the IX Corps were put into
the Dvina position from Budinowo to the northwest of Ulla.

The

bridgehead at Ulla had to be abandoned and German forces retreated
across the Dvina river blowing up the bridges. 59
the Soviets took Leonowo.

Southwest of Obol

Field Marshal Busch arranged the
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reinforcement of this front by transferring the 212th Infantry
Division from Army Group North.60
VI Army Corps.

General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group

Center, reported at 1105 hrs the reinforcement of VI Corps by the
14th Infantry Division minus one regiment left with the 4th Army.
The Soviet breakthrough area on the open left wing of the corps
was extremely threatening (see Figure 77).

Two Soviet regiments

with approximately 40 tanks were observed advancing to the south
on the Bogushevsk-Senno road.

Colonel Mantey, Chief of Staff VI

Corps, reported that the Soviet main effort south of Vitebsk was
on both sides of Bogushevsk.

The corps reported that the 256th

Infantry Division could no longer hold its position.

The Army Group

ordered the withdrawal of the VI Corps into the Tiger line at 1245
hrs (see Figure 78).61

The Tiger line was to be occupied between

the army border and Bogushevsk which was completed successfully.
The Soviets around 1200 hrs launched continuous strong attacks
supported by at least 120 tanks against both sides of Bogushevsk
in the Tiger line which had been occupied by the 14th Infantry
Division.

Nevertheless, Bogushevsk was captured by the Soviets.

The hole between the VI Corps and the Liii Corps permitted the
Soviets to advance to the west and northwest (see Figure 77).
Liii Army Corps.

The Liii Corps was in the greatest danger

occupying the Vitebsk salient.

The Soviets were advancing through

the hole to the north to Sarudniza. The Commander of the 3rd
Panzer Army, Colonel General Reinhardt, ordered the 4th Luftwaffe
Field Division to assemble at Ostrovno and from there to advance
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to the southeast at 1040 hrs.

The Soviets advancing to the

northwest through the hole to the Liii Corps were already on the
outskirts of Ostrovno and Lichoschina.

The first arriving

battalions of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division were ordered to stop
the Soviet advance.

Thus, A crisis in the 3rd Panzer Army had

developed because of the large gaping hole in the center between
the VI Corps and Liii Corps which could not be closed because there
were no available forces.62
Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel General Zeitzler called
Colonel General Reinhardt at 1525 hrs and informed him that the
Fuehrer was very much against an evacuation of Vitebsk because
Hitler believed "this would start the ball rolling. "63

Reinhardt

advised Zeitzler that the decision to evacuate Vitebsk today was
imperative so that the forces could be brought out to hold other
positions.

Therefore, it was urgently required that the troops

come out now before the encirclement so that they retained their
operational abilities. 64
recognized "too late."65

Reinhardt feared that this would be
Colonel General Zeitzler consulted with

the Fuehrer and informed Reinhardt at 1535 hrs that the Fuehrer
decided Vitebsk was to be held as a "fortress, and everything must
be attempted so the formations can hold it. 66

The LI 11 Corps

reported the loss of Shigaly and Soviet advances from Gorki and
Tolstjuki in unknown strength to the north.
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs it was
no longer possible to keep Vitebsk open since the Soviets already
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have occupied the perimeter road and the road from Vitebsk to
Lepel was under Soviet fire. 67

Colonel General Reinhardt stated:

The new situation makes the ordered solution
impossible. Something must happen immediately.
There is no longer another solution like the previous
proposal. 68
Reinhardt reasoned that the forces in Vitebsk could be used
to close the hole between the VI and IX Army Corps. Then a new
defensive front could be constructed.

However, if the order to

evacuate Vitebsk was not given the hole between VI and IX Corps
would grow even larger.

The encirclement of the divisions in

Vitebsk was almost completed and the 3rd Panzer Army's
commander's plan for the new defensive front based on the reality
of the situation was ignored by Hitler.
Meanwhile, Lt. General Krebs and Col. General Zeitzler had
conferred and spoke to Col. General Reinhardt at 1615 hrs.

Lt.

General Krebs informed Reinhardt that Field Marshal Busch believed
that one division was sufficient to hold Vitebsk.

Therefore, the

other divisions were free to breakout to the rear to restore
communication to the rest of the 3rd Panzer Army. 69

Lt. General

Krebs informed Reinhardt the 5th Panzer Division was on its way
from Orsha.

Reinhardt requested that the IV Flieger Division

provide some air support over Vitebsk since the Soviets had air
superiority.70

General Reuss reported that his fighters were

without their forward air strip at Ulla and the Stukas had been
concentrated on the 4th Army sector.

Later in the afternoon
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fighters appeared in the area of Vitebsk.

Col. General Reinhardt

informed Field Marshal Busch at 1820 hrs that the Soviets had
reached the south edge of Ostrovno and occupied Lichoschina. The
4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field Divisions were to secure the road to
the west of Vitebsk and hold it open.

The order was now:

"about

face, fight back to the Tiger line."71
Field Marshal Busch informed the 3rd Panzer Army of his
decision to hold Vitebsk:
His request for the Army to completely abandon Vitebsk
had been denied. There were special reasons which
made it essential to hold Vitebsk. Therefore, one
division will remain in Vitebsk which is the 206th
Infantry Division. Lt. General Hitter is appointed the
new battle commander. The Liii Corps Commander is to
ensure that the order to hold Vitebsk is followed. The
breakout of the other Vitebsk divisions shall be
conducted under the leadership of the corps
commander. 12
General Gollwitzer proposed that the commander of the 206th
Infantry Division be appointed as Commandant of "Fortress
Vitebsk."

Lt. General Hitter was appointed by Field Marshal Busch

in accordance with Fuehrer Order Nr. 11 Commander of "Fortress
Vitebsk." (see Appendix C).73
The Liii Army Corps in order to breakout of the encirclement
would have to traverse a 35-40 km hole that existed between the
VI and IX Army Corps.74 The Soviets continued to press through
this hole to the area south of the Dvina River.
Chodzy was now under Soviet control.

The line of lakes at

Thus, the Liii Army Corps

was becoming progressively separated from the remainder of the
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3rd Panzer Army as a result of unrealistic command directives
issued by the Army High Command which was subject to Hitler's
demands.

4th Army
The Soviets continued to make headway in both breakthrough
areas by use of heavy attacks supported by massed tanks. Each
breakthrough position contained a Soviet Tank Corps.

The Soviet

Breakthrough position in the XXXIX Panzer Corps sector contained
700 trucks loaded with Soviet infantry and numerous tanks. 75
German front had been stretched to a thin security line.

The

The 337th

Infantry Division had already lost more than 3/4 of their artillery.
The Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Dethleffsen
requested approval from Army Group Center to withdraw the 4th
Army Front back to the Dnieper covering position at 1100 hrs.
However, the Army Group at 1250 hrs only approved the withdrawal
of the left wing of the 4th Army on an 8 km stretch into the Tiger
line between Orechi and Dewinskoje Lake.

General von Tippelskirch

conferred at 1945 hrs with Field Marshal Busch about the
withdrawal to the Dnieper covering position, but the withdrawal
was denied.

Even a 6 km withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Division's

left flank was not permitted by Field Marshal Busch.

Field Marshal

Busch reasoned:
the prepared positions may not be abandoned because
otherwise the enemy would receive encouragement. 76
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In summary, the situation in the breakthrough areas was
tense.

The Soviets in the breakthrough sector of the 78th Assault

Division continued to advance with armored forces to the south
(see Figure 79).

The 78th Assault Division was ordered to

withdraw to the Hessen line west of Teolin from the Dnieper and
connect into line Makarowo-Bridgehead-Orsha-Orechi Lake-Tiger
line.77

In the XXXIX Panzer Corps sector the 12th Infantry Division

could no longer hold its position and it withdrew behind the river
Basya.

The 337th Infantry Division consisted only of severely

battered remnants and the Soviets had already crossed the river
Basya in this sector.

The critical problem was that a critical hole

emerged between the 337th and 12th Infantry Divisions (see Figure
80).78 There were no available forces to close the hole.

General von Tippelskirch attributed the surprising success of
the Soviets in the first two days of combat to several factors:
1. The Soviet artillery had more ammunition and a
longer barrage than in previous major offensives.
2. The fire control was more flexible and German
artillery was targeted more than previously.
3.

The Soviet air superiority was especially noticeable.

4. The Soviet armor followed rapidly behind the
infantry breakthroughs.
5. The breakthrough success was rapidly exploited and
both tanks and infantry immediately advanced into the
depth of the defense toward distant objectives. 79
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Major General Schuermann, Commander of the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Division attributed Soviet success to the following
factors:
1. The Soviets employed an enormous number of
tactical aircraft and there was almost a complete
absence of German aircraft.
2.

The Germans lacked operational reserves.

3.

The Front was totally overextended.80

The 4th Army lacked adequate reserves to counter the Soviet
breakthroughs.

The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was

restricted to use in the Dnieper covering position and the 14th
Infantry Division was dispatched to the 3rd Panzer Army.
Tippelskirch argued that if the 4th Army had been given a free hand
the situation could have been brought under control.

The 4th Army

on June 24th still had 1O divisions and 7 were completely combat
ready:

57, 267, 31, 12, 110, 260 Infantry Divisions, and the 18

Panzer Grenadier Division.81

Even the 25th Panzer Grenadier

Division was intact with only its left regiment locked in a major
engagement.

The division still had at its disposal a considerable

number of anti-tank weapons.
The fate of the 4th Army hung in the balance as early as the
evening of the second day of the Soviet offensive.
front no longer existed on the 4th Army sector.

A continuous

Field Marshal

Busch at midnight informed the 4th Army that the Soviets had
broken through at Bogushevsk with 120 tanks. 82

General von
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Tippelskirch ordered General Voelckers of the XXVll Army Corps to
concentrate all assault guns and self-propelled artillery on the
left wing.

In addition, two battalions of infantry were sent from

Staiki in the rear to the left wing of the XXVll Corps.

9th Army
The Soviets attacked in the XXXV Army Corps sector with 5-7
Rifle Divisions and two tank formations.

They achieved a wide

breakthrough north of Rogachev along the inner flanks of the 296th
and 134th Infantry Divisions.

The Soviets broke through the center

of the 134th Infantry Division with strong armored forces on a 3
km wide front which extended into the wooded terrain southwest
of Oserani (see Figure 81).

The greatest Soviet success was

achieved south of the Berezina River in the XXXXI Panzer Corps
sector.

The attack consisted of 15 Soviet Rifle Divisions and 3

tank formations attacking in the direction of Osaritschi and
Dubrowa.

The 129th Infantry Division was pushed back to Tremlja

after strong artillery preparation and the 35th Infantry Division to
a line extending from Tremlja to 1O km northeast of
Wolossowitschi to 6 km northwest of Tschernin.

A gap developed

between the left flank of the 35th Infantry Division and Tschernin
and the right flank of the 36th Infantry Division (see Figure 81 ).83
The 9th Army acquired the use of the OKH reserves: 20th Panzer
Division and 707th Infantry Division.84

The 20th Panzer Division

was ordered to deploy to the south in the XXXXI Panzer Corps sector
after having first been sent north to support the XXXV Army Corps.
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The fear was that a breakthrough in the south toward Bobruisk
would cut the main supply route to the forces deployed east of the
Berezina River.as

JUNE 25, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The situation of the 3rd Panzer Army grew worse by the hour.
The Soviets widened the hole between the VI Army Corps and the
Dvina river by 50 km and new Soviet forces were advancing into
this hole from the north toward Beschenkowitschi. 86

The closing

of this gap was not possible with the available existing forces.
The Liii Army Corps was surrounded in Vitebsk and the 290th and
24th Infantry Divisions along with the entire VI Corps were
removed from the 3rd Panzer Army (see Figure 92).87
IX Army Corps. The Soviets crossed the Dvina River on both
sides of Beschenkowitschi.

Soviet tanks with mounted infantry

also appeared north of Beschenkowitschi.

Chief of Staff, Major

General Heidkaempfer ordered the IX Corps at 0925 hrs to hold
Beschenkowitschi at all costs.

Further instructions were given to

Security Regiment 45, 201 st Security Division, 252nd Infantry
Division, and the Army Weapons School to build a new defense line
between the Lukomskoje Lake and Poluoserje Lake.

The 290th and

24th Infantry Divisions were removed from the IX Corps control
and placed under the tactical control of Army Group North's I Army
Corps.88

The 212th Infantry Division was to advance immediately
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to the area of Parafjanow.

The Commander of the 262nd Infantry

Divisional group in Beschenkowitschi reported to the IX Corps at
1120 hrs that the Soviets had reached the road UllaBeschenkowitschi and were in the town Pjatigosk.

The IX Corps

next report at 1340 hrs reported the Soviets reaching the
Sswetschanka river west of Beschenkowitschi.

The Corps

requested to withdraw to the line of lakes to the south.

Col.

General Reinhardt informed Field Marshal Busch that the Dvina
sector will be overrun and the Soviets could make it to the line of
lakes to the south before our own troops.

The Field Marshal

answered, "the withdrawal was completely ruled out.
position must be held. "89

Lt.

The Dvina

Major General Heidkaempfer reported to

General Krebs at 1425 hrs that the situation could not last

much longer or the Soviets would reach the Poluoserje Lake and
then the IX Corps would have no possibility of reinforcing its right
wing.

Beschenkowitischi was surrounded (see Figure 82).

Soviet

armor was advancing to the southwest from Ssenno threatening the
Army's rear (see Figure 82).

Col. General Reinhardt informed Lt.

General Krebs that the Soviets displayed the tendency to advance in
the direction of Lapel.

If the troops were to occupy the favorable

ground around the lakes then the decision must be made to abandon
the Dvina position of our own free will and in good time otherwise
it will again be "too late."90

But Field Marshal Busch in two further

messages at 1515 hrs and 1540 hrs gave the order that the Dvina
position was not to be evacuated because the LI II Army Corps had
to fight its way out.91

The Soviets were reported to have occupied
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Sswetscha at 1700 hrs.

General Wuthmann reported at 1825 hrs

that the battle in Beschenkowitschi was still continuing.

The

garrison of Beschenkowitschi was finally ordered to fight their
way back to the main battle line during the night.
VI Army Corps.

The 14th Infantry Division was reported to

have been overrun by Soviet armor at 0900 hrs.

A penetration of

the Tiger line at Saoserje in the 95th Infantry Division's sector
succeeded.
permitted.
Figure 82).

The withdrawal of the 95th Infantry Division was
It was withdrawn behind the Oboljanka River (see
Maj. General Heidkaempfer was informed in a

conference at 1000 hrs with Lt. General Krebs of the necessity of
the VI Army Corps to be placed under the command of the 4th Army
because of the circumstances and the withdrawal of the Corps
towards the 4th Army sector.

Lt. General Krebs confirmed this

discussion with an order at 1110 hrs placing the VI Corps under the
command of the 4th Army and extended the 4th Army's area of
responsibility to the area of Ssenno (see Figure 82).92
Liii Army Corps.

The Liii Corps was cut off from the rest of

the 3rd Panzer Army (see Figure 83).

Lt. General Hitter had been

the Commandant of Fortress Vitebsk since 0400 hrs and General
Gollwitzer of the Liii Corps was preparing the Corps for a breakout
from Vitebsk.

Vitebsk was under attack from units of the Soviet

43rd and 39th Armies.93

The Liii Corps reported at 1315 hrs that

the encirclement of Vitebsk was now complete.94

The 4th

Luftwaffe Field Division had virtually ceased to exist as a
divisional unit and the 246th Infantry Division along with the 6th
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Luftwaffe Field Division were engaged in bitter battles.95
penetrations into the actual city of Vitebsk had occurred.
Corps urgently requested fighter air cover.

Several
The

General Gollwitzer in

Vitebsk reported at 1900 hrs that he would concentrate his forces
for a breakout to the southwest beginning at 0500 hrs on June
26th.96

He requested air cover over the area southwest of Vitebsk.

Col. General Reinhardt advised General Gollwitzer that on the basis
of Fuehrerbefebl Nr. 11 (see Appendix C) the 206th Infantry
Division with Lt. General Hitter as commander were to hold
Fortress Vitebsk.97
Field Marshal Busch had the impression that General
Gollwitzer must have received a new withdrawal order with
details of the breakout.

Busch ordered at 1845 hrs that a General

Staff Officer from 3rd Panzer Army be flown or dropped by
parachute into Vitebsk to brief General Gollwitzer on the overall
situation.

Field Marshal Busch called 3rd Panzer Army again at

2000 hrs and insisted once again that a General Staff Officer be
sent to Vitebsk.

Col. General Reinhardt maintained that this was

not practical and apparently set this request aside.98

But Chief of

Staff, 3rd Panzer Army, Maj. General Heidkaempfer declared that
Col. General Reinhardt informed Field Marshal Busch of his decision
in the following manner:
Field Marshal, please inform the Fuehrer that only one
officer in the 3rd Panzer Army can be considered for
this jump, and that's the Army Commander. I am ready
to execute his order. 99
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There was no further discussion of this order after
Reinhardt's statement.

Lt. General Krebs informed Maj. General

Heidkaempfer that Hitler wanted the 206th Infantry Division to
hold Vitebsk for 6-7 more days.100
Lt. General Hitter reported at 2006 hrs a breakthrough into
the northeast section of Vitebsk and a struggle in the northwest
section which was very serious.

Bitter street battles in Vitebsk

and deep penetrations along the Pskov-Kiev (PK) road were
reported.

The 4th Luftwaffe Field Division Headquarters was

surrounded in Ostrowno while the rest of the division ceased to
exist (see Figure 83).101
Meanwhile, Major Balve was briefing Colonel Graf von
Kielmansegg about the 3rd Panzer Army situation and the lack of
antitank weapons.

During the briefing Colonel Kielmansegg

expressed the revisionist view from OKH:
Over the rapid falling back no reproaches from anyone.
Everybody was taken by surprise by the enemy's
strength. Presently, there are still no operational
reserve formations that have appeared from the
southern front. The view at OKH is that things would
not have gone much better if the abandonment of
Vitebsk had been ordered in good time.102
Major Balve, however, spoke out vigorously against this false view.
The 3rd Panzer Army was in serious trouble since two large
holes had been ripped through their front by Soviet armor and
mounted infantry.

A central problem was not only lack of reserves

but an extreme shortage of antitank weapons.

3rd Panzer Army

notified Army Group Center that with assignment of the VI Army
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Corps to the 4th Army and divisions north of the Dvina to the 16th
Army that the majority of antitank weapons had been lost.103

The

VI Corps had Panzer Jaeger Battalion 519 while Sturmgeschuetz
(assault gun) Brigades 281, 245 and 909 were all located north of
the Ulla.

Liii Army Corps had only 3 assault gun battalions and this

left 3rd Panzer Army with only one Sturmgeschuetz (assault gun)
Brigade to meet the on rushing Soviet Tank Brigades.

3rd Panzer

Army requested the return of Assault Gun Brigade 909 and other
Nashorn and assault gun battalions.

4th Army
VI Army Corps.

The newly assigned VI Corps reported at

0850 hrs that a Soviet Column was advancing through the wide hole
between its divisions and had reached the area north of Ssenno.
The Soviets were also reported at 1030 hrs as having advanced 1O
km southwest of Boguschewskoje.

The VI Corps had withdrawn to

the line Staiki-Papino-Schinkow (12 km southeast of Ssenno).
Army Group Center officially informed VI Corps with the 256th,
299th, 14th and 95th Infantry Divisions that it was now under the
command of 4th Army.104

The Army Group informed the 4th Army

and the VI Corps that the 5th Panzer Division was coming up from
the rear by train to reinforce this sector.
XXVll Army Corps.
evening and night.

Soviet attacks continued throughout the

The 78th Assault Division north of the Dnieper

River organized a new defense line:
Kupelka-Orechi Lake-Tiger line.

Teolin-Makarowo-Wydriza-

Orechi was lost and Soviet armor
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was pouring through Boguschewskoje advancing to the northeast
towards Smoljany.105
further to the west. 1os

Soviet armor was now in Ssenno 30 km
The XXVI I Army Corps reported that the

Soviets had broken through south of the Orechi Lakes and Soviet
armor was now in Ussy.

General Tippelskirch ordered the right

wing of the XXVI I Army Corps to prepare to withdraw to the Hessen
line (see Figure 84).
XXXIX Panzer Corps.

The Soviets attacking from the

southeast took Ssuchari and the 337th Infantry Division was forced
into retreat to the Resta River where it would then prepare for
withdrawal to the Dnieper covering position.

The XXXIX Panzer

Corps was ordered at 1100 hrs to prepare for a withdrawal to the
Dnieper covering position.

The 337th Infantry Division was pushed

back and entered Krugloje.

Field Marshal Busch gave his approval

to withdraw the 31st and 12th Infantry Divisions at night to the
Dnieper covering position.

However, the 260th Infantry Division

and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division of the XXVll Corps along
with the 110th Infantry Division were to remain in their present
positions. 101

The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" in the

Dnieper covering position was broken through at Ssuchari.

90

Soviet tanks followed by trucks were advancing toward Mogilev
(see Figure 85).108
The situation had become critical and General Tippelskirch
could no longer wait for approval from Field Marshal Busch and
then Hitler.

Tippelskirch ordered the withdrawal of the entire

front between Ssutoki (on the left flank of the 18th Panzer
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Grenadier Division) and the Dnieper northeast of Orsha back into
the Dnieper covering position and Orsha Bridehead (see Figure
86).109

Field Marshal Busch when briefed on Tippelskirch's actions

was outraged.

He told Tippelskirch that this was "an act in

contravention of orders."110

Furthermore, he had defied an order

from Hitler that only the 31st and 12th Infantry Divisions were
allowed to withdraw to the Dnieper covering position.111

Field

Marshal Busch ordered General Tippelskirch to have the divisions
reoccupy the former battle line.
General von Tippelskirch then issued the following order to
the XXVll and XXXIX Corps:
In all parts of the front not under attack, troops are to
hold firm until they are attacked by a superior enemy
force and then pushed back. The only troops to be
withdrawn from the front are those needed to close the
gap between the 78th Assault Division and the 25th
Panzer Grenadier Division and those needed to cover the
Dnieper River crossings which are threatened.112
However, Tippelskirch had not ordered the divisions to return to
their former positions as Field Marshal Busch had ordered.

This

dispute became moot when Hitler at 231 O hrs approved the
withdrawal of the other divisions.113

9th Army
XXXV Army Corps.

The Soviets attacked with 12 Rifle

Divisions and the 9th Tank Corps out of the area north of
Rogatschew in an attempt to sever the highway (see Figure 87).114
The Soviets would in further attacks against the flank of the Drut
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River Bridgeheads attempt to split up the front.

However, the XXXV

Corps achieved some local defensive success knocking out 120
Soviet tanks.11s
4th Army.

But the Soviets had severed the connection to the

Despite some local successes, the 15 km gap on the left

of the corps could not be closed.

In the center the Soviets had

crossed the Drut River and were 5 km west of Ozarichi and 5 km
west-northwest of Rogatschew (see Figure 87).
became worse by midnight.
Figure 87).

The situation

The left flank was ripped open (see

Units of the 707th and 134th Infantry Divisions were

fighting southwest of Buda.

Both the 134th and 196th Infantry

Divisions had been penetrated between Ozarichi and Rogatschew.
The Soviets were now 10 km northwest of Ozarichi and had crossed
the Rogatschew-Bobruisk road in the southwest (see Figure 87).
The XXXV Corps had exhausted its reserves to defend its left flank
by withdrawing battalions from the 6th, 383rd, and 45th Infantry
Divisions in the center.
XXXXI Panzer Corps. The Soviets had overwhelmed the 35th
Infantry Division's defense (see Figure 85).116

The 20th Panzer

Division arrived just in time to destroy the Soviet crossing
attempt on the Rudnya River east of Slobodka. The 20th Panzer
Division, however, could not continue its attack because the
crossing site was lost.

The 36th Infantry Division and the 20th

Panzer Division achieved a rendezvous southwest of Parichi.

The

left flank of the 36th Infantry Division was penetrated and had to
fight its way back to the Berezina River 3 km east of Parichi (see
Figure 88).

The 129th Infantry Division was also penetrated in 5
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places.

The 35th Infantry Division was fighting its way back to the

area north and northwest of Shkava.

It was reported that 200

trucks loaded with Soviet infantry had crossed the railway through
Zelenkovichi to the west.
General Jordan anticipated that the 9th Army would soon be
facing an encirclement battle.

He requested that Field Marshal

Busch permit him to withdraw the XXXV Corps southern front
thereby releasing the 383rd Infantry Division.

However, Field

Marshal Busch responded:
The Army without regard to the success of the enemy
breakthroughs has to remain in their present positions
where that is possible.111
The 9th Army realizing its precarious situation reached the
same solution repeatedly that the situation could only be restored
if the 9th Army forces were granted immediate freedom of action
by the withdrawal of the entire front to the Berezina River and the
Bobruisk bridgehead (see Figure 89).

But the answer was that the

defensive mission of the Army had not changed and that "not one
foot of ground was to be voluntarily abandoned. "118
If Army Group Center was to have saved itself then decisive
action would have been required on June 25, 1944 to restore a
badly ruptured front by immediately withdrawing all divisions and
the entire front line further to the west to form a new defensive
line on the Berezina River.

But instead Hitler insisted on "standing

fast" and this permitted the Soviets to encircle entire army corps
as the offensive progressed.

There was a vacuum of leadership at
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Army Group Center.

Field Marshal Busch failed to listen to his

army commanders and instead became a rubberstamp tor Hitler's
orders.

He failed to take decisive actions of his own to save his

army group.

Therefore, armies which had demonstrated superb

leadership in the past in fending off the Red Army now were
deprived of the freedom of action necessary to save themselves
from annihilation.

The fate of the Liii Army Corps, 4th Army, and

9th Army was sealed more by Hitler's orders than Soviet offensive
actions.
General Jordan's expression of bitterness over the OKH and
Army Group failures was expressed in the Kriegstagebuch on June
25, 1944:
Headquarters 9th Army is fully aware of the disastrous
consequences of all these orders. It can accept them
only inasmuch as, after representing his opposing view
upwards in a responsible manner, a commander in the
field is obliged to carry out the orders of his superior,
even if these go against his own convictions. It is a
bitter pill to swallow, though, when one feels that,
behind these Army Group instructions which so utterly
ignore one's own pressing suggestions, and behind the
answers given by the Field Marshal and his Chief of
Staff, one can see no sign of a commander showing any
purposeful will to do his utmost, but just the execution
of orders whose basis has long since been overtaken by
events.119
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JUNE 26, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The situation of the 3rd Panzer Army became more critical
with only weak units occupying the front which was threatened by
strong Soviet forces.

The area of Lepel was the only front which

could be reinforced.

Liii Army Corps attempted a breakout to the

southwest.

The main effort of the Soviets was centered at

Botscheikowo.
IX Army Corps.

In the early morning the Soviets attacked the

Dvina line on both sides and south of Ulla and achieved several
breakthroughs over a wide front.

The 252nd Infantry Division

fought its way back to the lake bottleneck of Poluoserje Lake Ussweja Lake.

During the night encircled units of Corps

Detachment D in Beschenkowitschi broke out to the southwest (see
Figure 90).120

The Soviet main effort was shifted from Corps

Detachment D to the 252nd Infantry Division according to General
Wuthmann of the IX Corps at 0900 hrs. Corps Detachment D took
over the southern tip of Paluoserje Lake.

It was unclear what units

of the 252nd Infantry Division had been able to fight their way
back. The 16th Army of Army Group North assigned Panzer Jaeger
Battalion 519 consisting of Nashorns (self-propelled 88 mm guns)
and Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 909 consisting of assault guns to
reinforce the IX Corps.

The arrival of the 212th Infantry Division

was delayed a few hours because of several rail demolitions north
of Parafjanow.
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The IX Corps reported at 1230 hrs that the Soviets had
secured a bridgehead at Botscheikowo and the poorly equipped
security troops could not withstand an attack.

General Wuthmann

reported a Soviet concentration of 60-70 tanks at Botscheikowo.
General Heidkaempfer emphasized the need to concentrate as much
artillery as possible against this armored concentration especially
assault guns and Hummels (self-propelled 150 mm guns).

General

Wuthmann pulled back the remnants of the 252nd Infantry Division
south of Poluoserje Lake to meet this Soviet concentration.

The

artillery of the 252nd Infantry Division was assigned to cover the
Division sector and Botscheikowo.

Col. General Reinhardt urgently

requested air strikes against the Soviet armor concentration
facing Botscheikowo.

General Wuthmann of IX Corps reported at

1900 hrs that Soviet armor had broken through at Botscheikowo.121
The security troops were in retreat.

Even with the arrival of

assault guns from Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 277, a counterattack
could not be conducted since the troops were incapable of further
combat at this time.

The right wing of the IX Corps was withdrawn

to the lake line at the beginning of darkness: Soroschina LakeNessino Lake-Ostrowno Lake-Woroschky Lakes-southern tip of
Poluoserje Lake (see Figure 90).
Liii Army Corps.

The morning of June 26th looked bleak for

the surrounded Liii Corps.

General Gollwitzer thanked Col. General

Reinhardt for his wishes of good luck and reported that he would
fight to the last.

In the early morning a report from the corps

indicated that the 206th Infantry Division was outside of the
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defensive ring with significant units as a result of the
development of the situation, and regrouping was no longer
possible because of heavy fighting .122

There were only 4

battalions available to defend the "firm position" in Vitebsk so the
conditions for carrying out the Fuehrer's order no longer existed.123
The entire corps must now either remain in Vitebsk or breakout
including the 206th Infantry Division.124

The situation and the

orders had made this last decision necessary.
Presently at 0700 hrs bitter battles were raging in southern
and western Vitebsk.
0500 hrs.

The LI 11 Corps had begun the breakout at

Lt. General Krebs reported at 1130 hrs that intervention

to assist the Liii Army Corps was no longer possible.
for Vitebsk was to continue.

The battle

Field Marshal Busch in a discussion

with Col. General Reinhardt demanded that the following
unequivocal radio order be sent to General Gollwitzer and General
Hitter in Vitebsk:
Vitebsk with the ordered units is to be held. No
freedom of decision! You are bound by the Fuehrer's
order.12s
The Liii Corps was advised of strong enemy forces in
Beschenkowitschi and in Ssenno.
east of Tschaschniki.

German units were still located

Luftwaffe reports indicated at 1235 hrs that

German infantry were crossing over the Tschernogosthiza in the
Tiger line 3.5 km south of Budilowo.

The Liii Corps continued to

request air cover and reported that the breakthrough had reached
the line Balbarody-Ossniki (see Figure 91 ).126

The situation at
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Ostrowno remained unclear.

German troops were extremely

exhausted and there were shortages of ammunition.

The 206th

Infantry Division reported that the mass of the division was
presently resisting Soviet attacks 8-1 O km southeast of
Vitebsk.121

The 246th Infantry Division was located west of the

206th Infantry Division.
The Liii Army Corps had essentially been split into two
groups (see Figure 92).

The first group contained two regiments of

the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division and the 206th and 246th Infantry
Divisions surrounded southwest of Vitebsk.12a

The second group

contained units of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division, one regiment
from the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division, and units of the 246th and
197th Infantry Divisions encircled north of Ostrowno.129

The

Germans launched 22 counterattacks in a desperate attempt to
breakout to the west.130

Lt. General Peschel lead elements of the

6th Luftwaffe Field Division out of the pocket more than 15 km to
the southwest into a swampy area.131

The 206th Infantry Division

Headquarters was moved to Teljatniki (4 km west of Vitebsk) at
0200 hrs.

Later, the Division Headquarters was transferred to a

bunker 300 meters west of Pawlowitschi (see Figure 93).132

Major

Voss, an officer of the 206th Infantry Division Headquarters staff
reported that the Liii Corps Headquarters and General Gollwitzer
during the afternoon were located in a concrete bunker 500 meters
south of the village Baschki (see Figure 93).133
General Gollwitzer received a radio message from 3rd Panzer
Army Headquarters inquiring what the situation was around
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Vitebsk.

A half-hour discussion did not produce a clear

formulation of a response to the Army Headquarters.

Lt. General

Hitter of the 206th Infantry Division did not intend to follow
Hitler's order to stay in Vitebsk.

His Division Headquarters was

already on the southern edge of the city.

He concentrated his units

for a breakout in the evening before the village of Sarudniza.

The

Lutschessa strongpoint continued to be held (see Figure 93).

The

206th Infantry Division had concentrated its forces for a breakout
to the south.

The supplies of the division which had been

concentrated in one area were for the most part completely
destroyed and burned by a Soviet air attack.134

The 206th Infantry

Division and Liii Corps Headquarters assembled at 2200 hrs with
approximately 2000 men which were divided into battle groups of
500 men each.

General Gollwitzer's final instructions were:

Men, we must still force this breakthrough,
you must not let your General down.135
The attack proceeded with yells of "Hurra" and shooting into
the Soviet outposts.

German casualties were terrible.

Major Voss

reported that he and other officers stopped this form of attack and
proceeded with the last units silently against the enemy.

The

breakthrough succeeded in passing through the village of Sarudniza
and past the first Soviet security line in the early morning hours of
June 27th.

Major Voss lead one attack group through behind an

assault gun and reached the woods before the village of Schelky.136
General Gollwitzer and Hitter had remained behind in Vitebsk.137
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4th Army
VI and XXVll Army Corps. The Soviets had crossed the PskovKiev (PK) road and had advanced 8 km further to the southwest.
There were wide gaps in the defensive line between the divisions
of both corps.

Between the 78th Assault Division and the 256th

Infantry Division there was a gap.

A gap also existed between

these divisions and the 14th Infantry Division.

Between the

divisions of the XXVI I Corps and the VI Corps there was a wide
gap.138

Smoljany was lost and Soviet armor was already south of

Obolzy (see Figure 94) and entering Ussweika (6 km southwest of
Obolzy).

Major. Weger of the 14th Infantry Division reported that VI

Corps was no longer holding and radio communications had been
lost.

The 14th Infantry Division was building a new defensive

front northeast of Kochanowo.
Lt. General Krebs informed the 4th Army at 0820 hrs that the
Soviets had ripped a hole 50 km wide between the VI and IX Army
Corps and were advancing with motorized infantry and armor
through this opening (see Figure 94).139

The Soviets were now

advancing through Ssenno and to the southwest.

Lt. General Krebs

stated that it was impossible to close this hole and moreover a
breakout attempt by the Liii Army Corps in Vitebsk had failed.

The

4th Army was informed that it would have to give up one of its
assault gun brigades for use by the Army Group.
Meanwhile, General Voelckers of the XXVll Army Corps
reported heavy fighting on the east front of his corps and in
Dubrowno (see Figure 95).

During the late afternoon the divisions
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were pulled back to the Orsha bridgehead.

The left wing of the

78th Assault Division extended to the rail line at Chorobrowo
(northwest of Orsha) and had no connection to the right wing of the
VI Army Corps on the highway in Dubowoje. The XXVll Army Corps
was ordered to hold the defense line Dnieper covering position-the
Dnieper west of Gatkowschtschina-Chorobrowo and to close the
gap to the right wing of the VI Army Corps.

The Commander of the

the 78th Assault Division, Lt. General Traut was in Orsha where he
was appointed Commandant of "Fortress Orsha" by the Fuehrer and
ordered to defend it. 140
Radio communications were restored to the VI Corps at 0915
hrs and the 95th Infantry Division was reported at Sserkuti (18 km
southeast of Ssenno).

The VI Corps was ordered to defend the line

Leschewo (12 km northwest of Kochanowo)-UssweikaGarneweschtschina Bridge (4 km west of Garneweschtschina).
According to a report from the the 14th Infantry Division that had
been fighting at Boguschewskoje the 256th Infantry Division had
been surrounded and Lt. General Wuestenhagen was killed leading
the breakout. 141

VI Army Corps was also to establish a connection

to the 14th Infantry Division to their east.

General Metz was

assigned to organize and scrape together any forces in the area of
Tolotschin to form a coherent defense.142

Aerial reconnaissance

reported 40 Soviet tanks advancing from the northeast through
Obolzy toward Tolotschin (see Figure 94).

VI Corps was instructed

to send a Tiger tank battalion and an artillery battalion to
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Tolotschin.

VI Corps was to reestablish communication to the

right wing of the 3rd Panzer Army at Lukowskoje Lake.
The XXVll Corps requested that Orsha be abandoned as a
"fortified position."

General von Tippelskirch responded at 1935

hrs that Orsha was to remain a "fortified position" and that Lt.
General Traut of the 78th Assault Division was to be the fortress
commander .143

The main attacks against Orsha came from Soviet

forces with armor.

The Soviets had reached the northeast and

north edge of the city.
city.

Soviet units were now even west of the

The XXVll Corps was defending the "Bear, position including

"Fortress Orsha" and also trying to prevent an advance by Soviet
forces past Orsha to the west and south.144
to be held against all enemy attacks.

"Fortress Orsha" was

The XXVll Corps continued to

hold Kopys and Ustje west of the Dnieper Bridgehead.
The VI Corps was attacked between Smoljany and Tschereja
and pushed back over the highway. In the afternoon, Kochanowo and
Tolotschin were under attack (see Figure 94).

The Soviet forces

advancing further to the west received a radio message to rapidly
occupy the Berezina crossings.145

The 256th, 14th and 299th

Infantry Divisions were no longer considered unified, combat
effective units.

The VI Corps reported that 40 Soviet tanks had

reached Tolotschin (see Figure 94).

Units of the 95th Infantry

Division were arriving with the beginning of the infantry column in
Tolotschin trailing back to Wygoda.

Elements of Tiger Tank

Battalion 505 were also sent to defend Tolotschin.

Soviet mobile

units captured Kochanowo and proceeded past Tolotschin cutting
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the rail line and highway to Orsha (see Figure 94).146 The XXVll and
VI Corps were forced to rely on the Belynitschi-Berezina road for
supplies.

Unfortunately, this road also traversed heavily partisan

infested terrain.
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the
31st and 12th Infantry Divisions and part of the Panzer Grenadier
Division "Feldherrnhalle" were now in the Dneiper covering
position.

The Corps reported that the Soviets had crossed the

Dnieper between Mogilev and Schkloff (see Figure 94).

General

Tippelskirch foresaw his army being cut off if it remained in the
Dnieper covering position and the Orsha bridgehead.

He requested

at 0920 hrs to withdraw his Army to the "Bear position" on the
west bank of the Dnieper River.147

Lt. General Krebs, however, did

not have the authority to authorize the withdrawal.

General

Tippelskirch was informed that OKH would propose a withdrawal to
the "Bear position" for tonight.
The situation had become even more acute by noon. The 31st
and 12th Infantry Divisions were under attack by superior Soviet
forces.

The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was thrown

back to the west. The XXXIX Panzer Corps was ordered at the onset
of darkness to withdraw behind the Dnieper River because the
Soviets may reach the Lupolowo bridge at Mogilev before the
German troops could.

General Tippelskirch assembled his generals

at XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters and informed them that there
could no longer be any delays.

The Army would withdraw tonight

behind the Dnieper River into the "Bear line" (see Figure 96). 148
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Rear Guards were to hold the bridgehead position east of Mogilev
until the other troops had crossed the river whereupon they could
then also withdraw behind the Dnieper River.

The Soviets late in

the afternoon broke into the Dnieper covering position.

General

Tippelskirch withdrew his headquarters between 1600-1800 hrs
from Gadowitschi to Knjashizy (13 km northwest of Mogilev) (see
Figure 94).149
The 4th Army leaders questioned the holding of Orsha and
Mogilev as "fortified places."

However, General Tippelskirch

continued to maintain that these cities must be held.

A new

development occurred on the right wing of the XXXIX Panzer Corps
where the Soviets broke through the Dnieper covering position and
had reached the Tschaussy-Mogilev rail line.
12 km east of Mogilev (see Figure 94).

The Soviets were also

Between Mogilev and

Schkloff the Soviets were crossing the Dnieper River in two places
with armor and infantry (see Figure 94).150

There were 12 Soviet

divisions located in this breakthrough area.
Despite the present circumstances, the XXXIX Panzer Corps
was ordered to defend the "Bear line" and clear up the Soviet
breakthroughs west of the Dnieper River.

In case of a Soviet

breakthrough of the "Bear line" then "Fortress Mogilev" and
"Fortress Orsha" were to be defended and held against all Soviet
attacks.
XII Army Corps.

This corps had assembled the strongest units

of the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division south of Mogilev which were
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to be used to assist the XXXIX Panzer Corps in the battle north of
the city.

The XII Corps was ordered to hold the "Bear line."

Thus, in the 4th Army sector the Soviets had crossed the
Dnieper River north of Mogilev and were encircling Orsha from the
north and west.

It was impossible to establish a new front north

of the Minsk-Smolensk highway.

The Soviets had crossed the rail

line and highway on a wide front between Orsha and Tolotschin.
(see Figure 94).

The Soviets were in a position to widen their

breakthrough on the deep left flank of the 4th Army.

9th Army
XXXXI Panzer Corps. On the morning of June 26, 1944 Soviet

tank spearheads had penetrated to within 20 km of Bobruisk
advancing from the south.151

The 20th Panzer Division was

ordere~

to break off its engagement east of the Berezina River and regroup
in the area west of Bobruisk.
southwest of Bobruisk.

A new defense line was to be built

However, the bridge near Glebowa Rudnja

was blown up because of approaching Soviet tanks leaving the 20th
Panzer Division trapped on the east bank of the Berezina River .152
This left only the Berezina crossing at Ugly-Stassewki which was
under heavy Soviet air attack.153

20th Panzer Division moved

toward this crossing and in the evening encountered a Soviet armor
column at Titowka (3 km east of Bobruisk) (see Figure 97)
containing 10-15 Joseph Stalin heavy tanks.154

These heavy tanks

blocked the further Advance of the 20th Panzer Division into
Bobruisk.
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Meanwhile, the 36th Infantry Division continued to hold the
Paritschi area west of the Berezina River and Army Group Center
ordered it to hold its position in order to block Soviet advances
along the river bank road.

However, this was unnecessary since the

Soviets had already penetrated south of Paritischi to within 20 km
south of Bobruisk.

The Soviet armor spearheads were within 5 km

of the city by late afternoon.
General Jordan was relieved of his command around noon to
report to Field Marshal Busch.155 Field Marshal Busch and General
Jordan were to report to the Fuehrer immediately.156

General

Weidling, Commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps was to assume
command of the 9th Army temporarily. 151
XXXV Army Corps.

The 383rd Infantry Division was ordered

back to Bobruisk immediately.

The 707th Infantry Division was

engaged in fighting around Buda.

The 9th Army repeated its request

to pull back the entire front of the XXXV Army Corps even though it
was probably too late.

The Soviets had at least 15 Rifle Divisions

and several other tank formations operating in the corps sector.
Soviet armor was concentrated during the afternoon 20 km
northeast of Bobruisk near the Bobruisk-Mogilev highway.

The

withdrawal of the front was still not permitted by the High
Command.

The order was "not one step back without pressure."158

The 134th Infantry Division was essentially destroyed under the
weight of the Soviet attack. 159
LV Army Corps.
sector.

This corps was thrown back on the Ptitsch

Between the corps left flank at Glusk and Bobruisk was a
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gaping hole through which the Soviets were pouring
reinforcements.160
During the night of June 26-27, 1944 the encirclement of
Bobruisk was nearly completed.

Soviet General Pliev's Cavalry

Mechanized Group took Glusk and the 1st Tank Corps took Glusha. 161
General Panov's 9th Tank Corps moved from Titowka and proceeded
around Bobruisk to seize all the roads and crossings northeast of
the city during the early morning hours of June 27, 1944 (see
Figure 98).162
Major Klassen of the 383rd Infantry Division in his report on
the collapse of the 9th Army blames the 9th Army Commander and
Major General Hamann for the debacle at the Titowka road junction.
Major Klassen claimed that the high command had since November
1943 the opportunity to build defensive positions to protect the
railway and road bridge into Bobruisk.163

He claimed that other

defensive positions had been established at other points but not at
this crucial position.

Furthermore, after the Soviets had achieved

a deep breakthrough at Mogilev with armor it was incomprehensible
that the Commandant of Bobruisk did not take action to secure the
bridgehead east of Bobruisk immediately .164

He also claimed that

the 20th Panzer Division was not aggressive enough when it
encountered Soviet armored resistance blocking the road to the
bridge.

Therefore, the Soviets on June 26th were able to block the

road junction at Titowka with Joseph Stalin heavy tanks, (see
Figure 99) the road bridge into Bobruisk with 3 tanks, and also
bring the railway bridge into Bobruisk under fire.165
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JUNE 27, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The 212th Infantry Division was assigned to assemble in
Lapel and maintain contact with Army Group North.

The last radio

message was received from the Lill Army Corps concerning the
breakout from Vitebsk.

The possibility of a breakout succeeding

was questionable because there was an 80 km distance to cover to
reach German lines. 166
IX Army Corps.

Tschaschniki was lost to Soviet artillery

bombardment and armor. The Soviets broke through the IX Corps
defensive line south of Ussweja Lake and were advancing
northwest to Ossinowka.
had unloaded in Lepel.

The bulk of the 212th Infantry Division

Lt. General Krebs notified 3rd Panzer Army

that its units needed to hold their present positions.

Major General

Heidkaempfer advised Krebs that the 3rd Panzer Army had only 2
divisions left intact.167

Soviet infantry entered Bobrowo and

Soviet armor entered Sslobodka.
breakthrough on its right flank.

Kampfgruppe Monteton reported a
Assault guns were on the way to

restore the situation, but road congestion made movement
difficult.

The Soviets were gaining ground against the 201 st

Security Division south of Ssokolskoje Lake (see Figure 100).
line of lakes at Ssusha was lost.

The

The Soviets reinforced their

breakthrough area with armor south of Ussweja Lake.

Kampfgruppe

Monteton reported at 1530 hrs two Soviet breakthroughs at Tjapino
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and Newgodowo.

The Soviet main effort against the 3rd Panzer

Army was reported at Bobrowo on the road at 1630 hrs.
Col. General Reinhard informed Field Marshal Busch that the
front of the 252nd Infantry Division between the lakes had
disintegrated (see Figure 100).

The Soviets broke through Ussaja

to the south and then swung north up to Kriwuschino. There was a
discussion over whether to deploy the 212th Infantry Division in
the north and maintain contact to Army Group North or deploy it in
the south to assist the 4th Army in its breakout.

Field Marshal

Busch ordered the 212th Infantry Division to the north to maintain
contact with Army Group North.168
circumstances.
northern wing.

Lepel was to be held under all

This jeopardized Kampfgruppe von Monteton's
The Soviets by 2000 hrs had already taken

Sslobodka and Gluschiza while advancing toward Tettscha.
Meanwhile, the 212th Infantry Division served as a reserve to hold
Lapel (see Figure 101).169 The entire 3rd Panzer Army now
consisted of two shattered divisions, security troops pulled from
anti-partisan operations, and stragglers from the Vitebsk area. 110
Lill Army Corps.

The last message from the Liii Corps was

sent by General Gollwitzer at 0345 hrs on June 27, 1944 which
stated:
Night breakout under personal leadership of Corps
Commander has started well. By 0300 hrs several
enemy positions penetrated at three places. We are
fighting for Sarudniza. What is the enemy situation on
the VI and IX Army Corps sectors and the best route to
take from Sadaroshye? Continuous fighter cover is
requested.111
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The 3rd Panzer Army continued to transmit the best direction
to breakout throughout the entire day.

However, there was no

confirmation of the message by the LI 11 Corps or the 206th Infantry
Division by radio.
Lt. General Peschel personally lead the breakout of elements
of the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division and died during the attempted
breakthrough to German lines.112

Lt. General Pistorius lead

elements of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division in a breakout to the
west and died on June 28th during the march through the area of
Gankowitschi-Rwesh.173
On the morning of June 27, 1944 the end finally came for the

Liii Army Corps.

The Soviets issued an ultimatum to surrender and

the remnants of the German divisions accepted it.

The following

German losses were recorded by Soviet sources:
The enemy suffered 20,000 dead and over 10,000 taken
prisoner near Vitebsk. The Commander of the 53rd
Army Corps, General of Infantry Gollwitzer and Chief of
Staff of that corps, Colonel Schmidt were taken
prisoner.174

Lt. General Hitter of the 206th Infantry Division was also
taken prisoner.175

However, he had defied Hitler's order to stay in

Vitebsk and had attempted a breakout which had advanced about 9
miles before it ended with a bayonet charge by the East Prussian
301 st, 312th and 413th Grenadier Regiments.176

A few desperate

groups of men did manage to elude the Soviets and make it back to
German lines.
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The 246th Infantry Division dissolved in this cauldron and the
Division Commander, Major General Mueller-Buelow was taken
prisoner.177

The 197th Infantry Division which had been attached

to the LI II Corps when the VI Corps had been pushed to the south
also disintegrated and the commander Colonel Hahne was missing
in action.178

The Liii Army Corps had ceased to exist which meant

Army Group Center had lost the following 5 divisions:
4th Luftwaffe Field Division
6th Luftwaffe Field Division
197th Infantry Division
206th Infantry Division
246th Infantry Division.179

4th Army
The XII Army Corps pulled back into the "Bear" line. The XXXIX
Panzer Corps was under heavy pressure and the Soviets had
achieved a deep breakthrough north of Mogilev. Ors ha in the XXVll
Corps sector was under attack from all sides.
Division still held the center of Orsha. 180
the VI Army Corps.

The 78th Assault

There was no contact to

The 4th Army wanted to abandon the fortified

places of Orsha and Mogilev, but Army Group Center High Command
demanded that "Fortress Orsha" and "Fortress Mogilev" were to be
held to the last under all circumstances.181

The 4th Army

Headquarters was transferred to Belynitschi.
XXVll Army Corps.
in the rear.

Soviets were already attacking the corps

"Fortress Orsha" was lost to the Soviets.182

Soviet

armor and cavalry forces in the area of Krugloje were advancing
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south (see Figure 102). The 4th Army requested to abandon the
Dnieper position and fight through to the west or it would have to
permit strong units to be encircled.

Army Group Center responded

with orders for 4th Army at 1145 hrs which continued to insist
that the Dnieper position and the fortified places were to be held.
If the Dnieper position had to be abandoned then the fortified
places would still have to be held and the Drut River position
defended.

Finally, at 1505 hrs a general withdrawal of all 3 corps

of the 4th Army was permitted.

The XXVll Army Corps was to fight

its way back to the line Osery-Starosselje-rail station Kochanowo
with contact to the right wing of the 14th Infantry Division in the
area llinka (12 km southeast of Tolotschin).

The 25th Panzer

Grenadier Division and the 260th Infantry Division fought through
to Starosselje (see Figure 102).
"Fortress Orsha" had been lost and Field Marshal Busch
inquired of General Tippelskirch how this designated "fortified
place" had been lost.

Apparently, Lt. General Traut, Commander of

the 78th Assault Division and Commandant of "Fortress Orsha" had
requested permission to withdraw from Orsha and the XXVll Army
Corps granted this request only after the Soviets had broken into
Ors ha and bitter street battles had developed .1 83

Lt. General Traut

claimed that under Fuehrer Order No. 11 as Commander of a
"Fortress" he "must have enough time" to assign his troops within
the defensive position (see Appendix C ).

Therefore, the

positioning of his troops was not possible because the Soviets had
already broken into Orsha from the north and northwest as the
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troops of the 78th Assault Division entered the city.184

Lt. General

Traut based his decision to withdraw from Orsha given the
unfavorable circumstances and used his interpretation of Fuehrer
Order No. 11 to save his troops from encirclement inside "Fortress
Orsha." (see Figure 103).

Meanwhile, southwest of Orsha Krugloje

was taken by Soviet armored units.
VI Army Corps. This corps had been broken apart and only
isolated individual units continued fighting.185

Remnants of the VI

Corps assembled in the area south of the highway at Krugloje.
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Soviets achieved a deep
breakthrough north of Mogilev.

The Soviets at 1040 hrs were

reported crossing the Dnieper north of Mogilev over a new bridge at
Trebuchi.186

The 11 Oth Infantry Division reported that it was

being attacked in the rear on the west bank of the Dnieper River.
The 4th Army sent a radio message at 121 O hrs to Major General
Erdmannsdorf, Commandant of Mogilev that Mogilev remained a
"fortified place" and was to be held to the last.187 The Army Group
Headquarters reinforced this order at 1515 hrs by declaring that
"Mogilev remains a fortified place."

Lt. General Bamler of the 12th

Infantry Division was appointed new Commandant of Mogilev and
required to obey Fuehrer Order No. 11 (see Appendix C).188 The 4th
(1.rmy had decided to withdraw the XXXIX Panzer Corps and the XI I
Army Corps 21 km to the west of Mogilev leaving it to stand alone
against the Soviet onslaught.

The corps were to withdraw to the

line Wjasma-Gamarnja-Gluchi-Shurawes-Golowtschin-north
Osery (10 km southeast of Krugloje).

of
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Major General Erdmannsdorf reported at 1920 hrs that the
Soviets after strong artillery preparation at noon attacked Mogilev
from the south, east and north.189 Weak German forces were unable
to prevent the river crossing in the east and this battle was now
being waged on the city's outskirts as a result (see Figure 104).
Two hours and 40 minutes later at 2200 hrs Major General
Erdmannsdorf reported that only the city center of Mogilev was
being held by the determined hand to hand combat of officer
Kampfgruppen.190

The last message from "Fortress Mogilev" was

sent at 2200 hrs and received at 2314 hrs.

Lt. General Bamler in

this message requested that Captain Opke of Artillery Regiment 12
receive the oak leaves to the Knights Cross for repeated
outstanding military exploits.

This was the last sign of life from

Mogilev.191
XII Army Corps.

This corps was pulled back to the "Bear" line.

The XII Corps had assembled strong forces behind its left flank to
assist the XX.XIX Panzer Corps to close the hole that would be left
by leaving behind the garrison in Mogilev.

The XII Corps reported at

1515 hrs that the Soviets on their right flank had advanced through
Ussochi and reached the village of Bazewitschi (26 km north of
Bobruisk).

This meant that the 4th Army was now threatened by

encirclement from the south as well as the north (see Figure 105).
The 4th Army ended the day in serious trouble. Orsha had
been lost.

The Soviets had penetrated behind the Dnieper river

between Mogilev and Schkloff and reached the area east of
Golowtschin.

The city center of Mogilev was all that remained
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under German control. The XXVll Corps had been outflanked in the
north and split into two parts. The VI Corps in the north had mostly
disintegrated with the exception of the 299th Infantry Division.
General Tippelskirch shortly before midnight issued the following
declaration:
Thanks and recognition to all brave veterans in the
severe battle against every cowardly act of
malingering. The Russian offensive and defensive must
be fought with all means then we will succeed.192
Tippelskirch was now appealing to his soldiers as individuals for
acts of heroism to compensate for the blunders of the High
Command.

9th Army
In the early morning hours of June 27, 1944 Bobruisk was
encircled by Soviet forces.

Approximately 70,000 troops were

trapped in the cauldron around Bobruisk.193

Soviet forces were

now on the road to Ssluzk, Nowyje Dorogi, and toward
Ossipowitschi (see Figure 106).

The 296th, 6th, and 45th Infantry

Divisions were fighting their way back to a bridgehead 4 km east
of Bobruisk.

These units were trapped on the east side of the

Berezina River with the Soviet thrust into their rear and the
blocking of the Berezina bridge east of Bobruisk (see figure
107).
The 383rd Infantry Division and the 20th Panzer Division
succeeded partially in their attack toward Titowka.

The Germans

were unable to take the wooden road bridge, but they did seize the
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railway bridge and managed to keep it open (see Figure 108).194
German troops had one exit from the east bank of the Berezina
River and that was over this railway bridge.

A steady stream of

vehicles and troops poured into Bobruisk over this railway bridge.
The XXXXI Panzer Corps wanted to get the 36th Infantry Division
and the remaining elements of the 20th Panzer Division into
Bobruisk.

Therefore, a final assault to seize the wooden road

bridge was launched and failed.195

Most of the armored elements

of the 20th Panzer Division were lost.196

Chaos then reigned

around the railway bridge as vehicles and guns were destroyed in a
desperate attempt to escape to the west bank of the Berezina
River.
The Soviet 16th Air Army flew continuous air attacks against
the two pockets created at Bobruisk: the XXXXI Panzer Corps in
Bobruisk and the XXXV Corps trapped on the east side of the
Berezina River (see Figure 108).

Marshal Zhukov witnessed the

carnage of this battle of annihilation:
I was not able to see the liquidation of the enemy in
Bobruisk, but witnessed the rout of of the Germans
southeast of the city. Hundreds of bombers of
Rudenko's 16th Air Army, coordinating missions with
the 48th Army, struck blow after blow at the enemy
group. Scores of trucks, cars and tanks, fuel and
lubricants were burning all over the battlefield. More
and more bomber echelons took their bearings from the
blazing fires, and kept dropping bombs of various
weights.
The terror-stricken German soldiers scattered in every
direction; those who did not surrender were killed.
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Thousands of Germans ...were dying in the fields of
Byelorussia. One of our prisoners was General Luetzow,
Commander of the 35th Army Corps. 197
According to Marshal Rokossovsky, Commander of the 1st
Belorussian Front the Germans launched no less than 15
counterattacks against Titowka on June 27, 1944.198

However, the

Soviet 9th Tank Corps and the 108th Rifle Division prevented a
German breakthrough across the road bridge into Bobruisk. 199
General P.A. Teryomov, Commander of the 108th Rifle Division
described the fiercest German attack in this sector:
About 2,000 enemy officers and men supported by fairly
strong artillery fire attacked our positions. Our guns
opened fire from a range of 700 meters, and machineguns joined in from 400 meters. The Nazis continued to
advance. Shells exploded in their midst, machine-gun
fire mowed them down. Still they came forward,
stepping over the bodies of their men. They came on
blindly. It was a mad attack. We saw the whole
terrible.picture. There was nothing heroic in it. The
Nazis seemed in a state of trance. There was in the
movement of this huge mass of men more of the mulish
stubbornness of the herd than of fighting men intent on
forcing their will on the enemy at all costs.
Nevertheless, the sight was an impressive one.200
Germans suffered terribly under Soviet airpower.

The

German troops in the Dubovka area southeast of Bobruisk were
pounded by 526 aircraft for one hour.

Marshal Rokossovsky stated:

The Nazis ran out of the woods, rushed about the
clearing, many of them dived into the Berezina, but
there was no escape. The whole area soon began to look
like a huge graveyard strewn with mauled bodies and
mangled machines.201
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During the two day onslaught the Germans suffered more than
10,000 dead and 6,000 prisoners were taken which eliminated the
German pocket southeast of Bobruisk.202
XX.XV Army Corps.

The 134th Infantry Division and elements

of the 707th Infantry Division were forced back to the Ola River
near Batsevichi.

When the remainder of the corps could not get

through at Titowka then it began to move north to meet the 134th
Infantry Division at the Ola River.

Lt. General Phillip, Commander

of the 134th Infantry Division committed suicide under the
pressure of the situation (see Figure 107).203

General Freiherr von

Luetzow lead the XXXV Corps from the area of Mikhaylevo (15 km
east of Bobruisk) toward the Mogilev-Bobruisk road.

He was later

captured by the Soviets.204
LV Army Corps. The corps was conducting a defense behind
the Ptich River.

The 35th Infantry Division located 15 km

southwest of Berezorka was reduced to a few remnants.

The corps

was ordered to conduct a phased withdrawal at 1630 hrs to the
new defense line Star-Dorogi-Lake Chervonoye.

The LV Corps was

placed under command of the German 2nd Army at 1800 hrs.205 The
2nd Army also assumed command of "Fortified Places" Slutsk and
Baranovichi.
The only relief for the 9th Army was the arrival of the 12th
Panzer Division from Army Group North that was to assemble at
Marina Gorka.2os The 390th Field Training Division and some
security formations were to provide cover for this deployment.
Gruppe Lindig consisting of ad hoc units, retreating troops, troops
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on leave, fragmented units, and railroad security forces attempted
to hold Ossipowitschi but were thrown back during the evening.201

JUNE 28, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
IX Army Corps.

In the sector of Corps Detachment D the

Soviets broke through onto the Kamen-Lepel road, 2 km southwest
of Kamen.

The 252nd Infantry Division reported the Soviets in the

woods west of Olschany and on the road east of SlobodaTscherstwjany which the division was blocking

The Soviets had

been attacking the city of Lepel since 0530 hrs and had broke into
the city with 12 tanks and occupied the rail station with 4 tanks
(see Figure 109).208 Lt. Colonel Ottow, the Commander in Lapel
reported at 0900 hrs that his command post had been moved to the
western exit of Lapel and that he would hold a bridgehead east of
the Essa River.209

Gruppe von Monteton simultaneously reported

that the Soviets with tank mounted infantry had forced their way
into Lepel and the battle in the city was still raging (see Figure
109).

During the morning Soviet armor was reported 30 km south

of Lepel near Studenka moving west.

Major General Heidkaempfer

requested that the Army Group hold the Beresino bridge northwest
of Begoml. The bridges over the Essa River west of Lepel at 1230
hrs were reported to have been blown up.

During the afternoon the

Soviets attacked the west bank of the Essa River.

The battles for

Lepel and the west bank of the Essa River were continuing as of

341

1800 hrs.

The IX Corps was holding the line Woron-Uschatschi.

The 212th Infantry Division was holding a position southwest and
west of Lepel (see Figure 109).

The corps was withdrawn to

Ssamoschje when 30 Soviet tanks emerged at Uschatschi.

The hole

at Woronetsch to the right wing of the 16th Army was now
approximately 12 km wide and the 3rd Panzer Army lacked the
forces to close this hole.210

Field Marshal Busch informed Colonel

General Reinhardt shortly before midnight that Field Marshal Model
had taken over the command of Army Group Center.211

4th Army
VI Army Corps.

The corps with the 299th and 14th Infantry

Divisions recaptured Krugloje.

General of Artillery Pfeiffer,

Commander of VI Army Corps was killed in an air attack about
2000 hrs outside of Mogilev.212
XXVll Army Corps. The Army Group ordered the corps at 1000
hrs to begin a withdrawal behind the Drut River and to anticipate a
further withdrawal to the Berezina River.

The 14th Infantry

Division was assigned to the XXVll Corps since it was in the corps
sector.

General of Infantry Voelckers, Commander of XXVll Corps

reported at 0800 hrs strong Soviet forces between StarosseljeGorodok.

The most distant elements of the corps had crossed

through Teterin and reached Shittja (1 km west of Kamenka) and
Tschirtschin. General Voelckers reported that his command post
was at Tschirtschin.213

The XXVll Corps reported a successful

breakthrough at Troiza (south of Starosselje) to the southwest.
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Soviet air attacks impeded the movement of the XXVll Corps.
260th Infantry Division was forced out of Starosselje.

The

The 25th

Panzer Grenadier Division was fighting on all sides (see Figure
110).

Soviet armor was again forcing their way from the north

into Krugloje at 1245 hrs.

Stuka aircraft support was requested.

The corps received the order at midnight to cross the Berezina
River.

The bridge at Wydriza (36 km east-southeast of Borisov)

was reported blown up and air supply was requested.
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The corps received the order to
withdraw behind the Drut River beginning in the evening and to
anticipate a further withdrawal to the Berezina River.214

The 5th

Panzer Division which was unloading in Borisov reported that
yesterday Soviet armor with infantry loaded in trucks were in the
rear of the corps moving south of Bobr on the rail line.21s

Soviet

forces were also south of Sseljawa Lake advancing southwest
toward Chatjuchowa.

The 5th Panzer Division was engaging these

forces (see Figure 110) and had the impression that the Soviets
were attempting to seize the Berezina River crossings at Ziembin
and Borisov.
The Commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps, General of
Artillery Martinek was killed in a Soviet air attack on a road back
to the Berezina River.21 s German troops were subjected to
continuous Soviet air attacks all along the roads leading back to
the Berezina River (see Figure 111 ).211 The Army Group recognized
that with deep breakthroughs on both flanks of the 4th Army that
the Berezina crossing at Beresino was threatened.

Soviet armor
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was driving directly southeast of the Berezina River and had
entered Sseliba and Brodez.

General Tippelskirch ordered that a

bridgehead east of the Berezina River be held to prevent the
Soviets from crossing the river.

The main road to Beresino was

crucial so the XXXIX Panzer Corps concentrated its anti-tank forces
on the road to prevent a Soviet armor breakthrough onto the road.
The 27th Fusilier Regiment of the 12th Infantry Division was
dispatched immediately to Beresino where the bridge had been
under continuous air attack since 1100 hrs.21a

The 27th Fusilier

Regiment had been cutoff from Mogilev by the Soviet offensive
thereby survivin·g the onslaught against Mogilev.
Meanwhile, there had been no reports from Mogilev since
2200 hrs yesterday.
fallen.

It was presumed that even the city center had

Field Marshal Busch issued an order at 1245 hrs that

permitted the 12th Infantry Division to abandon Mogilev.
it was already too late for the 12th Infantry Division.

However,

The 82nd

Grenadier Regiment of the 31st Infantry Division had also been
encircled at Mogilev and suffered the same fate.219
XII Army Corps.

The corps requested that a bridge be built

over the Berezina River for its withdrawal.
that a bridge at Perewos was being built.
order to withdraw behind the Drut River.

The 4th Army replied
The corps received its
It was also ordered to

send a motorized, reinforced regimental group from the 18th
Panzer Grenadier Division immediately to the Belynitschi-Beresino
road to advance west and secure both sides of the Berezina River
and cover the 4th Army right flank.

The 31st Infantry Division was

344

reported at 1000 hrs as already west of the Drut River.

The rest of

the corps was delayed by the construction of a bridge over the Drut
River.220 The XII and XXXIX Panzer Corps were ordered to bring
their headquarters to Beresino where the 4th Army Headquarters
was located.221
On the left wing of the 4th Army a 100 km hole existed
through which Soviet armor, trucks, and infantry were moving
southwest (see Figure 110). The 5th Panzer Division which had
just recently arrived by rail at Borisov was engaging the Soviet
forces attempting to reach the Berezina River on the left flank of
the 4th Army. Lt. General von Saucken was placed in command of a
task force on the north wing of the 4th Army.

The units comprising

Gruppe von Saucken were: 5th Panzer Division, Heavy Tank
Battalion 505, Gruppe von Gottberg, Gruppe von Altrock and staff
from the XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters.222 Gruppe von Saucken
was organized to block the advancing Soviet spearheads northeast
of Borisov.
The 4th Army was threatened with being cutoff on the east
side of the Berezina River (see Figure 110). The 4th Army
Headquarters was moved to Beresino after a 9 hour journey by road
which was under continuous Soviet air attack and burning vehicles
and dead horses obstructing the road had to be removed along the
route.223

General Tippelskirch requested fighter cover for the road.

The road bridge at Beresino was subjected to 25 air attacks.22 4
The houses burning around the town and bridge of Beresino forced
the 4th Army Headquarters to relocate to Shornowka (northwest of
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Beresino).

Field Marshal Busch notified 4th Army Headquarters at

1530 hrs:
The overall situation calls for speedy continuation of
the rearward movement to the Berezina River. All
combat effective formations are to be transferred as
fast as possible through Beresino to Borisov and
Svisloch.225
General Tippelskirch issued the order at 1745 hrs to all three
corps which stated: "Get to the Berezina.

No time constraints. "226

General Tippelskirch recorded in his diary that "now the order
comes too late. "227

Later that night Field Marshal Busch informed

Tippelskirch that Field Marshal Model was taking command of Army
Group Center.

General Tippelskirch in his last conversation with

Field Marshal Busch could not contain his bitterness over the
development of the situation which resulted from the leadership of
Army Group Center.22a

9th Army
The 9th Army finally received approval from Adolf Hitler to
abandon Bobruisk in the afternoon of June 28, 1944.229 The
previous day Hitler had ordered that Bobruisk be held with the
383rd Infantry Division.

However, when Bobruisk was encircled by

at least 10 Soviet divisions Hitler granted the troops in Bobruisk
freedom of action.230

Meanwhile, it was chaotic in Bobruisk which

was under constant Soviet air attack.

There was a lack of heavy

weapons because the troops had destroyed them in their retreat
into Bobruisk.

Major Klassen of the 383rd Infantry Division
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reported the morale of the troops had been adversely effected by
destroying their own equipment.231
reported as saying:

The common soldier was

"This Army has destroyed itself."232

The

Commander of the 9th Army observed:
9th Army has virtually ceased to exist as a fighting
force. It has not a single battleworthy formation
left.233
General of Armor von Vormann assumed command of the 9th
Army under the present circumstances.234

Troops kept pouring into

Bobruisk over the one open railway bridge over the Berezina River.
Meanwhile, on the right wing of the 9th Army the 35th
Infantry Division which consisted of mere remnants was fighting
its way back to Lyuban and the 129th Infantry Division was falling
back behind the Plyusha River southeast of Albinsk.
divisions had escaped encirclement.

These two

The 102nd Infantry Division

was still fighting on the Ptich River.
Behind the encircled Bobruisk forces a new defensive line
was established.

Gruppe Lindig contained the 390th Field Training

Division and the 12th Panzer Division which was unloading at
Marina Gorka.235 Therefore, on a 140 km front between the German
4th and 2nd Armies only a 20 km frontage astride the Minsk road
was defended with four security battalions, ad hoc units reinforced
by assault guns and one-third of the 12th Panzer Division.236
Lt. General Hoffmeister of the XXXXI Panzer Corps planned the
breakout from Bobruisk for the night of June 28-29, 1944.

During

the day more than 10,000 soldiers in Bobruisk fought off Soviet
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attempts to break into the city.237

Major General Hamann,

Commandant of Bobruisk conducted an all-around defense of
Bobruisk.

There were gun emplacements in buildings, barricades in

the streets, and tanks dug into the ground on street corners, and
the city entrances were heavily mined. The German Command
pulled back troops to the city center and concentrated large forces
of Infantry, artillery and tanks in the northern and northwestern
districts for a breakout attempt during the night.

The German

breakout would attempt to force the road in a breakout to the
northwest in the general direction of Osipovichi.

JUNE 29, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The 3rd Panzer Army consisted of the 212th Infantry
Division, the remnants of Corps Detachment D, and the 252nd
Infantry Division.238

Field Marshal Model asked Colonel General

Reinhardt what forces he would need to maintain a continuous
front to Army Group North.

Reinhardt responded that the front

could be maintained if Kampfgruppe von Saucken could help cover
the southern flank.
In the south half of a Soviet battalion had crossed over the
Berezina River in the morning fog.

Two companies of Soviet

infantry had already occupied the village of Brod west of the
Berezina and 14 km south of the Lepel-Begoml road. The German
engineers began destroying all the bridges over the Berezina River.
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The 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters moved to Borsuki in the
morning.

The 212th Infantry Division was pulled back to the Biber

line with contact to the IX Corps through Zerkowischtsche (see
Figure 112).

The IX Corps reported at 1100 hrs that Soviet armor

was now in front of Gorodez and in front of the 212th Infantry
Division and on both sides of the Plina road going north. On the
Lepel-Kalnik road densely packed Soviet motorized formations
were breaking through at Ssloboda to the north (see Figure 112).
Luftwaffe air strikes were requested against Soviet armor and
motorized columns on these roads:
Bogdanowo, and Uschatschi-Posselok.

Karbany-Gorodez, UschatschiThe Soviets at Brod were

reported building a bridge at noon (see Figure 112).

Northeast of

Kublitschi on the left flank of the IX Corps the Soviets achieved
two breakthroughs (see Figure 112).

During the late afternoon the.

212th Infantry Division was withdrawn behind the Berezina line.
Finally, a general withdrawal was ordered by the end of the day to
the following defense line: west bank of the Ponja River from south
of Dokszyce to the line of lakes north of Plissa Lake.239

4th Army
Field Marshal Busch informed the 4th Army at 1930 hrs on
June 28th that the Korpsgruppe von Saucken consisting of the 5th
Panzer Division, Kampfgruppe Gottberg, Gruppe Altrock and other
attached units were now under 4th Army command.240

The mission

of Korpsgruppe von Saucken was to secure the deep north flank of

349

the 4th Army so that it would be possible for the 4th Army to fight
its way back behind the Berezina River.
General von Tippelskirch flew with his Storch aircraft in the
morning to meet General von Saucken.

On his return trip he flew

out further to the east to get a picture of the situation east of the
Berezina River.

His plane was almost shot down near Wydriza (35

km southeast of Borisov) by ground fire.241

The Storch aircraft

received several hits.
The Soviets had already crossed the Berezina River to the
north in the area of Ziembin.242

The Army Group also reported 50

Soviet T-34 tanks on road at Bobr moving southwest.

The 4th Army

issued again the order to speed up the withdrawal and get behind
the Berezina River.

However, the bulk of the 4th Army with the XII

Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, VI Corps, and XXVll Corps was not
expected to be able to reach the Berezina River earlier than June
30, 1944 because of the slow progress in the fighting withdrawal
from the Drut River line (see Figure 113).243

The 4th Army like the

9th Army previously was threatened with being cutoff east of the
Berezina River by the parallel advance of Soviet units (see Figure
113).
The Berezina River bridge at Beresino was to become a
strategic position of decisive importance in the retreat of the 4th
Army.

It was now a high priority target for the Soviet Air Force.

During the morning the bridge received a direct bomb hit which
destroyed 10 meters of the bridge.244 The Army Engineer
Commander reported at 1030 hrs that the bridge could be repaired
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by 1700 hrs.

Then the bridge received another direct hit at 1215

hrs which severely damaged 15 meters of the bridge.

Nevertheless,

German engineer troops worked rapidly under continuous air attack
and reopened the bride to traffic at 1500 hrs.245
was also started.

A ferry operation

The congested roads leading to Beresino were

under constant Soviet air attack.246
VI Army Corps.

The corps requested fighter cover for the

Belynitschi-Beresino road because of the heavy losses suffered due
to Soviet air attacks.
XXVll Army Corps.

There had been no radio contact with this

corps since noon on June 28, 1944.247 The 4th Army sent the corps
radio messages briefing them on the bridges over the Berezina
River at 0040 hrs on June 30th.

Radio contact was restored when

the corps confirmed the message at 0315 hrs.

The bridge at

Tschernjawka was reported blocked by the Soviets.248

The bridge

at Beresino and the footbridge at Shukowez were reported open.
XXXIX Panzer Corps.

The corps reported that the withdrawal

from the Drut River line was continuing and it would cross the
Berezina River on both sides of Beresino and at Shukowez. The
corps requested fighter cover for the Belynitschi-Beresino road.
The corps reported at 1100 hrs that Traffic on the BelynitschiBeresino road had come to a complete stop since 0700 hrs.249 A
Storch aircraft was requested to determine the cause of the
traffic obstruction so measures could be taken to restore the flow
of traffic.

The corps advised the 4th Army that the fastest way to

expedite the withdrawal would involve the loss of vehicles.
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Therefore, the corps in order to avoid such loss proposed all
vehicles east of Beresino be driven off both sides of the road into
the woods. The end of the column would then be able to get
underway.

A bridgehead east of Beresino could be established so

that the vehicles could be parked within this bridgehead until they
could be moved to the west side of the Berezina once the bridge at
Beresino was operational.250
Meanwhile, the 4th Army obtained further reports about an
immediate threat to the Berezina River crossing at Beresino.

The

XXXIX Panzer Corps was informed at 1310 hrs that a Soviet force of
unknown strength with artillery had been identified in the area 15
km southeast of Beresino (see Figure 113).
The Soviet forces pursued the retreating front from the east
closely.

The 110th Infantry Division reported at 1535 hrs an

attack by 40 tanks and infantry at Lichinitschi (south of Krugloje).
The corps reported a Soviet breakthrough with armor and flak
artillery northwest of Betynitschi.

The German divisions were now

locked into a race with the Soviets for the Berezina River.
XII Army Corps.

The corps reported that the 18th Panzer

Grenadier Division would not cross the Drut River until 1000 hrs.
Lt. Colonel Reden reported at 0400 hrs that Soviet armor had not
yet entered Brodez, but Soviet combat reconnaissance had reached
the Berezina River at Jakschizy.251
in this area.

Elements of the 9th Army were

The dispersed 134th Infantry Division and the 707th

Infantry Division were here.

The 707th Infantry Division was

ordered to the bridgehead at Brodez where bridge construction was
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in progress and two small ferries were in operation.

The most

western units of the XI I Corps were ordered to proceed to the
Berezina River sector south of Beresino where the 4th Army was
threatened on its southern flank. .
The XII Corps reported that the 18th Panzer Grenadier
Division had been delayed as of 0849 hrs and would not be across
the Drut River before noon.

The 57th Infantry Division was

withdrawing from Ussakino (6 km west of the rail line) and the
267th Infantry Division was at Dulebo.
congestion was reported.
along two routes.

Further east heavy traffic

The 31st Infantry Division was moving

The smaller part of the division was on the

southern road at Kurpanje (8 km southeast of Pogost).

The larger

part of the division was on the northern road at Matschesk (12 km
southeast of Pogost).

4th Army Headquarters ordered the 31st

Infantry Division at 1500 hrs to destroy the Soviet force that was
advancing against the main highway from the Wjas-KutinKlubtscha road.
The XI I Corps received a radio message at 1730 hrs declaring
that Goroditsche (20 km south of Beresino) was occupied by Soviet
forces.252 The 4th Army ordered the XII Corps at 1930 hrs to
employ the 31st Infantry Division to protect the BeresinoBelynitschi road from the south once it reached the Berezina
River.253

The 31st Infantry Division was also ordered to send a

regiment immediately through Beresino to Tscherwen.

The 18th

Panzer Grenadier Division was also ordered to send its armored
reconnaissance vehicles immediately to the west edge of the
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Beresino.

The situation at Beresino was growing more tense.

The

707th Infantry Division reported Soviet armor followed by trucks
loaded with infantry on the east bank of the Berezina River at
Sseliba advancing north.
holding.

The small brigehead at Brodez was still

It was only defended by rear service troops, an artillery

battalion, and two anti-tank guns (Pak).

It would attempt to hold

the town but reinforcement with infantry and antitank guns (Pak)
were urgently needed.

One engineer battalion alone held both sides

of Perewos.
The intensification of the crisis facing the 4th Army was
evident by the end of June 29th. The Soviets had pursued the 4th
Army closely during its withdrawal from the Drut River line.

The

Soviets had reached the Berezina River at Tschernjawka during the
evening.254

Soviet armor was advancing from the south toward

Beresino (see Figure 113). The XII Corps had been ordered to
expedite their withdrawal, but the corps was delayed because the
crucial bridge at Beresino had been made impassable for several
hours.

The corps was trapped on the Belynitschi-Beresino road and

consequently suffered from continuous Soviet air attacks against
this main road for hours.255 Lt. General Schuenemann, Commander
of the 337th Infantry Division was killed during one of the Soviet
air attacks on the Belynitschi-Beresino road.256

This was the third

general killed within 24 hrs in the 4th Army.257
Korpsgruppe von Saucken in the north was suppossed to hold
the Soviets back north of the Minsk-Smolensk highway to facilitate
the withdrawal of the 4th Army.

However, the Soviets broke

------i
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through Korpsgruppe von Saucken with strong motorized and armor
units along both sides of the highway to the Berezina River.2sa

The

bridgehead Borisov was held and the Soviets crossing the river
northwest of Borisov were Repulsed at Studenka and Zembin by the
5th Panzer Division.259

9th Army
The plan for the breakout from Bobruisk was laid out by the
XXXXI Panzer Corp's orders which contained the following
provision_s:
1. The breakout was to be to the left of the road and
directly west of the Berezina River in a general
northern direction with the armored group of the 20th
Panzer Division in front.
2. The remaining divisions would follow behind the
right wing of the 20th Panzer Division.
3. The breakout would begin on June 28th at 2300 hrs.
Rear Guards were to hold their secure positions until
,7

0200 hrs on June 29th.
4. Tracked vehicles, Volkswagen and riding horses were
to be brought along but other vehicles and horses were
to be destroyed.
5. The wounded would remain in Bobruisk under medical
care.

The 383rd Infantry Division and troops of

"Fortress Bobruisk" were to gather the wounded and
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bring them to the citadel in Bobruisk to place them
under medical care.2so
The first breakout attempt from Bobruisk was executed at
0130 hrs.261

The Germans concentrated artillery and mortar fire

on the breakout sector to the northwest of Bobruisk.
formed skirmish lines followed by soldiers.

Officers

The attack failed

leaving 1000 Germans dead on the battlefield.262

The attack was

resumed at 0200 hrs and despite murderous fire from Soviet
artillery and machine guns German troops broke through to the road
toward Osipovichi.263

Meanwhile, the Soviets crossed the Berezina

River and broke into Bobruisk at 0400 hrs and the remaining
German garrison was liquidated by 1000 hrs leaving the Red Army
in possession of Bobruisk.264
The 20th Panzer Division's Panzer Grenadiers succeeded in
breaking through the Soviet lines during the night.

The armored

group of the division followed up this attack in a breakout in the
region of Nasarowka against weak Soviet resistance to the north
(see Figure 114).

During the evening hours the 20th Panzer

Division Kampfgruppe encountered strong Soviet resistance in a
line between Luki and Schatkowo to the west.
reinforcing the bridge at Schatkowo.

The Soviets were

German columns were fired

upon by heavy weapons from the Schatkowo bridge area. This
ceased with the German capture of Luki and Schatkowo (see Figure
114).

The Germans proceeded to secure their right flank by

shooting up the Schatkowo bridge with an 88 mm Flak gun
rendering It

unusab~.
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Meanwhile, the 383rd Infantry Division was assigned the
difficult task of fighting rearguard actions to cover the Bobruisk
breakout.265 These rearguards were reported still resisting the
pursuing Soviets in the northern outskirts of the city at 1300
hrs.266

These rearguards were mostly overtaken by pursuing Soviet

forces.

The rearguards would often have to fight off attacks from

all directions.

Flexible use of assault guns were required to fight

off Soviet armor.

Lieutenant Behr of the 383rd Infantry Division

coined the alert warning "panzer nach vorn" (tanks to the front) or
"panzer nach hinten" (tanks to the rear) to move the assault guns to
the point of crisis.267
Major General Haman, Commandant of Bobruisk and Lt. General
Hoffmeister, Commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps had
successfully broken out of Bobruisk during the night, but were
later captured during the retreat to the west.268

Nevertheless, a

large German force broke out the encirclement at Bobruisk.

German

aerial reconnaissance reported around 1200 hrs that the front of a
large German column was approximately 1O km northwest of the
city.

Between this location and Ossipowitschi a Soviet formation

was reported moving to the northeast which could possibly cut off
the German breakout.

The 9th Army requested that all the

resources of the German 6th Air Force be employed to assist this
breakout.269

According to aerial reconnaissance weak armored

spearheads of the XXXXI Panzer Corps and XXXV Army Corps had
reached the region east of Ossipowitschi by 1700 hrs.

The German

column was lead by six tanks and ten vehicles with the infantry

357

marching in the rear which stretched back to Bobruisk.270

There

were also other German forces noted by aerial reconnaissance
which were recognized 10-15 km north of Bobruisk on the east
bank of the Berezina River.
A new defensive front further to the west was being
assembled with the Lindig force which contained the 390th Field
Training Division and the 12th Panzer Division.

The new front

consisted of the Marina Gorka Bridgehead extending to Talka and
Lapitschi which sealed off the Bobruisk-Minsk road.271

JUNE 30, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The threat to the south flank of the 3rd Panzer Army emerged
with the repeated Soviet attempts to cross the Berezina river.

A

Soviet thrust into the rear at Katnik increased the threat to the
army.

The 212th Infantry Division was withdrawn to the

southwest first behind the Berezina river and later behind the
Ponja river.
During the night Soviet forces pushed through the right flank
of the 212th Infantry Division northeast of Begoml and crossed the
Berezina river occupying Babzy further to the west.272

The

security forces in Kalnik were withdrawn to the northwest to
protect the Ponja river crossing at Juchnowka.

3rd Panzer Army

sent Army Group Center a report about strong Soviet columns
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concentrated on the east bank of the Berezina river at Brod and
Begoml.

Air strikes by the Luftwaffe were requested.

Field Marshal Model wanted to block the Lepel-Dokszyce road
and also the rail line from Glebokie to the west.

Therefore, 3rd

Panzer Army was given command of the 391 st Security Division.
The division commander, General von Monteton had his command
post in Glebokie.273 The Soviets were viewed as moving in two
directions.

The northern group was moving in the direction Dvina-

Duenaburg and was already west of Polozk on the Dvina river.

The

southern group with the 1st Tank Corps was viewed as thrusting
south in the direction of Minsk possibly taking Molodetschno.
Meanwhile, in the center the Soviet 43rd Army would attack along
both sides of Glebokie.
Colonel General Reinhardt advised the Chief of Staff at Army
Group Center that the main danger to the 3rd Panzer Army was in
the south where the Soviets were crossing the Berezina river at
Brod outflanking the Panzer Army.274

The crossing site at Kalnik

was lost and in order to avoid the 212th Infantry Division from
being cut off it became necessary to withdraw the division behind
the Ponja river.

Reinhardt made it clear with the weak forces at

his disposal that they must be deployed behind a river or in a
prepared position in order to hold a sector.
The 212th Infantry Division smashed a Soviet attack in
battalion strength east of Beresino by concentrated fire.

During

the evening several Soviet attacks on both sides of the Beresino
river crossing in battalion strength were repulsed.

Finally, the
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212th Infantry Division received the order to withdraw from the
Berezina position at 1730 hrs and begin the defense of the Ponja
river sector.

However, the Soviets had already crossed the Ponja

river on the southern wing of the Panzer Army.

Dokszyce was also

abandoned in the withdrawal (see Figure 112).275
IX Army Corps.

Chief of Staff of the IX Corps reported the

withdrawal to the Gorilla line and withdrawal of the left wing of
the 212th Infantry Division to Tscherniza.

Colonel General

Reinhardt informed General Wuthmannn at 1830 hrs that the
Soviets had occupied Dzissna and had formed a bridgehead
southwest of Dzissna.

The IX Corps was ordered to begin its

withdrawal movement to the line east of KrolewszczyznaHolubicze-Plissa Lake.

The Corps was to focus its effort on

protecting the rail junction at Glebokie.

Army Group North was

given the task to restore the connection to the 3rd Panzer Army at
Glebokie.

General Wuthmann informed Colonel General Reinhardt

that he could only defend Glebokie from the northeast but not from
the north.

Reinhardt replied that he did not think the Soviets could

get through the swamp, but assault guns would be held in reserve if
necessary.

4th Army
VI Army Corps. The VI Corps was placed under the unified
command of Lt. General Vincenz Mueller.

All troops south of

Tschernjawka would belong to Gruppe General Mueller.

The VI

Corps Headquarters crossed over the Berezina at Shukowez on a

360

temporary bridge.

By 1200 hrs the first elements of the VI Corps

had crossed over the river.
XXVll Army Corps.

It was reported at 1800 hrs that the

spearhead of the Corps was west of Krugloje.
contact with the Corps.276

There was no radio

Gruppe General Mueller which was

forming rear guard defenses 30 km east of the Berezina river
finally reported that the XXVll Corps was now west of Krugloje
(see Figure 115).
XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Army Corps. The 4th Army
reported to the XXXIX Panzer Corps at 0315 hrs that the road to
Beresino was under enemy fire.277

However, the bridge was still in

German hands, intact and operational.

General Tippelskirch

transferred his command post from Shornowka to Ssmilowitschi at
0400.278

However, Tippelskirch remained in Beresino to meet with

Lt. General Vincenz Mueller, Commander of the XII Corps.
Tippelskirch had appointed Mueller commander of all troops in the
VI Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, and the XII Corps for the purpose of
expediting the withdrawal over the Berezina river.279

The XXVll

Corps was the only Corps excluded from his command.

Tippelskirch

in reference to the withdrawal movement advised Mueller to
expedite the entire withdrawal movement by disposing of all
superfluous material and regardless of heavy vehicles open the
Belynitschi-Beresino road.280

Tippelskirch issued the following

order:
The sharp reduction in fighting strengths and the need
to fight two separate battles within 4th Army's area
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make it essential to combine all troops engaged south
of Tschernjawka, including the VI Army Corps
Headquarters into a single group.
These troops will therefore be formed into Gruppe
General Mueller under the command of General Vincenz
Mueller. This order takes effect forthwith.
General Mueller is to see to it that the elements of the
XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters freed by this
reorganization are extricated by the fastest possible
means and transferred via Minsk to the Korps Gruppe
von Saucken.281
The rapid movement of the 31st Infantry Division over the
Beresino Bridge was ordered.

The 12th Grenadier Regiment was

already near the bridge. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the
110th Infantry Division was falling back under strong Soviet
pressure and wanted to know which bridge across the Berezina
river was available for the division's withdrawal.

Currently,

General Mueller notified the XXXIX Panzer Corps that as of 1130 hrs
traffic over the bridges was not possible.282

In the XII Corps area,

the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 267th Infantry Division
movement proceeded as planned. The XII Corps had no report from
the 57th Infantry Division, but it was noted to have had especially
difficult obstacles to overcome in the withdrawal.

The XII Corps

line secured by rear guards was now the line Ussakino-lglizaKorythiza-south of Pyschatschje (see Figure 115).

The XII Corps

was approximately 30 km from from the Berezina river at 2100
hrs. (see Figure 115).283 There were 50 to 60 Soviet tanks
reported to have passed through Uchwala advancing to the west.
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The situation on the Beresino bridge was growing more tense
by the hour.

The Soviets south of the bridge were laying down

harassing fire along the bridge and road.

The Soviet Air Force

conducted continuous, rolling air attacks since 1630 hrs.

General

Mueller ordered extensive destruction of baggage trains and
vehicles to clear the road to Beresino.284
fuel and food among the retreating troops.

There was a shortage of
The situation west and

north of Beresino was growing more precarious (see Figure 115).
The 286th Security Division reported that Soviet infantry at
Poplawy (9 km southwest of Beresino) had crossed the large road
to the north.

The bridge at Tschernjawka was burnt and two Soviet

tanks which had crossed the bridge were destroyed.285 The Soviets
had crossed the Berezina river in several places north of
Nowosselki.

The town of Beresino had been under heavy air attack

since 1700, but the bridge was still passable.286

General

Oschmann, Commander of the 286th Security Division was lightly
wounded during the air attacks.

The road to Tscherwen at 1855 hrs

was again cleared of Soviet forces and opened so the traffic was
able to move.
Field Marshal Model's new order for the main mission of the
4th Army was received at 2200 hrs:
4th Army's main task remains to get its divisions back
behind the Berezina river in as battleworthy a condition
as possible while the reinforcement of the echelons on
both flanks continues. Contact with 9th Army's eastern
flank through Tscherwen is to be established and
maintained. The protection of the flanks on the north
wing is required and the prevention of the outflanking
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of Borissow in the north. The defense line is to be
pulled back to the road behind the the Berezina river on
both sides of Borissow.

This would free the 5th Panzer

Division in case of an emergency to be employed west
of the Berezi na river to the northwest. There is no
available garrison for Borissow. Borissow is to be
incorporated into the forming of a defensive front as a
strongpoint (see Figure 116).287
Field Marshal Model made it clear that he would not be bound
to hold Hitler's designated fortresses when he chose not to
garrison "Fortress Borissow.288
The situation reported by the 4th Army at 0250 hrs on July 1,
1944 stated that most of Gruppe General Mueller (XII Corps,
remainder of VI Corps, and XXXIX Panzer Corps) was still retreating
toward the Berezina river (see Figure 115).289

The threat to the

Beresino bridge had intensified.

The bridge was now under

observer directed artillery fire.

There was an approximately 60

km long column of horse-drawn wagons and motorized vehicles two
and three abreast on the Belynitschi-Beresino road moving west
slowly because of heavy traffic congestion.290
The Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Dethleffsen
summarized the plight of the 4th Army:
Lack of information on the flanking armies' situation
makes it impossible for the 4th Army to judge whether
there is a risk of the enemy developing a third
encircling ring with pincers meeting about in the region
Minsk. The large gap on 3rd Panzer Army's right leads
one to suppose that there is no way of stopping an
advance on Minsk by strong enemy forces, especially
from the north. The extraordinary degree of enemy air
superiority, German troops fighting in the east had not
imagined until now, lead to especially high losses on
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our side; combined with his numerical superiority in
tanks and the constant threat to our formations flanks
and rear which resulted in the dismemberment of a
unified front to neighboring armies has resulted not
only in a considerable deterioration of combat worth
but also a sharp decline in morale. Our losses of
weapons are extraordinarily high. The difficult terrain
east of the Berezina river through which our formations
must traverse as they fight their way back has given
rise to irreplaceably high losses of vehicles and
precious material. Losses among commanders are
terrible. XXXIX Panzer Corps has lost three commanding
generals within 24 hours. Only a few formations are
still firmly under their commanders' control.
We can only reckon with significant elements of 4th
Army bei11g available to be employed in the development
of a new defensive front if they are spared the burden
of being bottled up again in the area of Minsk.291
The end of June 30, 1944 marked the 8th day of the Soviet
offensive and sealed the fate of the 4th Army divisions when the
Soviets obtained observer directed artillery fire on the Beresino
bridge.292 The Beresino-Tscherwen road had also been cut again by
Soviet forces.

Meanwhile, German forces in their vehicles waited

in long columns to cross the Berezina river while the Soviet Air
Force conducted continuous attacks against the masses of vehicles
in the 4th Army pocket (see Figure 115). The rear guards of Gruppe
General Mueller were still 30 km east of the Berezina river while
Soviet motorized and armor formations were outrunning the
Germans to the west (see Figure 115).

The Soviets were

approaching from the south on a broad front along the BeresinoTscherwen road.293

There were still no available forces on the

Beresino-Tscherwen-Minsk road.

The weakened regiments from the
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31st and 12th Infantry Divisions were speedily brought up so they
could be used to hold this road. The Soviets had already crossed
the Berezina river southeast and north of Borissow (see Figure
115).

They were advancing by swinging wide of Borissow to the

west with strong armored formations (see Figure 115).294

These

Soviet forces presumably reached an area 20 km north of Minsk
(see Figure 115). The German forces in the 4th Army by contrast
were forced to destroy the infrastructure of their Army with the
destruction of military material and vehicles east of the Berezina
river.

Gruppe von Saucken
General von Tippelskirch had flown out to brief General von
Saucken personally during the morning.

Tippelskirch had moved his

headquarters to Ssmilowitschi and arrived at 1100 hrs to receive a
report that the Soviets had reached the beginning of the Berezina
river and were moving in columns on the Lepel-Biehomla road and
on the track Ssklez-Postreshze-Brod.

Gruppe von Saucken received

a reinforced reconnaissance detachment with artillery to
reconnoiter the west bank of the Berezina river to the north and
determine Soviet strength in the area of Biehomla.

This unit was

assigned to block any southwestern movement by the Soviets.
There was a report at 1000 hrs of 5 Soviet tanks north of Rudnja
(18 km west of Borissow) moving south.295

This spearhead was to

be repulsed by 10 tanks and a rifle company from the 5th Panzer
Division.

East of Kamien Soviet armor had penetrated Ziembin and
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a bridgehead was being built north and east of the town.

A strong

Soviet armor attack occurred 7 km southeast of Ziembin and the
armor broke through.

Borissow was now under attack by more than

50 tanks from the north, east and southeast (see Figure 115).296
The Soviets started building bridges at Nowosselki and at Mal.
Ucholody which permitted them to secure the west bank of the
Berezina river.297

During the evening the Soviets broke through the

German Bridgehead at Borissow east of the highway bridge (see
Figure 116).298

Another Soviet breakthrough to the north at

Studenka was sealed off.

A Soviet detachment from the Brod area

with 5 tanks and artillery appeared at Pleszczenice (60 km
northwest of Borissow) and was destroyed.
The 4th Army was now faced with encirclement from the
north and south (see Figure 115). Furthermore, it had to execute a
crossing of the Berezina river without adequate crossing points
and under continuous air attack while resisting the pressure of
encirclement.

The entry made in the war diary for June 30, 1944

described the situation of the 4th Army as almost hopeless.299

9th Army
The Soviets were reported advancing beyond "Fortress
Sslusk" (see Figure 117) to the north. The 9th Army had prepared
strong positions south of Usda.

The front southeast of Marina

Gorka was holding. Army Group Center ordered the 9th Army to use
the 12th Panzer Division to block the Soviet advance southeast of
Minsk.

Furthermore, the 9th Army was placed in command of
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"Fortress Minsk" and was given the assignment to "increase the
defensive readiness of "Fortress Minsk" with all possible means" at
00.00 hrs, June 30, 1944 (see Figure 118).300
Meanwhile, the 9th Army was struggling to withdraw the
remnants of XXXXI Panzer Corps and the XXXV Army Corps from the
Bobruisk pocket (see Figure 119). The 20th Panzer Division's
armored advance group ran into strong Soviet resistance at
Tschutschja and threw the Soviets back.
Tschutschja were then cleared of Soviets.

The woods north of
The German spearhead

then encountered renewed Soviet resistance at Oktjabr which was
smashed with the capture of the glass factory.301
captured various Soviet heavy weapons.

The Germans

Lt. General von Kessel,

Commander of the 20th Panzer Division deployed a captured Joseph
Stalin tank (see Figure 99) at the end of the German column to
secure the rear.

The removal of the threat to the right flank

facilitated the mass of retreating German columns to advance
north between Shatkowo and Ssytschkowo (see Figure 114). The
Soviets were next encountered at the road junction northeast of
Ssytschkowo attacking the flank of the German column from the
north and west.

The various Kampfgruppen assembled along the

bank road which ran parallel to the Berezina river and fought off
various weak Soviet attacks while retreating north (see Figure
114). This column reached the area of Werbki in the afternoon.
Lt. General Hoffmeister reorganized the units from various
divisions for a further retreat.

The 20th Panzer Division remained

the most powerful unit possessing several tanks, 12 half-tracks
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and a self-propelled howitzer.302

The 383rd Infantry Division

conducting the rearguard action could not always block all the
Soviet attacking units and individual Soviet tanks sometimes broke
through and would attempt to shoot up the German columns.

But

once the German columns crossed the bridge at Werbki this problem
was prevented by the deployment of 88 mm Flak guns which
secured the bridge from attack by Soviet armor.303

The Germans

after concentrating their forces captured Ssloboda, the rail bridge
north of Oktjabr and the Sswisslotsch crossing north of Ssloboda.
However, Sswisslotsch remained under Soviet control and Soviet
reinforcements were pouring into the town.
The most foreward elements of the XXXXI Panzer Corps and
the XXXV Army Corps reached the Sswisslotsch estuary as the 12th
Panzer Division was advancing toward the Sswisslotsch sector to
make contact with 9th Army elements retreating from Bobruisk.
The Hoffmeister force reported the following status during the
morning:

"Bridge at Sswissiotsch in our hands.

Short of rations,

fuel and ammunition. Where do we go from here?"304 The 12th
Panzer Division replied:

"Make for Pogoreloje."305

The Hoffmeister

group reported at 1355 hrs:
Having to fight hard to break through again today.
Sswisslotsch bridge in our hands, Berezina bridge in
enemy hands. Short of ammunition, medical supplies
and rations.306
The Hoffmeister force reported later in the afternoon having
captured all three bridges around Sswisslotsch:

the Sswisslotsch
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river bridge west of the town; the road bridge over the Berezina
river into the town; and the railway bridge over the Berezina river
to the south.307

Unfortunately, the Bobruisk survivors could not

hold onto the bridges and they were lost again.308
Meanwhile, the 12th Panzer Division continued its attack at
Lapichi and threw the Soviets back across the Sswisslotsch river.
The 9th Army Commander, General of Armor von Vormann ordered
the Lindig force (see Figure 119) at 1510 hrs to launch a relieving
attack with the 12th Panzer Division from Pogoreloje toward
Sswisslotsch before first light.309

The fate of approximately

30,000 men depended on the attack of the 12th Panzer Division
toward

Sswisslotsch. 31 o

The Bobruisk survivors regrouped and the ordnance officer of
the 36th Infantry Division reconnoitered a route for the breakout of
the motorized vehicles.

The motorized column would begin moving

with the onset of darkness to the west and then turn north to the
bridge at Lipen.

The objective was to reach Pogoreloje where the

advance units of the 12th Panzer Division were located.3 11

This

column commenced its western movement at 1800 hrs after
receiving supplies from the air.

Meanwhile, the 383rd Infantry

Division secured the town of Tschutschja against a Soviet armor
attack at 1930 hrs and later in the evening the SswisslotschBerezina triangle against mounting Soviet pressure.

The attempt

to secure the right flank by the demolition of the Berezina river
bridge north of Oktjabr failed.
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During the evening of June 30th the bridge at Lipen was
occupied by the Kampfgruppe Colonel von Lilienhoff.

This

Kampfgruppe stormed the bridge using a captured T-34 tank (see
Figure 120) and successfully broke through.312
later on July 1st provide a crossing for Lt.

This bridge would

General von Kessel's

Kampfgruppe to reach the 12th Panzer Division.
General Hoffmeister sent part of the armored group of the
20th Panzer Division in the southwest direction toward
Brizalowitschi to secure the left flank and then turn north to reach
Lipen-Malinowka.

The flank security was necessary due to a

reported Soviet column moving from Ossipowitschi in the direction
of Sswissiotsch.

The armored group as expected met the Soviets

at Brizalowitschi and the 59th Panzer Grenadier Regiment launched
an energetic attack which repulsed the Soviets.

However, most of

the half-tracks were lost because of Soviet tank fire.

It was

during the night that the half-track containing Generals
Hoffmeister, Engel and Conrady was lost and the generals were
reported missing.313

It was later discovered that all three

generals had been taken prisoner by the Soviets.314
Field Marshal Model in discussion with OKH outlined his
reinforcement needs.

The 4th Panzer Division and 28th Jaeger

Division were to assemble in the Baranovichi-Ssluzk area.

The 1st

Hungarian Cavalry Division from the 2nd Army was also to
reinforce Baranovichi.

The 170th and 132nd Infantry Divisions

were to reinforce the Minsk area.
to be committed at Molodeczno.

The 170th Infantry Division was

The 7th Panzer Division was to be
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employed at Baranovichi or Molodeczno depending on the situation.
Minsk was not be held as a "Fortress." Therefore, Army Group
Center was anticipating at least five new divisions to build a new
defensive line on the Baranovichi-Dzerhinsk-Molodeczno axis.
These five divisions were:

4th Panzer Division, 7th Panzer

Division, 28th Jaeger Division, 132nd Infantry Division, and 170th
Infantry Division.315

JULY 1, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The main danger to the 3rd Panzer Army remained the hole
between it and the 16th Army of Army Group North.316 The
probable Soviet advance in the direction of Duenaburg would
require them to take the area around Glebokie.

This would result in

the severing of the 3rd Panzer Army's lifeline since south of the
road and rail line Glebokie-Postawy and west of it lay partisan
infested terrain containing well lead partisan units totaling at
least 12,000 men (see Figure 121).317

Nevertheless, the forces to

close the hole between the 16th Army and 3rd Panzer Army were
not available.

The 3rd Panzer Army was also threatened in the

south by Soviet forces that were moving through the ever enlarging
hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army in the south
(9ee Figure 122).318 This hole in the south like the hole in the
north could only be closed by the deployment of new forces.
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During the afternoon Soviet forces in battalion strength
moved from the northeast out of the swamp and emerged at
Torgany in the rear of the 2121h Infantry Division.

This

development caused the division to issue the order for withdrawal
at 1600 hrs.

The division had already been weakened by reinforcing

the area of Glebokie.
entire front.

Glebokie remained the key position on the

The 212th Infantry Division dispatched the Grenadier

Regiment 423 and a battery of assault guns from Assault Gun
Battalion 232 toward Glebokie.
The IX Corps reported that Soviet reconnaissance forces were
at Werecieje.

Colonel Praefke, Chief of Staff of the IX Corps

advised Major General Heidkaempfer that the Soviets were trying
to outflank the corps on the left flank.

Heidkaempfer advised the

IX Corps that they must hold their present position so the
withdrawal of the 212th Infantry Division could be executed along
both of the single roads leading from Glebokie to the west (see
Figure 121 ).319

The only other retreat route was through partisan

infested terrain southwest of Glebokie, but this route would only
be used in an extreme emergency. The Grenadier Regiment 423 was
to deploy north of Glebokie with the assault guns.

The commander

of the assault gun battery reported, however, at 1600 hrs that the
Soviets had reached the wooded terrain south of Miereckie.

The

Soviets from this location had begun to fire their artillery on
Glebokie.
General Wuthmann requested to withdraw the IX Corps under
cover of darkness, but Colonel General Reinhardt instead demanded
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a counterattack tomorrow toward the north with all available
forces concentrated for the attack.

The release of the following

reserves for the attack was granted: Engineer Battalion 62,
Grenadier Regiment 423, and assault guns.
The 252nd Infantry Division after it pushed back the Soviets
advancing on Glebokie was to be pulled back to the area of the west
edge of Plissa Lake to Ginki.

The 252nd Infantry Division and Corps

Detachment D had lost contact with each other because the Soviets
managed to occupy the woods between the two divisions.
The IX Corps Command Post was now located at Gut
Konstantinowo, 12 km southwest of Glebokie (see Figure 121).320
The Soviets were clearly interested in seizing Glebokie since this
would serve as the key road and rail junction for further operations
against Duenaburg.

It was clear that the next Soviet operations

would be to take Glebokie thereby severing the road and rail
lifeline to the 3rd Panzer Army.

Consequently, the 212th Infantry

Division received the order at 2100 hrs to withdraw and defend the
position between Serwetsch (west of Parafjanowo )-north of
Dokszyce-west edge of the swamp terrain northeast of Dokszyce.
The 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters was transferred during the
course of the day to Postawy (see Figure 121 ).321

4th Army
The 4th Army Headquarters in Ssmilowitschi had received
few reports during the night. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that
the Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was located on both
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sides of the main highway behind the Klewa river (see Figure 122).
The 110th Infantry Division was still the furthest division to the
east (see Figure 122).322

A Soviet attempt at encirclement was

prevented by the destruction of the Mosha Bridges.

The corps

wanted-to build a bridgehead east of the Berezina river with the
110th Infantry Division in the line Shurowka-DmitrowitschiOreschkowitschi.

The 110th Infantry Division was directed to head

for Shukowez.
General von Tippelskirch flew to Beresino in the early
morning.

He discovered that Gruppe Floerke was withdrawing from

their position at Tschernjawka.
premature.

Tippelskirch viewed this action as

He wrote down an order to Lt. General Floerke

personally:
The decision now to withdraw to the south is
intolerable given the scope of the total situation of the
army. You are to turn around immediately and attack
the enemy moving through Murowo. A withdrawal is
only permitted under heavy enemy pressure and is only
allowed up to the Usha which must be held and
connection with the VI Army Corps at Shukowez
established ... It is critical therefore that this order is
strictly carried out. 323
Minsk was now threatened by Soviet mobile forces.

The

170th Infantry Division was enroute by train to Minsk but its
.arrival was not anticipated before July 2nd at 0600 hrs.

Between

Minsk and Molodeczno the 221 st Security Division was deployed to
secure the rail line.

The Commandant of "Fortress Minsk," General

Sperling had only 900 men from alarm units and stragglers that had
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been picked up.324

Soviet attacks were anticipated to be coming

soon.
Gruppe von Saucken whose main task remained the securing
of the the Borissow-Minsk road also prevented Soviet traffic from
crossing the road to the south and penetrating the region north of
Lohojsk (see Figure 122).

In Beresino from 0400-0430 hrs the

sound of combat could be heard from the direction of Pogost.

In

Brodez (15 km south of Beresino) a Soviet division was assembling
to cross the Berezina river.325

The Soviets had already advanced to

Negonitschi west of the Berezina river around midnight with an
entire division.
Kampfgruppe General Mueller had several objectives to
accomplish today.

It had to destroy the weak Soviet forces that

were east of the Berezina river blocking the German retreat and
then immediately cross over the river and shore up the south flank
of the Berezina river.326
The 4th Army presented Army Group Center at 1000 hrs with
a summary of its situation.

The 267th Infantry Division and 18th

Panzer Grenadier had smashed the pursuing Soviet forces in the
area south of lgliza.

Northwest of Brodez the Soviets had crossed

the Berezina river in division strength and were advancing to the
north.

The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle," and the

110th Infantry Division were west of the Klewa river on both sides
of the Minsk-Smolensk highway.
Soviets.327

Tschernjawka was taken by the

Kampfgruppe vc;m Saucken after a hard battle lost

Borissow (see figure 123).328

The forward line of the Kampfgruppe
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currently runs from 6 km southwest of Gliwin to Rudnja on the
Ussjasha river (30 km northeast of Minsk) (see Figure 123).
The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the Soviets with strong
forces and armor had pierced the position of the Panzer Grenadier
Division "Feldherrnhalle" north of the Minsk-Smolensk highway at
Kotytniza and was pressing the attack further in the direction of
Galez.

Soviet armor was also reported to have broken through the

line of the "Feldherrnhalle" at Kukarewo.

The Soviets had also

reached the Berezina river northeast and west of Shurowka. 329
The XII Army Corps requested an air attack from the IV
Flieger Division against the Soviets east of Korytniza and to the
south on the road.

The XII Corps reported at 1108 hrs its

intentions to build a bridgehead at Beresino to bring across units
to the west bank of the Berezina river and hold open the crossing to
the west.

Fighter cover was necessary the entire day.

The

destruction of Soviet forces at Selischtsche was not possible due
to the shortage of forces.

But here and on both sides of Shornowka

German countermeasures were underway.
The XII Army Corps reported at 1300 hrs that the 267th
Infantry Division and 18th Panzer Grenadier Division were now in
the line Dulebo-Matschesk-Babinka and had received orders to
retreat to the Klewa river.

Dulebo was under heavy attack.

The

Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was now in the line
Babinka-Sababiny-Galez.

The 57th Infantry Division was advancing

out of the area west of Golynka, the 110th Infantry Division was
engaged in the withdrawal to the bridgehead Shukowet.

The 31st
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Infantry Division has reached the Klewa river.

The Soviet

concentration at Sselischtsche (5 km north of Beresino) was
reported on the Berezina river. 330
Kampfgruppe Mueller was presently in danger east and west
of the Berezina river.

Soviet armor with infantry was reported at

1115 hrs to have pushed through Tscherwen to the north and cut
both sides of the Minsk-Smolensk highway thereby cutting off the
route of retreat and supply for the 4th Army (see Figures 122 &
123).331

The 286th Security Division and the XII Army Corps were

ordered to immediately send combat effective units with anti-tank
(Pak) guns to clear out the Soviet forces severing the 4th Army's
lifeline to the west.332

4th Army reported at 1355 hrs to Army

Group Center that ground supply was no longer possible, and that
air supply of food, fuel and ammunition was necessary for the units
at Beresino and all units east of Tscherwen.333
The 110th Infantry Division was ordered at 1505 hrs to
immediately march through Mikulitschi on Tscherwen.

However,

the 110th Infantry Division reported that the situation on the west
bank of the Berezina river and on both sides of the Shukowez bridge
could only be controlled by bringing up new forces from the west
since the XII Corps had no further available forces.
The next few hours brought more adverse reports.
Kampfgruppe Koenig reported at 1120 hrs that Soviet forces of
unknown strength had blocked the road at Now. Marjanowka and
Kampfgruppe Koenig was incapable of freeing the road.
Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 1715 hrs that the Soviets had
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taken Nowosselki.

The 110th Infantry Division reported that

contact was made in Schepelewitschi with the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Division which was now 50 km from Beresino.

The

Soviets which had broken through the Panzer Grenadier Division
"Feldherrnhalle" on the Minsk-Smolensk highway were at 1700 hrs
1 km from Pogost. 334
The 4th Army sent a summary of the situation to Army Group
Center and OKH at 1815 hrs stating:
The enemy through the advance of strong forces west of
the Berezina river from the south and through the
extension of his breakthrough position on the Berezina
at Tschernjawka has encircled the XII Army Corps and
the XXXIX Panzer Corps. Consequently, the failure to
respond with air supply en masse for these corps and
the XXVll Army Corps will result in the breakout of
units which will cease to be combat effective. The
advancing enemy armor forces from the northeast on
Molodeczno precluded the rail transport of approaching
reinforcements for Minsk. The Army at the moment
only has freedom of action for the 5th Panzer Division
and its mission to secure the unloading of approaching
reinforcements in the region of Molodeczno and from
there to restore contact with the 9th Army in the
direction of Stolpce. The enemy advance on Minsk will
be delayed as long as possible. A General Staff Officer
from the Army Group with full command authority is
requested for Minsk early on July 2nd.335
The 4th Army transferred their Command Post to the
encampment at Melitta on the highway 6 km east of Minsk. 336
Kampfgruppe von Saucken reported that the Soviets were
advancing on a broad front on both sides Kamien (12 km northwest
of Ziembin) against the line Kozyry-Chotajewicze.

The Soviets
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advancing through Pleschtschenije to the southwest made it
necessary for a rapid concentration of forces in the Kaina sector
northwest of Lohojsk.

General von Saucken ordered the withdrawal

of the front to the highway sector on both sides of Smolewitschi
which would shorten the front.
The 286th Security Division was ordered to send a
Kampfgruppe to the area east of Tscherwen to combat the Soviet
units that had broken through in this area.

Lt. General Mueller had

restored communications with Lt. General Graf von Oriola who was
presently the commander of VI Army Corps and Lt.
of the 14th Infantry Division.337

General Floerke

He requested that sufficient

forces with anti-tank weapons be transferred toward Tscherwen
(see Figure 123).

Soviets were attacking Poplawy at 1800 hrs.

A

Soviet force of 200 men was reported to have crossed the Berezina
river at Sharnowka.
The 4th Army issued the last report of July 1 , 1944 stating:
Fighting heroically on all sides in places against a
closely pursuing enemy with superior forces, the army's
last divisions are trying to fight their way back to the
Berezina river despite shortages of ammunition, rations
and fuel. 338
The 57th Infantry Division was attacking in the area west of
Golnyka.

The 267th Infantry Division, 18th Panzer Grenadier

Division, and Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" earlier
were fighting between Dulebo and Galez.

Presently, these divisions

were trying to fight their way back to the bridgehead south of the
Minsk-Smolensk highway between Beresino and Pogost.339

The
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Soviets were reported to have broken through the German lines
north of Pogost.

In the rear of the 4th Army, the Soviets had

crossed the river at Guta (6 km southwest of Beresino) and had
reached the road at Sslobodka and Tscherwen west of the river.340
Further north the Soviets had taken Nowosselki and crossed the
Berezina river in numerous places.

The 110th Infantry Division had

reached Shukowez on the Berezina river, but had completely
exhausted its rations.341

The Kampfgruppe von Saucken was

engaged in heavy battles west of Borissow against superior Soviet
forces.

There was also no communication with the XXVI I Army

Corps.342
General von Tippelskirch sensing the desperation of the 4th
Army felt that he should fly personally to the cut off corps because
as Commander of the 4th Army he belonged with his troops.343
However, Colonel Dethleffsen, Chief of Staff of Army Group Center
argued that this was not the time "to make a gesture" but to build a
new front from the rear.344

Tippelskirch in the end agreed with

Colonel Dethleffsen.
The 4th Army situation was desperate.

The 4th Army

reported that the XII Army Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps and the XXVll
Army Corps were encircled (see Figure 122).345

On the right flank

the Soviets had occupied the only road that the 4th Army could use
as a route of retreat.
east of Tscherwen.

The Soviets were also occupying a wide front

On the left flank the Soviets had reached the

Berezina river at Shornowka and Shukowez.

The Soviets had also

crossed the river between Tschernjawka and Borissow.

Borissow
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was captured by the Soviets.

Kampfgruppe von Saucken was locked

in battle west of Borissow and Soviet armored forces were
approaching Molodeczno (see Figure 122). The mass of the 4th
Army still remained east of the Berezina river.

Kampfgruppe

Mueller was being thrown back into a bridgehead east of the
Berezina river and the XXVll Army Corps still remained 50 km to
the northeast of the river.

Lt. General Mueller reported at 1900 hrs

Soviet breakthroughs with armor at Dulebo and on the highway
toward Pogost.

The Berezina bridgehead had been contracted to a

depth of 6-1 O km as a result of ammunition shortages for artillery
and heavy weapons.346

Elements of the 31st Infantry Division,

267th Infantry Division and 286th Security Division were
transferred to the west bank of the Berezina river to prevent the
Soviets from bypassing them and reaching their rear area.

Lt.

General Mueller requested continuous fighter cover and Luftwaffe
air strikes for July 2nd against the Soviets on the highway
northeast of Pogost.

The failure of the air supply effort in

providing sufficient quantity of supplies meant that the breakout
of the corps would result in the loss of combat effective units. 347
The 4th Army reported the following order of battle during
the evening of July 1, 1944:
Kampfgruppe Mueller:
XII Army Corps with elements of 31st Infantry Division;
remnants of Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle,"
12th Infantry Division, 337th Infantry Division;
Commandant of Beresino Garrison; 286th Security
Division; and the XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters.
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Kampfgruppe von Saucken:
5th Panzer Division; Headquarters of von Gottberg
force; and Kampfgruppe Floerke (remnants of 14th
Infantry Division).
XXVll Army Corps:
110th Infantry Division
Kampfgruppe Koenig:
remnants of Grenadier Regiment 12 (31st Infantry
Division); remnants of Grenadier Regiment 27 (12th
Infantry Division); elements of the 337th Infantry
Division. 348

9th Army
Lt. General von Kessel crossed the rail line OssipowitschiBrizalowitschi-Ssloboda early in the morning.
the wooded swamp terrain southeast of Lipen.

His group reached
The Bobruisk troops

had marched through the night of June 30-July 1st around
Sswisslotsch to the southeast of Lipen with the 20th Panzer
Division leading the way.349

The 20th Panzer Division located the

bridge over the Sswisslotsch river at Lipen which was unoccupied
by Soviet troops permitting the Germans to cross over the river
and proceed in the direction of Malinowka-Pogoreloje.350

Lt.

General van Kessel and the commander of Grenadier Regiment 59
along with the remaining staff were leading the column with a
half-track in front and a captured Joseph Stalin tank bringing up
the rear.

The column at 0700 hrs heard the noise of armored

vehicles approaching from the direction of Malinowka-Pogoreloje.

383

The 12th Panzer Division launched its attack to rescue the
survivors of Bobruisk in the early morning hours.

Captain

Blancbois, Commander of the 1st battalion, Panzer Grenadier
Regiment 25 of the 12th Panzer Division reinforced with armor
launched his attack at 021 O hrs through Pogoreloje towards the
town of Sswisslotsch.351

The Hoffmeister group reported at 0500

hrs that it held a 3 km front south of the Sswisslotsch river and
that the the town of Sswisslotsch was still occupied by Soviet
troops.

German tanks of the 12th Panzer Division penetrated as far

as Prudichi (2 km northwest of Sswisslotsch) at 0840 hrs.352

The

Panzer Grenadier battalion during the afternoon had penetrated to
within a few kilometers of the Bobruisk force.

Captain Blancbois

and his Panzer Grenadier battalion mounted in half-tracks fought
elements of 4 Soviet rifle divisions before making first contact
with the Bobruisk troops in the early afternoon at Malinowka.353
This undertaking had assisted the breakout of thousands of 9th
Army troops.

Later, on July 3, 1944, the 9th Army reported that a

total of 25,000 men from Bobruisk had successfully escaped Soviet
encirclement. 354

JULY 2, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The 3rd Panzer Army had become increasingly detached from
the rest of Army Group Center.

Its front was further north closer

to Army Group North while a huge hole in the entire front existed in
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the south (see Figure 124).

The 3rd Panzer Army concentrated its

forces around Glebokie while the Soviets attacked its flanks.355
The Soviets using armor had forced their way into Holubicize in the
Corps Detachment D sector.

The 212th Infantry Division defended

the line Parafjanowo-north of Dokszyce-Krolewszczyzna.

An

attack in regimental strength on both sides of Dokszyce was
smashed.

Colonel General Reinhardt advised the commander of the

212th Infantry Division at 1035 hrs that the Soviet tank supported
attacks would have to be repulsed without further use of assault
guns since it was the desire of the IX Corps to have all the assault
guns sent to Glebokie.

General Senzfuss was of the opinion that

the Soviets would not succeed in cutting off the 212th Infantry
Division.

The division still had security troops available for

reserves.
The IX Corps reported at 1050 hrs that Soviet reconnaissance
forces had been observed at Laskie (10 km northeast of
Woropajewo).

The Corps dispatched 2112 flak batteries, 1 assault

gun battery and one battalion of infantry loaded in trucks from the
102nd Regiment of the 252nd Infantry Division.

The Soviet

presence in the area of Laskie represented a serious threat of a
wide outflanking movement from the north which threatened the
new withdrawal route.

Colonel General Reinhardt continued to

stress to General Wuthmann of IX Corps the importance of holding
Glebokie so that the 212th Infantry Division would have a clear
retreat route (see Figure 125).

Colonel Schmid reported at 1330

hrs that the village of Osinogrodek was already occupied by the
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Soviets and along the road to the west several burned out vehicles
were observed as a result of the surprise attack of the Soviet 44th
Motorized Rifle Brigade against Postawy (see Figure 125).

The

situation had become critical in the south and the north as the
front was bent back around Glebokie in a wide arc (see Figure 125).
The 212th Infantry Division was placed under command of the IX
Corps.356
west.

The division was to withdraw to the north and then turn

The 212th Infantry Division was to occupy the line Servecz

lake-northwest of Krolewsczyzna-Zabinka.

The IX Corps was to

maintain contact with the left wing of the 212th Infantry Division
holding the line Zabinka-north of Bursy lake at Romanoczuki.

This

line was to be held and only a withdrawal to the line of lakes north
of Glebokie was permitted under severe Soviet pressure.
During the afternoon the Soviets broke into Korolewoon on
the right wing of Corps Detachment D with infantry and armor.
Soviets continued to press their attack and took Podhaje.

The

The

order was issued to withdraw at 1650 hrs to the 212th Infantry
Division and the IX Corps to withdraw in the general line Servecz
lake-west bank of lake west of Lastowiec-Pistrowskije lake.
Colonel General Reinhardt spoke to General Wuthmann, Commander
of IX Corps around 2000 hrs and reported that the 252nd Infantry
Division had reached the line on the Pietrowskije lake.

The corps

was given the mission to hold the position Ssewecz lake-Glebokie
and to place its reserves on the supply road.

Colonel General

Reinhardt now viewed the threat from the south as far greater then
the north.

The Soviets had turned toward Duenaburg in the north.
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The 212th Infantry Division reported at 2015 hrs that the
withdrawal road at Soroki was blocked by the Soviets.

Three

assault guns were sent to Soroki to assist the withdrawal of the
division. The new IX Corps Command Post was located at Ozuny.
Colonel General Zeitzler spoke with the Chief of Staff of the
16th Army of Army Group North shortly after 2300 hrs.

The 16th

Army was given the order to hold Polozk as a "Fortress" (Fester
Platz).357

This assignment made a continuous front connecting the

16th Army to the 3rd Panzer Army no longer possible.358
Therefore, the 3rd Panzer Army was faced with a completely open
north flank.

Colonel General Zeitzler also informed Lt. General

Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center around Midnight that the
Soviets were on the highway and rail line north of Dunilowicze
based on POW interrogation and were preparing to take Postawy.

4th Army

Lt. General Mueller requested at 0255 hrs air resupply for the
110th Infantry Division on the east bank of the Berezina river
opposite Shukowez.

Unfortunately, Shukowez had been occupied by

the Soviets earlier.

This meant that the destruction of the 110th

Infantry Division was fairly certain.
During the night the 4th Army Headquarters at Melitta (east
of Minsk) was informed by Army Group Center that forces were
being channeled to Molodeczno because of the, threat of
encirclement from the north.

The 170th Infantry Division arriving

as reinforcement was ordered to Molodeczno instead of Minsk.

The
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Assault Gun Battalion 1337 was also unloaded at Molodeczno.
Army Group Center ordered Lt. General Lend le of the 221 st Security
Division to take command of all arriving elements of the 170th
Infantry Division pending the arrival of the commanding officers
for this division.

The 170th Infantry Divisional elements, Assault

Gun Battalion 1337 and Police Regiment 2 were formed into
Kampfgruppe Lendle to block the area of Radoskowicze and to hold
open the area of Molodeczno.
However, General von Tippelskirch was not comfortable with
an unknown general defending his northern flank.

Therefore, he

ordered Lt. General Metz, a battle proven commander to assume
command of the arriving elements of the 170th Infantry Division
and the 221st Security Division Headquarters.

Metz was ordered to

form Kampfgruppe Metz with all available troops in the area.359
Metz was also given the mission to block the rail line and road to
Wilna, and prevent the Soviet motorized troops from advancing to
the west by the line Lepel-Borissow.
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller during the late evening of July 1,
1944 had transferred his command post over the Berezina river to
an area 6 km southwest of Beresino and north of the highway.360
Lt. General Mueller placed the Commander of the 110th Infantry
Division in charge of crossing all divisions over the bridge at
Shukowez.
Lt. General Krebs and General von Tippelskirch conferred at
0915 hrs.

Tippelskirch expressed the concern that

countermeasures must be taken since the Soviets had almost
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reached the Wilna area.

Kampfgruppe von Saucken could not remain

west of Borissow when the Soviets had advanced through Wilejka
to Smorgonie (see Figure 124).
Tippelskirch.

Lt. General Krebs agreed with

Therefore, General Tippelskirch based upon this

understanding ordered Kampfgruppe von Saucken which consisted of
the 5th Panzer Division, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 and a multiple
rocket launcher battalion to disengage from the current action and
advance through Radoszkowice to reach the battle around
Molodeczno. The Kampfgruppe was ordered to hold open the
swampy terrain section of Molodeczno to permit the unloading of
reserves from the west and maintain a base to receive the
encircled elements of the 4th Army (see Figure 124).
Kampfgruppen von Gottberg, Mueller, Floerke and the Heavy
Tank Battalion 501 were to prevent the Soviet advance and capture
of Minsk.361

They were also to maintain the connection to the

encircled units.

Kampfgruppe Floerke was to hold the area around

Tscherwen as long as possible because only here did a possibility
exist to restore a connection to the encircled formations.362

Lt.

General Floerke reported Soviet offensive preparations and
requested a Stuka attack on Ostrowy.
The 4th Army Headquarters during the late afternoon
established a new command post at Zaslaw (20 km northwest of
Minsk).363

A series of reports were received from Lt. General

Floerke at 2105 hrs.

Floerke had radioed earlier at 1130 hrs that

overwhelming Soviet forces had broken through at Lyssaja Gora and
his Kampfgruppe had been forced to occupy a new defensive line
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along the Gat river.

The German line was reported at 1850 hrs to

run through Kukolewka-Tschernogradje.

Then at 1955 hrs Floerke

radioed that Soviet armor had broken through the center of the
position on the road and had turned the flank of the position.

The

Kampfgruppe proposed to establish a new line at Sadoroshje (on the
highway)-Jagodka.

The bridge at Ssmilowitschi had been destroyed

by aerial bombs and high explosives.

The 4th Army ordered Lt.

General Floerke to reinforce the units escaping from the
encirclement at Ssmilowitschi and prepare to smash the expected
Soviet attack.

These units at Ssmilowitschi were to be supplied

and then immediately evacuated to the west.
General Metz arrived at Molodeczno at 0530 hrs and placed
the following units under his command:

170th Infantry Division,

Kampfgruppen of the 14th and 299th Infantry Divisions, Police
Battalion 31, and the 221 st Security Division Headquarters with
attached units.

Soviet armor emerged in Krasne only 16 km

southeast of Molodeczno.

Together the Kampfgruppe 299th Infantry

Division and German Tiger tanks pushed the Soviets back.

General

Metz reported that Wilejka was under weak tank and artillery fire
since noon.

Metz reported his defensive line north of Molodeczno.

A defense screen was being rapidly organized at Smorgonie by
Army Group Center.

The 5th Panzer Division assembled in the area

of Ossoschizkij-Gorodok and freed the rail line to Molodeczno at
Krasne (see Figure 124).
In the south Kampfgruppe Floerke was pressed back which
decreased the prospects for the encircled corps.

Ssmilowitschi
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was picked by the 4th Army as the supply center for fuel, food and
ammunition for the encircled corps:
Corps and XXVll Army Corps.364

XII Army Corps, XXXIX Panzer

However, the 4th Army reported at

1940 hrs that ground supply could no longer be guaranteed at
Ssmilowitschi and air supply was urgently requested.

Lt.

General Vincenz Mueller reported that since early

morning a battle continues at Pogost.

Soviet crossing attempts

north of the Beresino bridgehead had been smashed, the holding of
the bridgehead till evening appeared questionable.

The Soviets

were halted at the Berezina river on both sides of Beresino by the
4th Army (see Figure 126).

But the increased Soviet pressure and

the outflanking movement in the south made it necessary for the
corps and the 110th Infantry Division to withdraw in the direction
of Smolewitschi (36 km northeast of Minsk) on the following day.

Lt. General Mueller reported at 1845 hrs that his divisions had
crossed the Berezina river except for the rear guards.365

Mueller

stated that the divisions had "complete confidence" and the "will to
breakthrough" in taking the direction toward Smolewicze. 366
The 4th Army reported at 2140 hrs that Minsk was threatened
from the northeast by Soviet armor (see Figure 126).367
Kampfgruppe Mueller was informed that it must withdraw through
Ssmilowitschi where resupply was planned and then proceed past
Minsk to the south then west.

The XII Army Corps radioed that it

was moving in the direction of Minsk with "complete confidence"
and the "will to breakthrough" but help was needed through air
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supply.368 The 4th Army's supply problems were enormous.
than 20,000 men were starving.369

More

General von Tippelskirch

sent the following message to Kampfgruppe General Mueller:
The progress of the corps is followed with a fervent
heart. We are doing everything to help that we can with
our limited forces.370
General von Tippelskirch had made a decision for the building
of a new front with the withdrawal of the reinforced 5th Panzer
Division to the area of Molodeczno (see Figure 124).

Kampfgruppe

von Saucken remained in the area west of Borissow (see Figure
124).

And the remaining German soldiers could not effectively

prevent the Soviet armored formations from advancing which had
already reached Wilejka and Stolpce.

The withdrawal of the 5th

Panzer Division, however, opened up the area west of Borissow
which lead to the compression of the encircling ring around the
encircled corps (see Figure 126).371

Kampfgruppe von Gottberg

continued to hold its position on both sides of the rail line in the
region of Smolewitschi.

General von Tippelskirch prevailed upon

both General von Gottberg and Floerke personally to hold their
positions east of Ssmilowitschi and Minsk.

Kampfgruppe Floerke

especially was needed to hold its position while there was a
chance to save elements of the encircled corps.

But during the

course of the day Kampfgruppe Floerke was pushed back from the
area west of Tscherwen to Ssmilowitschi.372
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9th Army
During the early morning hours of July 2, 1944 Stolpce was
still under German control.

The 9th Army Headquarters crossed the

Njeman and deployed in the town of Mir.373 The Soviets were
moving rapidly and Soviet armor arrived in front of Stolpce and
began firing into the city.

The Soviets took the city during the

morning and blocked the Njemen bridges that were needed by
Kampfgruppe Lindig which was still in the area southwest of
Marina Gorka.

The 12th Panzer Division received the order to

attack the Soviets in Stolpce and throw them back across the
Njemen river (see Figure 124).374 The main supply line to Minsk
ran through Stolpce which was now cut.

The 12th Panzer Division

disengaged from the line Talka-Ugolez and Kampfgruppe Lindig to
attack Stolpce (see Figure 124).
The 9th Army reported that as of July 2nd 15,000 men from
Bobruisk had successfully broken through to German lines with the
help of Kampfgruppe Lindig and the 12th Panzer Division.375
Meanwhile, the Soviets had appeared southeast of Stolpce and to
the northwest of Stolpce lay the partisan infested Naliboki woods
and swamp area that no longer had intact bridges over the Njemen
river.

The advance of the Soviets on Molodeczno from the northeast

signaled the beginning of the expected encirclement of Minsk (see
Figure 126).

The Minsk encirclement had approximately a 60 km

circumference.376

The 9th Army Headquarters was forced to move

by Soviet pressure from Mir to Nowamysz near Baranowicze.377
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The Soviets advanced from Stolpce to the west and captured Mir
with armor and infantry.

JULY 3, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Soviets during the night had achieved deep breakthroughs
southeast and east of Glebokie with strong armor and infantry
forces (see Figure 125).

The 212th Infantry Division was forced to

withdraw to a new position west of Glebokie (see Figure 125).
This withdrawal was covered by the heroic actions of weak rear
guard troops.

The withdrawal was conducted as plannned.

3rd

Panzer Army continued to withdraw to the west to avoid
envelopment.
During the night the Soviets had achieved deep breakthroughs
on both inner flanks of Corps Detachment D and the 252nd Infantry
Division (see Figure 125).

The IX Corps gave its divisions the order

at 0530 hrs to fight their way back to a line west of Glebokie:
Sserwetsch lake-Olchowiki-Gut Konstantynowo-Mosarz. 378
Contact with the 212th Infantry Division had been lost during the
night.

The commander of Grenadier Regiment 423 in Dunilowicze

reported that the Soviets had broken through west of Glebokie
using 2 assault guns and by concentrating its regiments.

Grenadier

Regiment 423 before the Soviet attack had 400 men and at 1000
hrs only 100 men remained.379

The four battalions of the 212th

Infantry Division were personally lead from the front during the
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withdrawal by the division commander and the operations officer.
The divisional artillery was withdrawn behind a protective screen
of infantry.
The IX Corps reported that the Soviets had been deflected
from the southern road by the 252nd Infantry Division.

The main

Soviet pressure was not in front of Glebokie but from the north.
Nevertheless, Colonel Schmied at Zuberki had established an
assault gun barrier and prevented a Soviet thrust onto the main
road.

The intention of the IX Corps was to transfer the 212th

Infantry Division to the southern sector and the 252nd Infantry
Division to the northern sector of a new defensive line.

Corps

Detachment D was to disengage and be transferred by motorized
column to the lake sector of Postawy.

The IX Corps Headquarters

remained at Oschany (see Figure 125).
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief
of Staff of Army Group Center at 1300 hrs that his troops had lost
much of their combat effectiveness.

They were fighting their way

back to the Dunilowicze line (see Figure 125). A defense of
Postawy could not be guaranteed.

The right and left flanks of the

Panzer Army were just hanging in the air completely open (see
Figure 126).380

An immediate reconnaissance was requested

especially between both Army Group Center and Army Group North
to ascertain the furthest advance of the Soviets.

Reinhardt further

explained that if the Soviets broke through the Postawy position
the Panzer Army would not be able to do anything because of the
lack of combat troops (see Figure 125).381
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The rear guards of the IX Corps consisted of blocking
positions on the southern road at Laskie and on the northern road at
Zuberki.

Both blocking positions were occupied by Infantry and

assault guns.

The Zuberki position repulsed a company strength

attack supported by armor at 1330 hrs. The IX Corps had been in
continuous battle since June 22, 1944 and the troops were
exhausted and many were fighting rear guard actions and retreating
in their bare feet.382

The withdrawal to the Holbie sector with the

bridgehead Dunilowicze had not been completed by the evening. The
Soviets managed to occupy the area on both sides of Postawy.
During the evening aerial reconnaissance reported a Soviet armored
thrust by 18 tanks from the northeast toward Postawy.

The 252nd

Infantry Division had its armor protective screen organized on the
north edge of the town.

The entire IX Corps later in the evening

was ordered to withdraw further to the west and occupy the First
World War positions west of Postawy on both sides of the town
(see Figure 127).383 The right wing of the corps was to rest on the
northern tip of the Narocz lake and the left wing on the Kamja bend
at Vileitos.
Soviet attacks supported by armor and tactical aircraft
against Glebokie failed.

The 16th Army reported that it would

restore contact with the 3rd Panzer Army through Duenaburg.

Two

divisions were freed by a withdrawal of the I Army Corps and were
to assemble southeast of Duenaburg.
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4th Army
On the morning of July 3, 1944, the 4th Army Headquarters in
Zaslaw (northwest of Minsk) received two messages from
Kampfgruppe Mueller.

Kampfgruppe Mueller had retaken the

Beresino bridgehead and then abandoned it.

Lt. General Mueller had

transferred his command post to Gaidukowo (24 km northwest of
Beresino).384

Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 0130 hrs that

strong Soviet pressure made it necessary at dawn to withdraw to
Ssmilowitschi.

Lt. General Floerke reported at 0440 hrs that the

traffic through Ssmilowitschi had diminished.

The troops had held

the bridgehead throughout the night in costly battles.

The 4th

Army informed Lt. General Floerke at 07 45 hrs that Kampfgruppe
Floerke would have to hold on as long as possible to make contact
with the XII Army Corps which was approaching from the region of
Gaidukowo.

Kampfgruppe Mueller was informed by radio at 0815

hrs that the situation at Minsk was unclear and the strongpoint
Ssmilowitschi and Kampfgruppe Floerke were endangered.
Therefore, a rapid juncture with Kampfgruppe Floerke was
necessary.

Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 0750 hrs that the road

junction north of Ssmilowitschi was occupied and Soviet columns
were moving north.
The Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Corps broke into Minsk from the
east on July 3, 1944 and forward elements of the 11th Guards and
31st Armies had reached the city (see Figures 128 & 129).385

The

1st Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front arrived on the
southeast outskirts of Minsk 4 hours after the 3rd Belorussian
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Front forces which completed the encirclement of the German 4th
Army.386

The 4th Army received an urgent report around 1000 hrs

that the Soviets had entered Minsk. 387

The 4th Army reported to

Army Group Center at 1055 hrs that Kampfgruppe Floerke had been
pushed back to Ssmilowitschi and the connection to the XII Army
Corps was in progress (see Figure 129).

Minsk was cleared of

German troops by units of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts by the
end of the day.388

Minsk had been lost and individual Soviet tanks

were already between Minsk and Zaslaw (see Figure 128). The 5th
Guards Tank Army passed around Minsk from the north and broke
out into the area northwest of Minsk and cutoff the German retreat
toward Molodeczno (see Figure 128).389 The 5th Panzer Division
and 170th Infantry Division had the mission to hold open the
bottleneck Molodeczno east of Radoszkowice and to block the
crossings at Usza and Wilja up to Smorgonie (see Figure 128).390
Lt. General Metz clarified the situation on the north flank in
his 0700 hrs report.

Elements of the 170th Infantry Division and

221 st Security Division were deployed from Krasne to Smorgonie.
The reserves consisted of 2/3 of the 5th Panzer Division
assembled in the area Krasne-Molodeczno.

German rail traffic

from the west could now only run as far as Smorgonie.

A German

pilot reported Soviet bridge construction over the Wilja river 4 km
north of Smorgonie.

The 4th Army requested air strikes on the

bridge and reconnaissance northeast of Smorgonie.

This request

was was sent to Army Group Center and simultaneously to OKH and
the 6th Luftflotte.
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The 4th Army Headquarters was transferred from Zaslaw to
Molodeczno during the afternoon.

The 4th Army Headquarters

received reports in Molodeczno concerning Minsk.

Minsk was lost

to the Soviets around 1000 hrs and Soviet armor was reported on
the road half way between Grodek-Ostroszycki-Radoszkowice and
Kosakowa as well as on the road Minsk-Zaslaw and MinskRakuw.391

Kampfgruppe von Saucken was attacking Soviet armor at

Kosakowa when it received an order from General Tippelskirch to
defend the land bridge from Molodeczno in the line north of
Radoszkowice to Smorgonie.

It was also to hold this area open for

the retreating corps against the pursuing Soviets from the
southeast.

The 4th Army informed Kampfgruppe Mueller and

Kampfgruppe Floerke at 1710 hrs that Minsk was occupied by the
Soviets and the best breakout route was through Stolpce where two
Panzer divisions were being sent.392

Kampfgruppe Gottberg was

ordered at 1715 hrs to prevent a Soviet advance from Minsk to the
land bridge on both sides of Wolozyn with all available means (see
Figure 128).
Kampfgruppe Gottberg with the fall of Minsk became
fragmented.

Field Marshal Model issued new orders for the 5th

Panzer Division to attack toward Grodek-Ostroszycki.
General von Tippelskirch constructed a new front using the
60 km wide roadless swamp terrain of the Puszca Nalibocka woods
(see Figure 129).

North of the Nalibocka woods the defense was

delegated to the VI Army Corps.

On the left of the Nalibocka woods

the XXXIX Panzer Corps was assigned this sector to defend. The
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corps defense assignment extended from the land bridge of Wolozyn
to the line northeast of the swampy terrain and south of Wolozyn
to the Berezina river.
A conference among 4th Army Commanders occurred during
the morning of July 3, 1944.

General Voelckers, Lt. General

Vincenz Mueller, Lt. General Traut, Lt. General Ochsner, Lt. General
Drescher, Maj. General Schuermann, Maj. General Klammt and Lt.
General Trowitz were all present.393
not present.

Lt. General von Kurowski was

General Voelckers who showed signs of exhaustion

took charge of the conference.

The purpose of the conference was

to determine the direction of the breakout from the
encirclement.394
optimistic.

The atmosphere of the conference was definitely

The notion of surrender or capitulation was never

expressed or indicated.395

Lt. General Mueller complained about the

excessive use of nonessential vehicles by the Panzer Grenadier
Division "Feldherrnhalle."

The division still had too many cars on

the road which clogged the road and consumed gasoline that was
needed for the assault guns.

However, the main source of irritation

expressed concerned the non-arrival of supplies and poor
communications with 4th Army Headquarters.396

The breakout was

to be conducted in two corps groups with the XXVll Corps leading
the movement west.397

The individual breakout of divisions was

not discussed at this conference.
General Voelckers at the conclusion of the conference
ordered the retreat to the west to begin on the evening of July 3,
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1944.

The order of battle for the breakout was organized as

follows:
1. 57th Infantry Division and weak elements of the
78th Sturm Division were to advance through
Samostotschje to Rudnja on the right.
2. The 31st Infantry Division was to advance to
Tscherwonnaja Sslobadka in the center.
3. The 78th Sturm Division was to advance to
Beresowka on the left.
4. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was in the
rear to first secure both sides of Ossowyj Bor as a
rearguard then it could follow the other divisions.398
The XXVll Army Corps received one 800 liter fuel drop by air to
support the breakout. 399

This fuel was used mostly for the

command and radio vehicles of the corps staff.

However, the 78th

Sturm Division also received 200 liters of this fuel.
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller reported to the 4th Army at 1435

hrs that the troops of the encircled divisions had lost their combat
effectiveness:
The route to Ssmilowitschi was blocked by the enemy
in strength. Individual groups of tanks are approaching
from the north. The route conditions are difficult.
Despite stringent measures heavy congestion occurs
and as a result signs of disaffection among the vast
numbers of stragglers are evident. There existed no
more possibilities to concentrate combat troops and
artillery with sufficient ammunition rapidly enough for
a planned attack because of movement problems.
Therefore, I have decided and ordered the breakout of
the threatened encirclement with as many men of sound
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morale as possible with basic weapons heading south of
Minsk to the west.400
Field Marshal Model issued the following orders for further
operation of the 4th Army:
1 . The area of Dukora must be held by conducting a
sufficient anti-tank defense to make possible a rallying
point for the elements of the 4th Army still east of
Minsk. The enemy following up in this direction is to be
shaken off, and his actions against Minsk from the north
suppressed, by a thrust of an armored group from the
5th Panzer Division from the area of Radoszkowice onto
Grodek-Ostroszycki. The elements east of Minsk are to
be directed westwards through Stolpce or Wolozya
depending on the situation.
2. The area of Wolozyn-Molodeczno-Smorgonie was
to be kept open. The enemy crossing the Wilja river
north of Smorgonie is to be attacked and thrown back
over the river. The neck of land between Smorgonie and
the marshes south of Lake Narosz is to be blocked.401
Soviet movement during the evening determined the
possibility for construction of a new front and the fate of the
encircled corps.

According to recent reports an entire Soviet Tank

Army was breaking through past Minsk to the south through
Dsershinsk-Rubeshewitsche.

Another report issued by Lt. General

Lendle of the 221 st Security Division at 1415 hrs based on German
aerial reconnaissance reported 3 Soviet columns lead by armor
advancing side by side on Minsk while German columns were only a
few kilometers west of Minsk.402

The XII Army Corps had

successfully fought its way through in 3 Kampfgruppen to the west
in the area north of Tscherwen.403
thrown out of Ssmilowitschi.404

Kampfgruppe Floerke was

There were no reports from the
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110th Infantry Division and the XXVll Army Corps.

The defense of

Minsk had collapsed during the morning.405 The Soviets by noon
were west of Minsk and probing Zaslaw.

Strong Soviet armored

forces were attacking further west of Grodek-Ostroszycki and
locked into combat at Kosakowa with Kampfgruppe of the 5th
Panzer Division where continuous and heavy armored battles
developed.

Soviet reconnaissance forces northwest of Smorgonie

had succeeded in crossing the Wilja river.

Lt. General Vincenz Mueller no longer believed a general
breakout was possible under the circumstances.

He had elected to

gather what battle hardened troops of sound morale he had left and
taking only infantry weapons launch a breakout.

This marked an

end to any effective combat operations of the old 4th Army.

The

encircled forces consisted of the remnants of 1O divisions of the
old 4th Army, 4 divisions of the VI Army Corps, and the Panzer
Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle. "406

Therefore, a total of 15

divisions ceased to exist as combat effective units. 407
The Luftwaffe had failed to provide the necessary air support
for the ground troops in their attempts to breakout to the rear.

It

also could not provide air cover for the rear areas to protect rail
transport.

The German soldier was repeatedly called upon to

provide his own air defense.

Previously, the Luftwaffe High

Command openly stated that the enemy controlled the air by day
and night.

German air defense doctrine called for the employment

of all weapons including machine guns and rifles against low flying
air attacks.

Their advice to the German Soldier about seeking
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cover during an air attack did not mean sticking their "head in the
sand," but "lying on their back, raising their rifle and shooting."408
Army Group Center also found it necessary to issue an order on July
3, 1944 to all military personnel traveling on trains.

When the

train under air attack halted all military personnel were to
disembark and engage the Soviet aircraft with rifles and machine
guns.409

9th Army
The 12th Panzer Division had been pulled out of the front at
Marina Gorka during the night and was enroute toward Stolpce.

The

4th Panzer Division had commenced its attack from Nieswiez and
made good progress.

Horodziej was taken during the advance. The

attack of the 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions to retake Stolpce had
not yet succeeded.

The 4th Panzer Division was stalled northeast

of Horodziej by severe Soviet resistance.

The 12th Panzer Division

lacking reports from Stolpce dispatched a Storch aircraft to
assess the situation and it was shot down over the city.
The Bobruisk troops which had escaped earlier had been
moved by train to the west, but many that had escaped later were
now marching on foot in stocking feet because their feet were too
sore to wear boots.

The lucky ones were riding in vehicles of the

12th Panzer Division and supply vehicles.
Major General von Kessel of the 20th Panzer Division
concentrated the mass of motorized and horse-drawn vehicles into
one group with the purpose of finding another crossing over the
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Njemen since the Soviets had occupied Stolpce.410 The
Kampfgruppe of the 20th Panzer Division thrust to the northwest
through partisan positions in the Nalibotski forest as far as
Jeremicze where the Kampfgruppe began the construction of a
bridge over the Njemen river.

The 9th Army had dispatched an

assault gun reinforced Kampfgruppe of the 28th Jaeger Division and
a bridging column to this location.

This bridge was completed by

1800 hrs on July 3rd.
The battle of Stolpce had taken an unfavorable turn.

The 12th

Panzer Division reached the area northeast of Stolpce, but a
breakthrough appeared hopeless.411

The spearhead of the 4th

Panzer Division had failed to make any further headway by evening.
The Soviets were laying down artillery fire on the rail station
Horodziej where the 4th Panzer Division was being relieved by the .
28th Jaeger Division which was forced to unload on the open
tracks.
The 9th Army during the morning was renamed "Gruppe von
Vormann" and placed under the command of 2nd Army.412 The 9th
Army was to retain the designation "Gruppe von Vormann" until
July 10th when the 9th Army Headquarters became fully functional
again.413

"Gruppe von Vormann" consisted of the following units:

12th Panzer Division
28th Jaeger Division
Gruppe Harteneck:
4th Panzer Division
4th Cavalry Brigade
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division
"Fortress Baranowicze"
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and all arriving formations in this area.414
The 9th Army reported at 1330 hrs the recovery of
approximately 25,000 soldiers of various units from Bobruisk. 415

JULY 4, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
A link up by 3rd Panzer Army with the 16th Army was going
to be attempted through Koziany with the 215th Infantry Division
from the 16th Army and Grenadier Regiment 435 and
Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 393 of the 3rd Panzer Army.

Meanwhile,

Kampfgruppe 3rd Panzer Army was ordered to block the neck of
land between Narocz lake and Dzisna, and along both sides of
Postawy (see Figure 127).
The withdrawal movement by the 212th and 252nd Infantry
Divisions into the old First World War positions (line of lakes
directly west of Postawy) went according to plan (see Figure 127).
Corps Detachment D was partly transported by truck to the
southern sector of its new position north of the Miadziol lakes.
The 212th Infantry Division's rear guards had to fall back to the
forward outposts of Miadziolka.

Aerial Reconnaissance revealed

that Soviet columns were advancing out of the region of
Parafjanow through partisan territory to the west on the right
flank of the Panzer Army (see Figure 127).416 The spearhead had
reached the region directly east of Konstantynowo.

Ground

observation reported at 1700 hrs that individual tanks were
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probing out of the area of Kobylnik to the north.

The Soviets with

the mass of their motorized vehicles had crossed the of land north
of the Narocz lakes.

The 3rd Panzer Army responded by dispatching

a strengthened Kampfgrupppe with infantry units,
Sturmgeschuetzen (assault guns), and Nashoernern (tank
destroyers) under the command of Major Hoppe of the Heavy Panzer
Jaeger Battalion 519 (see Figure 127).417 Major Hoppe was
assigned to beat back this renewed threat of envelopment and if
possible occupy the line of lakes between Narocz and Miadziol.
The necessity of stripping reserves to strengthen the right
flank of the Panzer Army weakened the center sector where there
were no further available reserves.

The linking up with the 16th

Army north of Koziany was no longer possible due to a shortage of
forces (see Figure 127).418
Lt. General Krebs informed 3rd Panzer Army at 1530 hrs that
it was to take over the command of Wilna.419

Contact with the

Commandant of "Fortress Wilna" would shortly be arranged.

Lt.

General Krebs informed the Panzer Army that there was a prospect
that the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions would arrive to assist this
front.

Wilna was supposed to be reinforced.

The supply of the

Panzer Army would be based on the rail line Wilna-Kauen.

Maj.

General Heidkaempfer requested at 1700 hrs that Lt. General Krebs
arrange for the destruction of the Wilna river bridge at Michaliski
by a low level air attack.

Engineer Battalion 505 received the

demolition assignment to destroy the stream crossings west and
north of the northern tip of Swir lake.

The IX Corps was no longer
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exposed to great danger on the southern flank because of the
deployment of the 197th Infantry Division by truck.

Major Hoppe's

Kampfgruppe was supposed to launch a flank attack but the
infantry to support and protect the Kampfgruppe's armor had not
arrived from Corps Detachment D.

The infantry riding in panje

wagons would have to increase their pace in order to keep up and
protect the armor.
The IX Corps rear guards were ordered to remain in the
stream sector east of Postawy till 0200 hrs.

Soviet armor

northeast of Postawy had not yet reappeared.

The battalion

strength of the 212th Infantry Division averaged only about 150
men who needed food and sleep.420 The left wing of the IX Corps
was located in Kurti (6 km northwest of Postawy) but because of a
lack of troops contact could not be reestablished to the 16th Army
through Koziany (see Figure 127).421

Maj. General Heidkaempfer

knew that everything must be done to concentrate artillery against
the eastern front of the corps so that the probable Soviet attack on
Postawy on July 5th could be met with concentrated artillery fire.
The IX Army Corps Command Post was now located at Jankiszki (5
km southeast of Aduliskis) (see Figure 127).
The 3rd Panzer Army defense at the end of the day was based
upon the First World War position between the north edge of the
Miadziol lake and the Hoduschki woods.

Corps Detachment D was

ordered to attack the following day and occupy the neck of land
between Narocz lake and Miadziol lake.
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4th Army
The XXVll Army Corps which had been out of contact since
June 30th had fought their way back and Joined Kampfgruppe
Mueller in the area of Ssmilowitschi.422

Generals Mueller and

Voelkers reported at 0700 hrs their decision to breakout that
evening in the direction south of Minsk proposed by General von
Tippelskirch.423

Army Group Center at 1530 hrs ordered

Kampfgruppe 4th Army to block the neck of land between the
Nalibocka woods and the swamp terrain south of the Narosch lakes
in the line forward of Wiszniew-Smorgonie and to delay the
Soviets forward of this line as long as possible.

Meanwhile,

Soviets advancing from Minsk to the west took Rakow defended by
weak security forces.
Field Marshal Model did not address the encircled divisions
personally this day because he was involved in the conduct of
offensive operations.

The Soviets on a wide front had already

crossed the road to Smorgonie at Molodeczno and west of the city.
General von Saucken was forced to withdraw the Kampfgruppe 5th
Panzer Division from Grodek and used it to clear the MolodecznoSmorgonie road (see Figure 130).

In the VI Corps sector the

Soviets forced their way into Molodeczno and Gmurgainys.
were still raging in these areas.

Battles

Soviet forces advancing along the

rail line from the northeast also took Lebicdziew.

Aerial

reconnaissance reported massive Soviet forces moving on the roads
Bobruisk-Minsk and Mogilew-Beresino-Ssmilowitschi.
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The 4th Army reported during the evening that since June 26,
1944 the Soviets had deployed the following units against the 4th
Army:

41 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, 1 mechanized corps, 1

cavalry corps, 1 tank brigade and a large number of independent
army units.424

The 4th Army reported that at least 1000 Soviet

tanks had been deployed against it and 473 had been destroyed.425
The 4th Army breakout was not successful.

The 78th Sturm

Division, 25th Panzer Grenadier Division and 31st Infantry Division
were halted in their advance to the west.426

The 25th Panzer

Grenadier Division's spearhead lead by 3 assault guns was blocked
by Soviet heavy· weapons from any further advance 3 km west of
Belaja-Lusha. 427

The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had saved 32

assault guns and 20 self-propelled guns from being abandoned due
to lack of fuel, but these guns had mostly exhausted their
ammunition and there was no further available fuel.

The division

had received no regular supply of fuel, ammunition and food since
the Soviet offensive began on June 22, 1944.428 The only supply of
ammunition left was for rifles along with some handgrenades.
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division launched another attack
consisting of only infantry leaving their vehicles behind on the
road.

The attack was launched through the wooded area to the right

of the road by Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119 under the
command of Major Koller.

Motorized Grenadier Regiment 35 under

the command of Colonel von Bergen was to exploit the breakthrough
of the 3rd Battalion of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119.

Lt.

Colonel Luick, Commander of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119
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remained behind with the remaining units and combat vehicles.

The

attack failed, however, and the Soviet defense line could not be
cleared by a joint effort from the west and east.

Meanwhile,

Soviet attacks were repelled despite a shortage of ammunition.
Soldiers that had no more ammunition would have to crouch in fox
holes until the Soviets were within hand-to-hand combat range
whereupon the troops would jump out of their holes using empty
weapons in hand-to-hand combat to repulse the Soviets.429

Soviet

attacks were repulsed but the Soviets continued uninterrupted fire
into the compressed cauldron with all available weapons which
caused the Germans high casualties.

The Command Post of the 25th

Panzer Grenadier Division was at Belja Lusha and the XXVll Army
Corps Command Post was at Basseka.

2nd Army
Gruppe General von Vormann. On the right wing of Gruppe Lt.
General Harteneck the Soviets were advancing from the southeast
directly south of the rail line west of Siniawka.

On the left wing

of Gruppe Harteneck the Soviets encircled Nieswicz and took Kleck
from the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division.
was assembling around the town of Snow.

The 4th Panzer Division
The 4th Panzer Division

received the mission to attack to the south to prevent a Soviet
breakthrough at "Fortress Baranowicze" (see Figures 130 & 131 ).430
The 12th Panzer Division was fighting its way back to the west and
had abandoned its attack toward Stolpce.

The 28th Jaeger Division

and Kampfgruppe Lt. General von Kessel were to establish a
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security line on the Usza sector facing northeast.

The Soviets

were reported to have already occupied Turzec in this sector.
Army Group Center in sorting out the available divisions of
the 9th Army decided that the following divisions were still
operational:

35th, 102nd, 129th, and 292nd Infantry Divisions.431

The remaining 9th Army divisions could not be used as divisions.432
The 20th Panzer Division was to be restored and all available
elements made combat ready.

JULY 5, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Soviets attacked the south wing of the IX Army Corps
during the night and broke into the German positions at Laposie and
Mikitki.

The Soviets also took Juodaciai.

There was already a hole

in the direction of Wilna which kept growing larger with the gap
between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army (see Figure 130).
There was still no contact with Army Group North yet.433
Reconnaissance reported that Tverecius (18 km north of Aduliskis)
was occupied by the Soviets.

The Soviets attacked the eastern

front of the Panzer Army from the right wing to the hills at
Postawy with heavy casualties (see Figures 130 & 132).
Maj. General Heidkaempfer advised Army Group Center that
the position in the southern sector could not be held any longer.
withdrawal to the Aduliskis line (see Figures 130 & 132) during
the night was proposed.

The Chief of General Staff informed

A
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Colonel General Reinhardt that both sides of Postawy could no
longer be held and the right wing was already southeast of
Svencionys (see Figure 132).

A withdrawal was ordered for that

night. The new Panzer Army Command Post was to be established
in Sirvintos.434
"Fortress Wilna" was to be placed under the command of the
3rd Panzer Army during the discussion at 1500 hrs between Col.
General Reinhardt, Field Marshal Model, and General von
Tippelskirch at the Wilna airport.435

However, the formal

subordination of the city would occur later.

The discussion was

shifted at 1630 hrs to the subject of Wilna's defense with the
Commandant of "Fortress Wlna," Major General Poel.436
Wilna was merely a notion without combat troops.

"Fortress

The strength of

the garrison consisted of 1 battalion from the 170th Infantry
Division, 3 companies of stragglers with engineer platoons, 4 Flak
batteries, and 1 military police company.437

"Fortress Wilna" was

officially placed under command of Col. General Reinhardt of the
3rd Panzer Army at 2000 hrs.438

Hitler wanted Wilna held and the

following reinforcements were to be sent to Wilna:
2 Valkyrie Regiments (1068, 1069),
Hitler's "Escort Battalion" (Battalion von Werthern),
761 st Brigade (partially motorized),
Anti-tank Battalions (PAK) (1059, 1060),
1 combat battalion 1041 for the 252nd Infantry
Division.439
The arrival of these reinforcements was expected by July 6th in
the afternoon.
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The 225th Infantry Division was requested for Podbrodcie.
However, the 225th Infantry Division had just begun assembling in
the area of Dukstas-Turmont for an attack to restore the front
between Army Group North and 3rd Panzer Army.440
divisions were available from Army Group North.

No other

The 225th

Infantry Division would be available at the earliest by July 10th
after unloading from rail transport.

The first transport will roll

through Duenaburg on July 7th.
Major General Heidkaempfer oriented the Commandant of
"Fortress Wilna" at 2100 hrs about the enemy situation.

Soviets

had been observed advancing toward Wilna from the direction of
Aschmena (see Figure 130).

Soviets were also reported at 2030

hrs to have broken through at Lentupis moving further to the west
(see Figure 132).

Aerial reconnaissance identified groups of Soviet

armor and a Soviet motorized group moving west toward Podbrocie.
Contact between Army Group North and 3rd Panzer Army still had
not been restored during the day.441

4th Army
Both the XI I Army Corps and the XXVI I Army Corps were
moving west (see Figure 130). The XII Corps was located in the
woods south of Pekalin at the road intersection (4 km south of
Pekalin).

Both corps after heavy battles had lost most of their

supplies and artillery.

The corps were going to advance south of

Minsk on the line Dsershinsk-Zaslaw and then turn northwest in the
direction of Wolozyn-Dubina.442

A supply drop was requested that
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night at Bridgehead Wolma where 8 fires in a square would provide
recognition for the air drop.
A message from the XXVll Corps at 1420 hrs stated:
All attempts to force a way out with our last resources
have failed. The Corps is on the defensive.443
General von Tippelskirch replied by radio at 2300 hrs to the
XXVll Army Corps:
With deep emotion and shattered by the feeling that we
can do nothing to help, your old true Comrade-in-Arms
salutes the Army. General von Tippelskirch.444
The XXXIX Panzer Corps was now 40 km southeast of Minsk
(see Figure 130).
The Soviets broke through the VI Army Corps in the evening
with 15 tanks and became entangled with Kampfgruppe Lt. General
von Bergen at Wolozyn (see Figure 130). These Soviet tanks were
repulsed after 6 were knocked out (see Figure 130).

Nevertheless,

Grodek and Wolozyn were lost on the new 4th Army front by the end
of the day.

Field Marshal Model ordered the 4th Army to assemble

for defense of the neck of land between the Naliboki woods and the
swamp terrain east of Smorgonie.445 The PanzerKorps von Saucken
(XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters, 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions)
were to attack northwest of Smorgonie to the north to repulse the
Soviets which had crossed over the Wilja river and were advancing
on Wilna (see Figure 130).446 The connection with the south wing
of the 3rd Panzer Army was to be restored.

However, The 170th

Infantry Division under Kampfgruppe von Saucken was thrown out
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of Molodeczno and Smorgonie (see Figure 130). The new defensive
line was located on the edge of the hills on both sides of Markowo.
Elements of the 221 st Security Division west of Smorgonie
repulsed a Soviet armored thrust (see Figure 130).
A conference of the surrounded 4th Army Generals was held
at 1630 hrs and attended by General Voelckers, Traut, Trowitz,
Klammt and Schuermann.447 Generals Drescher and Ochsner were
not present.

General Voelckers stated that all breakout attempts

had failed for days.
posture.

It was finally time to take a defensive

Maj. General Schuermann inquired what purpose this

measure would serve.

He asked, "Will the Corps be broken out from

outside the encirclement by German forces?" General Voelckers
responded:

"There were no available forces.

The objective was

defense against Russian pressure for 2-4 days followed by
surrender of the entire Corps. "448

Maj. General Schuermann

requested permission for his division with empty weapons to
breakout.

General Voelckers refused his request.

General

Voelckers stated:
The Russians have advanced further than 100 km to the
west, you will enter new encirclements again and
again, and in my opinion will fail to return to the
homeland. When we surrender ourselves, the chance
exists, that at least the men may save their lives.
Besides think of your wounded. In an orderly surrender
to the Russians the chance exists that they will be
provided for.449
Finally, General Voelckers departed from the conference and
Maj. General Schuermann conferred with the remaining Division

416

Commanders. He stated: "Can no commander make the best of
things. "450

Lt. General Trowitz who had previously underwent

encirclement at Tscherkassy and Maj. General Klammt agreed
immediately with the view of Maj. General Schuermann.

Lt. General

Traut, however, continued to vacillate between the breakout and
surrender.

Later, Lt.

General Traut decided in favor of the

breakout.451
The final conference of the surrounded 4th Army Generals
assembled under the direction of General Voelckers at 1900 hrs.452
There were only 4 generals at this meeting.

General Voelckers

informed them that Lt. General Drescher, Commander of the 267th
Infantry Division had just reported Russian breakthroughs on the
eastern front of the Corps in two places.

General Voelckers now

granted his permission to all the generals to breakout.453

The 4

Division Commanders agreed that each general would breakout on
his own front separately.
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division's sector during the day
had not changed.
the east.

The Soviets continued to attack from the west to

The Soviets were repulsed in hand-to-hand combat and

the last handgrenades had been used.454 There was now a shortage
of rifle ammunition with no more than 10-15 rounds per rifle.
situation was becoming critical.

The

The 25th Panzer Grenadier

Division now had 600 wounded receiving no medical care.

It was

similar for the other divisions, the 57th Infantry Division had 1000
wounded, the 260th Infantry Divisions had 800-1000 wounded. 455
Medical supplies were no longer available.

Maj. General
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Schuermann ordered a reconnaissance of the Soviet lines to
determine the position for the breakout.
Maj. General Schuermann issued the order to breakout to his
commanders at 2000 hrs.

He divided the division into 3 attack

groups:
1 . Colonel von Bergen with Grenadier Regiment 35 on
the right.
2. Maj. General Schuermann in the center with the
artillery section of the Panzer Jaeger Battalion, the
engineer battalion and elements of Grenadier Regiment
119.
3. Lt. Colonel Luik with Grenadier Regiment 119 on
the left. 456
The three groups were to be in position at Welikij-Less at midnight
for the attack.
The wounded were entrusted to the care of a doctor, who was
left in possession of a letter with an appeal to the military honor
of the Russian commander.

The artillery was destroyed once the

ammunition had been exhausted.
The objective of the attack was to reach Koidenowo
(southeast of Minsk) which was also known as Dserhinsk.

Maj.

General Schuermann proceeded to the assembly point at 2200 hrs.
The assault of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division took place at
midnight with shouts of "Hurra" and empty weapons.457

The

breakout succeeded but many wounded were left behind in the dark
during the assault.
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The other two main groups were under the command of Lt.
General Traut southeast of Volma and Lt. General Mueller east of
Volma.458

Both of these groups attempted to breakout to the west,

southwest and south toward the area of Baranovichi (see Figure
130).

The Soviet 53rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and the

50th and 49th Armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued to
surround and compress the pocket containing the German 4th
Army.459

2nd Army
Kampfgruppe Lt. General Richert (part of the LV Army Corps)
had reached the west bank of the Sslutsch coming from the area
Ssosnkowitsche.

The 292nd Infantry Division was advancing along

the rail line Luniniec-Baranowicze to restore contact to the
southern wing of Kampfgruppe Lt. General Harteneck (see Figure
133).460
Kampfqruppe General von Vormann. The Soviets broke through
the north wing of the 4th Cavalry Brigade with 10 tanks and 6 were
knocked out (see Figure 133).

The 4th Panzer Division attacking

from Snow to the southwest liquidated this breakthrough (see
Figure 133).461

Soviet forces on the north wing of Kampfgruppe

von Vormann had crossed over to the west bank of the Usza river.
Aerial reconnaissance confirmed the presence of numerous tanks.
The 28th Jaeger Division gained only limited ground against these
Soviet units (see Figure 133).

The 12th Panzer Division which had

made contact and linked up with numerous straggler units crossed
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the Niemen river at Jeremicze (see Figure 133).

Kampfgruppe von

Vormann was able to repulse Soviet breakthroughs toward
Baranowicze (see Figure 130).462

The construction of a new

defensive front behind the present front had begun.

The rebuilding

and reorganizing of smashed divisions was also in progress.
The Soviet plan of attack by using a multiple axis advance
starting with 6 major points of concentration combined with
objectives in depth had achieved an outstanding success.

Soviet

offensive operations from June 22nd to July 5th had virtually
liberated most of White Russia (see Figure 134 ).

JULY 6, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Chief of the General Staff ordered the Commandant of
"Fortress Wilna" to blow all the bridges from Niemenczyn to the
edge of the city.463

The bridges around the city still being used

were to be manned by security forces.

General Poel reported that

all bridges that lead from Wilna to the east had been destroyed
three days ago.
The 212th Infantry Division rearguards were closely engaged
by the Soviets.

Elements of the division were engaged on the east

edge of the woods 3 km east of Lentupis.

The security troops under

Soviet pressure withdrew from Lentupis (see Figure 135).

The

Soviets attacked the IX Corps in the morning in the rear of its right
wing and Kampfgruppe Corps Detachment D from the south. (see
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Figure 136).

The Soviets advancing from the area of Tverecius

attempted to outflank the north flank of 3rd Panzer Army by
thrusts from the east and north.

The Soviet forces advancing in the

south encountered only extremely weak German resistance.

The

Soviets in the north were moving along the road from in the
northeast in the direction of Svencionys (see Figure 135).

The IX

Corps was assigned the general task of providing the "defense for
Duenaburg."

Meanwhile, a 155 km hole remained between the 3rd

Panzer Army in the south and the 4th Army in the north (see Figure
136).464
The gaping hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army
created major problems for the defense of Wilna (see Figure 136).
Lt. General Krebs advised Colonel General Reinhardt that one
Valkyrie Regiment would be in Wilna today and tomorrow another
regiment and the Fuehrer Begleit Battalion would be in Wilna.
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs that 3rd
Panzer Army could only fulfill one mission, either the northern
operation with the 252nd Infantry Division or the defense of
Wilna.465

Reinhardt stated:

The notion of fortresses is pure nonsense. There are no
forces and also no suitable headquarters available for
the defense. When the Soviet main effort is on Wilna,
the 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters perceives that
establishing contact with Army Group North had greater
importance since the Army can at least go on
controlling such troops as it still possesses. 466
Lt. General Krebs informed the 3rd Panzer Army at 1040 hrs
of Field Marshal Model's decision.

The main effort of the 3rd
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Panzer Army was to be centered on Wilna.467

Panzer Platoon 21

had already arrived and was to move up in the direction of
Podbrodcie.

Elements of the 170th Infantry Division had arrived in

Wilna and were to make contact with the IX Corps to the north.
Army Group Center reported at 1045 hrs that the following
units were en route to Wilna:

Infantry Battalion 1041 in Lublin,

Valkyrie Regiment 1067 in area of Bialystok, Valkyrie Regiment
1068, Valkyrie Regiment 1069, Infantry Brigade 761 from Kauen,
and Fuehrer Begleit Battalion von Werthern which would depart
Arys on July 6, 1944.468
The 225th Infantry Division would be transported by rail and
employed on the south wing of the Panzer Army to close the hole
between the 4th Army and 3rd Panzer Army.469
Soviet forces in the wooded terrain northwest of Lentupis
advanced further to the north to the region of Paginiai (see Figure
135).

Soviet attacks east and northeast of Aduliskis suffered

heavy casualties, but forced the north wing of the Panzer Army
during the morning to be pulled back in the line AduliskisMelagenai (see Figure 135).
Colonel General Reinhardt visited the command post of
"Fortress Wilna" during the afternoon and discovered that there had
been no further reinforcement of the garrison.

Reconnaissance

reported at 1230 hrs that 8 Soviet tanks and accompanying
infantry had apparently crossed the Wilja river before the
demolition of the bridge at Mikalischki.

The inner defenses of

Wilna was organized into a series of defense positions and a main
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battle line that was weakly occupied on the northern arc and more
strongly occupied on the eastern arc.

Road obstacles were

prepared, however, there were no mines.

Railroad engineers had

prepared demolition charges at the entrances to the city.
defense was reinforced by ten 88 mm cannons.

The air

These guns would

be complemented by four full strength batteries of 88 mm guns and
a Flak Kampftruppe during the night of July 7th.

These 88 mm guns

could be used as potent anti-tank guns as well as air defense guns.
Col. General Reinhardt stressed the importance of protecting the
most important bridges to the Flak Commander.

Panzer platoon 21

was sent to reinforce the security line east of the city.

The supply

situation in the city had improved with rations for 30,000 men for
21 days stockpiled.470

Two more infantry battalions had arrived by

the end of the day in Wilna.

One battalion was deployed on the

northern sector and two battalions were kept in reserve.
Soviet pressure against the eastern front of the IX Army
Corps increased.
in Lentupis.

However, two Soviet battalions were annihilated

The motorized Army Engineer Battalion 505 with the

support of assault guns was given credit for the success of the
counterattack which retook the town.

The Commanding General of

the IX Corps reported the especially dangerous situation at
Lentupis at 1930 hrs to Col. General Reinhardt.

Corps Detachment

D was withdrawing on the rail line northeast of Lentupis (see
Figure 135).

The IX Corps was going to hold the elevated terrain 8

km southeast of Svencionys as long as possible (see Figure 135).
The 391 st Security Division had practically disintegrated. 471

The
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IX Corps reported that it disengaged from the Soviets and the right
wing of the Corps was on Soros lake in the line Perszukszta-both
sides of Svencionys-line of lakes northeast of Svencionys-and the
lake at Koncerzina (see Figure 135). This line was to be held as
long as possible to allow the 225th Infantry Division to unload its
advance elements on July 7th (see Figure 135).
The arrival of the 6th Panzer Division had been anticipated so
some of the bridges over the Wilja river had not been blown up
earlier and this represented a dangerous situation since the 6th
Panzer Division would not arrive till July 10th at which time the
bridges would h·ave to all be blown up.472

Meanwhile, the first

trains loaded with reinforcements for Wilna arrived at 1800 hrs
with elements of Infantry Brigade 761, Panzer Grenadier Brigade
von Werthern, and Valkyrie Regiments 1068 and 1069.

4th Army
There were no reports from the XI I and XXVI I Army Corps
today.473

The Soviets advanced southwest from Molodeczno and

reached the wooded terrain northwest of Wiszne.
terrain around the city was held.

The elevated

Elements of the 7th Panzer

Division were employed to hold the line here, and also attack to the
north to cut off the Soviet units which had broken through the
defense line.

The 5th Panzer Division was successful in closing

the hole south of Smurgainys by attacking east from Krewe to the
north.

Soviet attacks through Ziuprenai and deep into the flanks

forced the withdrawal of the line 11 km southeast of Krewe 9 km
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northeast of Krewe-Aschmena.

Soviet forces outflanking the 4th

Army advanced into the hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th
Army (see Figure 136).

Soviet motorized forces moved through

Smurgainys and Mykoloskis against Wilna (see Figure 136).474
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division during its successful
breakthrough ran into a hail of Soviet fire from artillery, tanks,
anti-tank guns and mortars.

Maj. General Schuermann's

Kampfgruppe burst through the Soviet lines, but out of the original
1000 men only 100 survived.475

Colonel von Bergen, Commander of

Motorized Grenadier Regiment 35 was killed in the breakout and Lt.
Colonel Luick, Commander of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119
was severely wounded and most probably taken prisoner.476

The

remnants of the division were broken down into small groups of
30-50 men.

Maj. General Schuermann's Kampfgruppe crossed the

rail line Bobruisk-Minsk with 80-90 men moving south, but after
three futile attempts no breakout was achieved.477

Maj. General

Schuermann decided to swing back around Minsk to the north and
then turned west and broke through with his dwindling detachment
north of Molodeczno and south of Wilna past Mereczsanka.478 A
difficult crossing of the Njemen river was achieved after a sharp
fight with Soviet troops for the control of a pontoon bridge.479
Finally, Maj. General Schuermann and his Kampfgruppe of 35 men
reached German lines on August 17, 1944 southeast of Sudauen. 480
Lt.

General Traut's group tried to breakthrough to Dzerzhinsk,

but was destroyed by the Soviet 49th Army of the Soviet 2nd
Belorussian Front.481

Between Minsk and Baranowitschi the
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majority of the 78th Sturm Division under the command of Lt.
General Traut had assembled in a village which had become
surrounded by Soviet infantry on all sides.

The Soviet infantry

launched a sudden attack from all sides with shouts of "Hurra" and
stormed the village killing the wounded and taking Lt General Traut
and the remaining soldiers prisoner.482

Lt. General Traut raised his

hands and surrendered according to one survivor.483
Lt. General Muellers Kampfgruppe broke through to the Ptich
river south of Minsk and attempted to seize the airfield at Ozertso
12 km southwest of Minsk but failed.
The Soviets had taken extensive measures to prevent the
infiltration of German troops to the rear and at the same time
began exploiting the newly occupied areas for military manpower.
Maj. General Schuermann was the only German General of the 4th
Army to survive and escape Soviet captivity.

He delineated the

Soviet measures he encountered in his retreat to German lines as
follows:
1. Russian hunting detachments in strengths of 3-15
men strongly armed with machine guns and machine
pistols scoured the terrain.
2. Partisans were deployed as militia in the villages
to prevent the population from helping the Germans by
strict surveillance.
3. Conscription detachments covered the land. The
men between 17 and 45 years of age were mobilized for
military service. The horses and grain were seized.
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4. Slow moving aircraft scoured the area and the
located Germans were reported by radio to hunting
detachments or combat aircraft.

5. Construction of blockade lines were organized.484

2nd Army
Kampfgruppe von Vormann.

The Soviets broke through on the

right wing of the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division on both sides of
the road to Brest-Litovsk and achieved deep breakthroughs on both
sides of Lachewicze against the 4th Cavalry Brigade.

The attack of

the 28th Jaeger Division and 12th Panzer Division in an attempt to
cut off the Soviets west of the Usza sector failed.

Kampfgruppe

von Vormann was withdrawn to the Myszanka sector (south of
Baranowicze) - east edge of Baranowicze - Cyryn Korelicze (see
Figure 136). 485

Elements of the 12th Panzer Division thrust into

the rear of the advancing Soviets from the north.

JULY?, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Wilna city defenses were attacked by two battalions of
National Polish patrisans during the early morning hours which
were repulsed (see Figure 137). The bridge at Niemenczyn was
blown up during the night by German troops.

Air force reports

observed strong Soviet reconnaissance forces moving toward Wilna
which were engaged by the Luftwaffe and 8 Soviet tanks were
destroyed (see Figure 137).

Maj. General Heidkaempfer, Chief of
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Staff 3rd Panzer Army informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff
Army Group Center of the situation.
not arrived from Army Group North.

The 225th Infantry Divison had
Lt. General Krebs assured

Heidkaempfer that a parachute regiment would be flown into Wilna
on July 8th.486

Therefore, the airport was not to be destroyed prior

to their arrival.

Maj. General Heidkaempfer requested air

reconnaissance between Wilna and the right wing of the IX Corps to
ascertain the position of Soviet forces west of Narocz lake (see
Figure 137).

The first train carrying Panzer Brigade von Werthern

arrived in Kauen at 1215 hrs.

These elements were directed to

advance through Wilkomir to Sirvintos.
The withdrawal of the IX Corps was executed according to
plan but was pursued by the Soviets on a broad front (see Figure
138).

The Soviet main effort was focused on both the main roads

leading to Svencionys and on the left flank of the 252nd Infantry
Division (see Figure 138).

The wooded terrain southeast of

Svencionys was penetrated by 600 Soviet infantry and several
tanks while German troops were still engaged north of this position
(see Figure 138).

The Soviets continued their advance to the west

along both sides of the main road east of Kukiskiai.

Maj. General

Heidkaempfer reported to Lt. General Krebs that Soviet forces were
advancing on the left wing of the IX Corps toward lgnalina and they
were encountering no German resistance (see Figure 138). 487
Therefore, the left wing of the IX Corps was open again (see Figure
138).

The Soviets were also advancing southwest of the right wing

of the IX Corps toward Podbrodzcie.
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Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs that the
Soviet 3rd Mechanized Corps with 4 brigades was prepared to
attack Wilna.

Col. General Reinhardt considered pulling back the

defense line to the west bank of the Wilja-Neris because the
terrain in this area offered better possibilities of defense since
there was a shortage of forces and supplies for the defense of
"Fortress Wilna."

Lt. General Krebs response to this proposal was

that the mission of Kampfgruppe 3rd Panzer Army remained
twofold:
1 . The containing of the Soviet advance as long as
possible.·
2. The holding of "Fortress Wilna" for the
approaching German forces.488
The 225th Infantry Division was to be employed to cover the
lakes on the right flank of the 16th Army.

In case the Soviets

occupied the rail line at lgnalina then the 225th Infantry Division
would be employed to clear the Soviets from the rail line (see
Figure 138).

The Fuehrer Begleit Battalion was to be used north of

Wilna in an eastward direction.
unloading in Kauen.

Currently, the battalion was

Lt. General Krebs assured General Poel that the

parachute regiment would arrive today in Wilna.

Maj. General

Heidkaempfer stressed the decisive importance of Army Group
North blocking the area between the Dringa Lake and Dysna lake.
The Soviets during the early afternoon pushed the German
forces back west of lgnalina and cut the crucial rail line WilnaDuenaburg (see Figure 138).489

Paluse was lost at 1500 hrs from
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an attack from the southeast (see Figure 138).

The Commandant of

Wilna was notified at 1230 hrs that the parachute regiment would
land at the airport and it was then to be deployed to the north.
Meanwhile, Grenadier Brigade 761 arrived in Wilna without its
equipment.

The airport at Wilna was to be kept open for the arrival

of the parachute regiment and then was to be blown up no later then
1600 hrs.490

The forces arriving in Wilna were concentrated into

one unit. The Parachute Regiment 16 and the 1st Parachute
Engineer Battalion of Parachute Regiment 21, Grenadier Brigade
761 and Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern were combined and
placed under the command of Lt. General Bergen of the 390th Field
Training Division.
Lt. General Krebs notified Maj. General Heidkaempfer that
Hitler had issued a "Fuehrer Befehl:
under all circumstances.

"Fortress Wilna" was to be held

The fortress must allow itself to be

encircled if necessary."491

Major General Heidkaempfer responded

to Lt. General Krebs that "the situation at Wilna was developing
exactly like Vitebsk. "492

Krebs responded that he did not believe

this was the case because "the Panzer Army was 300 km closer to
German military bases and Wilna was facing only 3 mechanized
Brigades not rifle corps and tank corps. "493
The IX Corps in its fighting withdrawal was pursued on a wide
front southwest, east and northeast of Svencionys (see Figure 138).
The Soviets in the south had reached the rail line at Podbrodszie.

Lt. General Krebs informed the Panzer Army just before
midnight that General Stahel was appointed the new Commandant of
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"Fortress Wilna."494

Major General Heidkaempfer reported that the

Soviets were already on the west bank of the Wilja river and had
blocked the arterial road to Wilkomir with anti-tank gun fire.495
Major von Werthern, Commander of the Fuehrer Begleit Battalion
could no longer get out of Wilna except through Kauen to reach the
Panzer Army Headquarters.

The Soviets had pushed their way to

within 200 meters of Wilna's eastern defense line (see Figure 139).
The anticipated parachute regiment had not arrived except for the
regimental staff and two companies.

The Soviet crossing of the

Wilja river was certainly possible because the police battalion
from Police Regiment 16 had failed to secure the area.

Anti-tank

guns, Flak Kampftruppen and two Latvian police companies were
withdrawn from the German bridgehead at Nowa Wilejka (see Figure
139).

It was hoped with these forces the Soviets could be delayed

until the last train arrived in Wilna.
before the entire front.

Soviet armor now appeared

General Poel believed that Soviet armor

had bypassed the airport and therefore it was still safe for Junker

52 aircraft to land with troops.496

Maj. General Heidkaempfer

requested to be informed immediately when the landing of Junker

52 transport aircraft was no longer possible due to Soviet
operations.497

Meanwhile, Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern

was still coming out of Wilkomir.

The Panzer Army had requested

to employ Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern on the west bank
of the Wilja river, but Hitler insisted that the brigade be placed
into "Fortress Wilna. "498
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The IX Corps would have to withdraw again to avoid being
outflanked.

The Soviets occupied lgnalina and had crossed the rail

line at Podbroczie heading west.

The new resistance line was:

Orinos Lake - length of Zeimena river and the Zeimena lake chain to
the chain of lakes west of lgnalina.

Contact with the arriving

225th Infantry Division was to be established.

4th Army
There was no radio contact from the surrounded Divisions of
the 4th Army.499

The last contact had been the messages received

on July 5, 1944.

General von Tippelskirch sent one last message to

the XII Army Corps:
Everlasting thanks for your courage and heroism.
bear fruit despite a11.soo

May it

Meanwhile; Soviet aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets on the
surrounded troops which stated:
LAST WARNING
German soldiers surrender, further resistance is
senseless. Army Group Center has been completely
destroyed, your comrades have deserted you ... Lay down
your weapons and come out of the woods in lines with
white flags.soi
The eastern front of the new 4th Army had been penetrated
northeast of Krewe and pushed back to a line 10 km west of Krewe
(see Figure 137).

The north wing of the army was forced back

through Aschema by strong Soviet reconnaissance forces.

The 4th

Army was in the process of withdrawing to a new line Surwiliszki-
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Medinikaj.

Field Marshal Model assigned the 4th Army the task of

delaying the Soviets advancing toward Wilna along the rail line
Molodeczno-Wilna by attacking with mobile forces the southern
flank of the Soviets (see Figure 137).502
Kampfgruppe Weidling holding the line with weak police
forces east of Lida was pushed back to the west by Superior Soviet
cavalry and armor forces (see Figure 137).

This made it possible

for the Soviets to breakout of the Naliboki woods.

Soviet armor

was moving along the Molodeczno-Lida rail line and had reached the
region northeast of Lipniczki (see Figure 137).

Kampfgruppe

Weidling was subsequently placed under the command of the 4th
Army at 2300 hrs.

2nd Army
The Soviet breakthrough attempt on the southern wing of
Kampfgruppe von Vormann resulted in a deep penetration on the 1st
Hungarian Cavalry Division's sector (see Figure 137).

However, the

Soviet attacks southeast of Baranowicze and on the north wing of
the Kampfgruppe were mostly beaten back (see Figure 137). The
encirclement of "Fortress Baranowicze" was prevented (see Figure
137) ,503
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JULY 8, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The Soviets closed the ring around "Fortress Wilna" which
was defended by 8 battalions (see Figure 140).504 The 5th Guards
Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps had broken through
to the city fortifications and breached them and encircled Wilna
from the north and south in cooperation with the Soviet 5th Army
(see Figure 140).505 General Stahel reported to the Command Post
of the 3rd Panzer Army for a briefing as the new Commandant of
"Fortress Wilna." The road between Wilkomir and Wilna had been
disrupted by the Soviets so General Stahel flew by Storch aircraft
into Wilna (see Figure 140). The Panzer Grenadier Brigade von
Werthern coming from Kauen reached the Army Command Post
which had taken shelter in a rail station as a result of an air
attack.

Major General Heidkaempfer informed Lt. General Krebs of

the situation at Wilna and wanted to know what forces would be
used on the front when Wilna was encircled.506

Lt. General Krebs

stated that the 131 st Infantry Division and other units would soon
be arriving. The IX Corps was to be strengthened on the southern
wing while the northern wing was left to Army Group North to
reinforce.

The 225th Infantry Division would soon be arriving on

·the southern front of the IX Corps.
The Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern was requested to
be employed up to 20 km northwest of Wilna in order to free the
west bank of the Wilja river to the north.

The Brigade was,
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however, to be based in Wilna.

The 131 st Infantry Division coming

from Grodno was to be employed upon arrival to free the area south
of Wilna.

The 5th Panzer Division was in the area 30 km southeast

of Wilna to cover the city from the south.
Soviet armor was reported entering Nowosiolki southeast of
Wilna.

Soviet armor was also reported blocking the main road

Wilna-Wilkomir by tank fire (see Figure 140).507

A report by an

officer was received at 1200 hrs that the Soviets were on the road
to Sirvintos southeast of Mejszagola (see Figure 140).

This

prompted the transfer of the 3rd Panzer Army Command Post to
Wilkomir.5os

Later in the afternoon the Command Post moved to

Gut Leonpol (4 km southwest of Wilkomir).509

Meanwhile, numerous

attacks supported by armor were repulsed on the southern and
eastern front of Wilna (see Figure 140).

A heavy engagement for

both sides of a railroad tunnel southwest of Wilna occurred.

Soviet

reconnaissance thrust through Mejszagola to the northwest pushing
back weak German forces 7 km northwest of Mejszagola.

The

Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern coming out of Wilkomir
received the order to establish a bridgehead on the south bank of
the stream northwest of Mejszagola (see Figure 140).
The Soviets pursued the withdrawal movement of the 212th
and 252nd Infantry Divisions of the IX Corps to the Zeimena sector
slowly (see Figure 141).

The 391st Security Division established a

defensive line on the right flank of the Corps.

The pressure on both

sides of Svencioneliai mounted and Maj. General Heidkaempfer
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requested Luftwaffe support (see Figure 141 ).

The Soviet 43rd

Army was responsible for the operations against the IX Corps.
The arrival of the Soviet 39th Army on the front before Wilna
was confirmed so that another 6 divisions and two tank brigades
would shortly enter the battle.

The Commandant of Wilna sent two

messages during the evening:
Heavy combat in the evening, further terrain loss,
northwest bank abandoned. Panic. The situation of the
troops for tomorrow is very grave. Thrust from
Ludwino from the east and heavy battles on the west
wing and strong Soviet forces had been detected at
Nowosiolko. A total of 18 tanks had been knocked
out.510
The second radio message followed:
Condition of the troops is so serious that disintegration
by midday tomorrow is probable. Ammunition shortage.
If remnants are to be rescued, a breakout in the
direction of the west must be authorized at 0200
hrs.511

4th Army
Kampfgruppe General Weidling pulled its right wing back to
NowoGrodek and Usielub (see Figure 142).

Soviet attacks forced a

further withdrawal to the west to Molczadz and the Nieman river.
Strong Soviet cavalry forces breached the thin German security line
and Soviet armor entered Lida (see Figure 142).512 The rail line to
Wilna north of the city had been crossed by Soviet forces moving
west (see Figure 142).
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Kampfgruppe Mueller during the night of July 8, 1944
attempted to breakout across the Ptich river in the region of
Samokhvalovichi.

The Soviet 121 st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army

defeated Kampfgruppe Mueller decisively.513

Lt. General Mueller

surrendered and made the following statement during interrogation
by the Soviets:
Our position had become intolerable. We found
ourselves isolated. We had born enormous losses.
Thousands of soldiers had been wounded. They were
left without attention of any kind, since there was no
possibility of helping them. Everyone was starving.514
Lt. General Mueller accepted the Soviet terms of surrender
and on July 8, 1944 issued the following order:
To the soldiers of the 4th Army located east of the
Ptich River!
After a week of heavy fighting and marches our position
has become hopeless ... Our fighting ability has fallen to
the minimum, and there is no hope of supplies. The
Russians, according to information from the High
Command, are at the city of Baranovic hi. The last
paths ... have been cut off to us. There is no hope of
breaking out of here with our forces and equipment. our
formations are scattered in disorder. A Colossal
number of wounded have been abandoned without any
aid. Having been given further information about the
terms of capitulation proposed by the Soviet command
group, Gen. Mueller gave the order to "cease fighting
immediately. "515
Thus, the mass surrender of the remnants of the German 4th
Army began.
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2nd Army
Kampfgruppe von Vormann.

The main battle line was broken

in several places by Soviet attacks.

The Soviet 28th and 65th

Armies reinforced their attack on Baranowicze with the 4th Guards
Cavalry Corps and the 9th Tank Corps from the north. The 4th
Guards Rifle Corps and the 1st Guards Tank Corps were employed in
the south against Baranowicze.

This added reinforcement allowed

the Soviets to take Baranowicze (see Figure 142).

The attack on

both sides of Baranowicze from the north and south broke through
permitting the city to be taken by a frontal assault in the early
hours of July 8, 1944 (see Figure 142).516 The Soviets breached the
front of the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division and reached the rail
station Lesna and the road to Slonim northwest of the rail station.
The Soviets occupied Nowa Mysz west of Baranowicze (see Figure
142).

The 28th Jaeger Division northwest of Baranowicze resisting

the Soviet attack suffered the loss of 1 infantry and 1 artillery
battalion which were cutoff from the rest of the division.511

The

Soviets reached Dworzec and crossed the Molczadz river to the
west.

The 12th Panzer Division was withdrawing from the area

southwest of Nowogrodek and advancing from the northwest on
Dworzec.
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July 9, 1944

3rd Panzer Army
The 3rd Panzer Army informed Army Group Center that the
only way to stabilize the 3rd Panzer Army front was to expedite
the closing of the hole between 3rd Panzer Army and the 16th
Army.51s

The Panzer Army required more than the 225th Infantry

Division to close the hole north of Wilna.

One infantry Division and

one Panzer division were needed in addition to close the gap.519
The Commandant of Wilna had proposed to breakout, but
Hitler's orders to hold Wilna under all circumstances was received
at 0230 hrs.520
relieve Wilna.

Everything was being done in the way of attacks to
Maj. General Heidkaempfer noted that Wilna was in

danger of encirclement from the northwest and the southwest (see
Figure 142).

An attack by the Fuehrer Escort Battalion was not

possible since it was already under attack.

An attack toward Wilna

would only be possible by units arriving from the west.
Colonel General Reinhardt spoke to Field Marshal Model
concerning the Fuehrer's decision.

Reinhardt stressed, "that it was

insanity to give troops the order to hold when they can not hold at
all. "521

Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff of Army Group Center

called Col. General Reinhardt after Reinhardt's conversation with
Field Marshal Model and explained the Fuehrer's decision to him.
The order to hold Wilna had been transmitted at 0200 hrs by Army
Group Center directly to General Stahel in Wilna.

The Luftwaffe
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received the mission to support the battle at Wilna.

Col. General

Reinhardt responded:
that the decision to hold the fortress would create a
new hole which the army could not plug because the
army has no more forces. It is too bad for the troops in
Wilna. The command of the Army is placed in question
through this order.522
Army Group Center awaited a new decision of the Fuehrer
which was expected during the afternoon.

Col. General Reinhardt

noted that this appeared "too late" for the case of Wilna.523

The

Soviets during the night forced the garrison of Wilna back to the
general line of the south edge of the rail station to directly east of
the eastern entrance - cathedral square - south bank of the Wilja
river.

The main battle line in the western sector northwest of the

rail station remained under German control (see Figure 143).
Meanwhile, Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern had since
0545 hrs been attacking Mejszagola (see Figure 143).

Soviet

resistance was broken and reconnaissance was dispatched from
Mejszagola to the south and east (see figure 143).
Kampfgruppe T olsdorf reported at 0940 hrs that the Soviets
had reached the western exit of Wilna and further strong elements
were in Ludwinowo and east of it (see Figure 143).

Lt. Colonel

Tolsdorf reported that he could not attack because there were no
available heavy weapons and artillery.

Therefore, the following

order was issued:
The Kampfgruppe will take the defensive and defend the
presently held Waka sector between Landwarow-Gorale
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to the junction with the Wilja river. Reconnaissance is
to be conducted to the southeast up to the bend in the
river. All arriving elements are upon arrival to be
placed under the command of Lt. Colonel Tolsdorf. All
bridges are to be blown up as possible so long as
explosives are available.524
The Soviets during the course of the day closed the ring
tighter around "Fortress Wilna." (see Figure 143).

The German

attack from the west toward Wilna failed due to the shortage of
anti-tank weapons.525

Strong Soviet forces advanced south of

Wilna to the west and reached the stream sector of Landwarow and
occupied Gorale and the rail line to the southeast (see Figure 143).
Maj. General Heidkaempfer reported that aerial reconnaissance had
observed a Soviet column on the road from Wilna to the southwest
containing 28 trucks, 2 tanks and a recon car.
The Soviets attacked "Fortress Wilna" during the evening from
the southeast and east with infantry and armor.

The Soviets

succeeded in breaking through several German positions and
infiltrated the inner city (see Figure 143).526

Violent battles

continued throughout the city leaving it in flames in several places
as a direct result of artillery fire.
destroyed.

12 Soviet tanks had been

Air supply of Wilna was in operation, but General Stahel

notified 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters at 2000 hrs that a spotlight
could not be used to identify the place for the supply drops at night
since the city was burning.

Soviet fighter aircraft covered the

entire battle area and the Soviet Flak defense southeast of the city
was active.

The Soviets had managed to settle into many parts of

the city and interfere with German movement by 2320 hrs.527
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German Flak Battalion 296 had proven successful in knocking out
Soviet tanks during the fighting which had proved decisive for the
entire garrison of the fortress.528

Three Soviet tanks entered the

rail strongpoint of Stare Troki west of Wilna.

The Soviets

northwest of Wilna had reached the north bank of the Wilja river in
the woods 4 km northeast of Nykonty.
The relief effort for Wilna was being assembled in Kauen
north of the rail line and elements of the 6th Panzer Division
including a panther tank battalion had arrived by evening.529

The

69th and 93th Infantry Divisions along with a parachute battalion
would be assembled at Kauen shortly.

This attack group forming in

the area Kauen-Jonawa-Wilkomir was assigned the task of
restoring contact with "Fortress Wilna" and the south wing of the
IX Army Corps. The mobile forces of the group would be employed
to delay the advance of the Soviets in the area around and north of
Wilna.
IX Army Corps. The commanding general of IX Corps informed
Col. General Reinhardt that the troops holding the line on the
outermost left flank had experienced a rupture of their front.

The

Soviets were advancing on Sela and were already further west and
south of Tauragnai lake. Col. General Reinhardt gave the IX Corps
Commander freedom to withdraw to the line Orinos lake-Lakajai
lake-east of Labanoras-to the eastern tip of Alsetos lake.

The IX

Corps was to maintain contact with the 391 st Security Division on
its right and on the left contact with Taurignai lake.

Soviet

spearheads were reported at 1030 hrs on the highway before Utena.
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Army Group North was sending assault guns to clear the
Duenaburg-Utena road.

Soviet pressure on the German defense of

the rail line on both sides of Svencioneliai increased (see Figure
141 ).

The 225th Infantry Division was now in action and the

Soviets had been forced out of Garniai to Juknenai.

The division

was clearing the road to the southeast and in the direction of
Utena.

Army Group North reported that the 225th Infantry Division

had retaken Tauragnai during the evening.

However, a hole between

the left wing of the 252nd Infantry Division 7 km southwest of
Tauragnai and Tauragnai lake remained open.

Colonel Praefke, Chief

of Staff of IX Corps informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army
Group Center that the attack to the east from the north bank of
Tauragnai lake by the attack group of the II Army Corps of Army
Group North would widen the gap between the 16th Army and
elements of the 3rd Panzer Army since the Soviets were advancing
west on the south side of Taupagnai.
Utena were occurring.
northeast of Utena.

Combat engagements near

The 225th Infantry Division was fighting

Army Group North continued to be assigned the

task of making contact with the 3rd Panzer Army's north wing.sJo
This contact was to be made at a small lake near lndibakiai.

4th Army
Kampfgruppe Weidling on the right wing of the 4th Army was
withdrawn to a new position southwest and west of Lida.

The 4th

Army front by the evening ran from south of Jasiunai 8 km east of
Salcininkavi to Devyanishkes with a mobile defense north and east
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of Voronovo.

Key divisions of the 4th Army had been greatly

reduced in strength by continuous action.

The following divisional

strengths of anti-tank guns and tanks were reported for July 9,
1944:
5th Panzer Division:
Panthers
guns

6 Panzerkampfwagen IV
12 Panzerkampfwagen V
6 towed heavy anti-tank
6 self-propelled anti-tank guns

7th Panzer Division:

170th Infantry Division:

26 Panzerkampfwagen IV
6 Sturmgeschuetz (assault guns)
20 heavy anti-tank guns
13 heavy (88 mm) anti-tank guns
6 towed heavy anti-tank guns

The 170th Infantry Division was no longer capable of
defensive operation.531

The 50th Infantry Division with 6

battalions had taken over the southern defensive sector of the 4th
Army.

The 4th Army had lost by July 10, 1944 130,000 out of an

original strength of 165,000 men which meant that 78% of the old
4th Army had been lost.532
The remnants of the old 4th Army had been routed and only
small isolated groups of desperate German soldiers attempting to
reach German lines in the west remained and of these troops only
80 officers and 838 soldiers returned to German lines.533

The

Commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front assigned the 49th Army to
liquidate the remnants of the encircled German forces.

The 38th

Rifle Corps was given the specific task to comb the terrain east of
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the Ptich river to mop up the isolated small pockets of German
troops.
The tragic fate of the German 4th Army was marked by a
short message from the Fuehrer which was transmitted to the
armies of Army Group Center by Field Marshal Model:
The Fuehrer in conference with me today expressed his
satisfaction with the conduct of the troops of the Army
Group which have been involved in the heavy battles of
the last few days. Reinforcements will be arriving.
With them we must successfully accomplish the tasks
set us.534

2nd Army
Kampfgruppe von Vormann.

The troops were exhausted from

the previous day's engagements and could not hold the defensive
line east of Slonim any longer (see Figure 144).

They were

withdrawn under constant Soviet pressure to the west bank of the
Szczara.

The 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions withdrawal progressed

as planned (see Figure 144). The 28th Jaeger Division was locked
in heavy combat with the Soviets northeast of Slonim (see Figure
144).

Elements of the 4th Panzer Division attacked from Slonim to

the northeast to provide some relief.535

The Soviets with weak

forces had already forced a crossing over the Szczara 15 km north
of Slonim (see Figure 144).
counter this penetration.

German local reserves were rushed to

